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The Ethical ?Consciousness 
The growth of the ethical consciousness in the individual 
has not been adequately studied by the psychologists. The 
question has indeed attracted the attention of several writers 
but the treatment of it has been on the whole unsatisfactory. 
For this there are several reasons. In some cases the 
problem has been examined in a more or less incidental way 
in connection with the discussion of some special theory or 
theories. The problem is too comprehensive, however, to admit 
of being adequately treated in this way. Where it has 
been more directly attacked, two things have detracted from the 
value of the discussion. Either the writer has failed to 
preface his genetic account with an analysis of the developed 
ethical consciousness or, where such an analysis has been offered, 
the view adopted of that consciousness has been too narrow to 
enable one to see the genetic problems in their true focus. 
In the former case, where no analysis is given, the writer either 
assumes that the ethical consciousness is too familiar a fact 
to require elaborate analysis; or he considers that this analysis 
has been sufficiently carried out by the philosophers who have 
made Ethics their special province. The history of ethical theory 
from Socrates onwards, is a standing refutation of the notion 
that we can safely dispense with the analysis in question. 
It can be said, on the contrary, that there is no question 
of general philosophic interest that makes a severer demand on 
the resources of the psychologist. 
When the writer, again, simply leaves the genetic student 
to garner from general ethical theory his ideas as to what 
is involved in the developed ethical consciousness, another diffi- 
culty presents itself. This is the difficulty of focussing the 
broad and largely non -controversial questions that primarily 
concern the geneticist. In ethical theory as such, where the writer's 
interest is not in some special problem such as our present one, 
the natural tendency is to concentrate on certain problems of a 
more fundamental character; such, for example, as lie at the root 
of the rival ethical systems of Hedonism, Eudaimonism, Intuitionism 
and Rationalism. The final settlement of these more basic 
controversies is fortunately not a necessary preliminary to such an 
account of the developed ethical consciousness as will set the 
genetic psychology of ethics its task. Moreover, preoccupation with 
such questions tends to foster a somewhat abstract and artificial 
view of the ethical consciousness itself. 
The second kind of defect which we have mentioned is that 
which results from a narrowing of the sphere of action with which 
ethi¡s is supposed to be principally concerned. It is not uncommon, 
for instance, to find ethical growth described and explained as the 
process of 'socialisation', and this term is then interpreted in too 
narrow a sense, unless indeed it is understood in so wide a sense 
that it becomes too vague to be helpful. The view adopted for 
the purposes of the present essay seeks to avoid any narrowing 
of the so- called sphere of ethics and at the same time aims to do 
justice to the actual concreteness of content found in the ethical 
consciousness. If our view as to the nature of the problem 
of ethical growth be questioned, our answer is, that not 
only can such a view as the one we advocate be justified 
by a consideration of the actual questions that have engaged the 
attention of the ethical thinkers, but that it is the only 
satisfactory view where the interest is primarily genetic. It pre- 
sents the problem in its true focus, indicates where and how 
results of ethical significance in the education of the individual 
are secured, and avoids that one -sidedness of emphasis or barren 
(3) 
generality of treatment which has seriously detracted from the value of 
most discussions of this problem. It may be stated here that this result 
is in the main secured by broadening the concept of 'ethical' 
good in such a way as to make it in a certain sense inclusive of 
other non -moral values, such as the values of science and art. The 
precise relation of the ethical good to these other goods will be 
examined and a general justification of the broader concept of 
the ethicdl. 1l be offered. To this part of our task we may now 
proceed. 
An analysis of the developed ethical consciousness involves, 
to begin with, the examination of the different uses of the terms 
'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong'. To say that this 
consciousness is developed is tantamount to saying that the 
individual's gay of living reflects the true meaning of these 
categories. As Socrates clearly saw, it does not necessarily 
follow that he can give a reasoned and consistent account of 
them. There are excellent reasons, as we shall see, why, as a 
rule, he cannot do this. Nevertheless, it is necessary, if we 
are to appreciate the real nature of the ethical consciousness, 
to isolate the universal elements in the correct particular 
judgments which right conduct implies. 
Now, of these notions, the most fundamental appears to be 
the notion of 'good'. The view taken here asserts both the 
logical and the psychological priority of this notion. We shall 
therefore begin with an analysis of this concept. The difficulty 
this meets us at the outset is precisely that which engaged the 
attention of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, namely, that of 
distinguishing the derivative, secondary senses of the term 
from its fundamental and primary sense. Ordinarily, we talk of 
a good wine, a good dinner, a good horse, a good book, a good man; 
(4) 
and it is interesting to remember that this diversity in the,SL- 
e of the term (good) is reflected historically in ethical theory 
in a variety of versions of the ethical end. 
îïuch of the confusion with regard to the connotatinn of this 
term is due to a failure to distinguish sharply between two 
very different senses in which we may say it is primary and 
fundamental, namely, the psychological sense and the ethical 
sense. We may well say, for example, that the ultimate sense of 
the term is a purely psychological one. In this sense it has no 
meaning that we could call ethical, and yet we may quite 
legitimately speak of a fundamental ethical sense of the term. 
We then have in view a derived or later meaning in which 
we can detect, for the first time, an ethical import. 
This would represent its primary ethical sense. 
The fundamental meaning of 'good' is 'satisfying'. The object -- 
or situation which is good is one which confers satisfaction. 
This may appear vague or, rather, clear only in so far as it is 
tautological. As it stands(and it has too often been left 
standing at this) it is open to this charge. But the further 
step of giving psychological content to the term satisfaction 
(content which does not involve us in a circle) proves that it 
is not only not tautological but that it is the only correct 
way to describe a certain purely psychological fact or 
situation to which all the different meanings which we come 
to attach to this term can, in the last analysis, be traced. 
What then do we mean by the 'satisfying'? It means that 
object or situation which is appropriate to an impulse or 
need in the sense that it naturally brings this impulse to an 
end. Nothing is intruded into the argument by the terms 
'appropriate' or 'naturally'. We begin, at the lowest terms, with 
(5) 
an organism and its environment. The organism is in a state of 
greater or less adjustment. Maladjustment announces itself in 
the organism in the form of felt need or what for the present 
we shall broadly call impulse. All that is implied by 
an object 'appropriate' to an impulse is the broad correspondence 
between organism and environment which means that the existence 
of an impulse implies the existence of an object which will 
satisfy that impulse; all that is meant by bringing the impulse to 
an end 'naturally' is the adjustment which such an object 
secures, as contrasted, for example, with the 'unnatural' 
termination of the impulse as the result of persistent and 
effective thwarting of it. 'Good', then, as applied to the 
object or situation means that it is appropriate in this 
sense; as applied to the experience, it means simply the 
fact of adjustment itself. We have, in a purely 
psychological concept applicable to all organisms as such. 
But we hope to shew that the meaning of good is not 
radically changed when it comes to have ethical import, that 
it still retains this identical core of meaning. Further, we 
cannot lose sight of this purely psychological situation 
without creating a serious hiatus in our ethical thinking. 
A critic might remark at this point that we are merely, in 
a roundabout way, identifying the 'good` with the 'pleasant'. 
While a full discussion of hedonism, psychological or ethical, 
would be out of place here, it is perhaps important that we 
should refer to certain psychological considerations with regard 
to pleasure. formally, pleasure is the accompaniment of successful 
activity; and successful activity would ultimately mean adjustive 
activity. it is the index in consciousness of an activity which 
furthers the life of the organism. Moreover, in the case of 
(6) 
a highly specialised organism, such as the human, a distinction 
can be drawn between the pleasure which is the accompaniment 
of successful activity and the pleasure which results from 
the stimulation of specialised bodily organs such as the 
organs of sense. it is the natural supposition that the 
distinction is an incident of the evolution of the organism, 
and that in more rudimentary forms of organic life the 
distinction does not exist. Further, with the highly developed 
organism, where the distinction exists, it is reasonable to 
admit that the feeling in each case, strictly qua feeling, is 
the same(that is, if by an abstraction we think of it apart from 
the cognitive and conative elements of the situation) and yet 
on the other hand to give full weight to the consideration 
that, qua total experiences, the two situations may well present 
radical differences from the standpoint of their significance 
for the life of the organism. Lastly, we would refer to the 
importance for ethics of certain direct and immediate effects 
of pleasure for which there is experimental evidence - effects 
which we may describe generally as a temporary stimulation 
of organic processes or heightening of organic `tone'. The 
point is important as it seems to furnish a reasonable psychological 
basis for the admission of pleasure as one among the goods or 
values which will presently engage our attention. 
These considerations with regard to pleasure enable 
us to make the following statements, which follow from our view 
of the meaning of good as described above. (1) The husteron 
proteron of psychological hedonism is clearly brought out - the 
thing normally desired is the object itself, whatever it happens 
to be, and not the pleasure incidental to the realisation of 
the object. The fallacies in the theories that seek to base a 
(7) 
hedonistic view of the good on ultimate psychological facts 
have been already sufficiently exposed by those writers who 
have examined the general psychological basis of ethics and 
that question need not detain us here. (2`) It is left open to us 
to say that in certain cases, as perhaps in the case of the parental 
impulse to protect the young, even the existence of this 
incidental pleasure may be questioned. (3) It is reasonable 
to assert a broad,general correspondence between pleasure on the 
one hand and, on the other, those activities that make for ad- 
justment or satisfaction in the sense of that fuller, more 
complete life in which we would find the real meaning of the 
term 'Happiness') as well as the ultimate meaning of 'goodness'; 
while at the same time an attempt at anything in the nature 
of an exact quantitative statement is out of the question. 
This account of the relation between goodness and pleasure 
is admittedly rather vague or, at least, non -committal but 
the history of ethical speculation seems to suggest that 
this is perhaps about all that can be said with confidence 
on the problem - at least on purely empirical grounds. We 
may add here that we shall have occasion to examine 
later an interesting genetic question with regard 
to hedonism, namely, the question as to the psychological 
influences that lead the individual practically to adopt 
such a view or, in other words, to live a life which 
implies iti) 
So far we have given to the notion of good an essentially 
objective meaning, but at the same time a meaning 
which has yet no ethical implication. Under what conditions 
does "good" come to acquire an ethical significance, however 
(1) see fl) 270 --2744 
(8) 
rudimentary? What is the fundamental ethical, as distinct from 
psychological sense of the term? To answer this question we 
note in the first place the existence in the organism of a 
multiplicity of impulses, each terminating in or pointing to 
its own satisfying object or good. It is clear, then, that there 
is the possibility of a conflict - a conflict which viewed from the 
side of the organism, is a conflict of impulses, and, from the 
side of the objects, is a conflict of 'goods' or aims. We need 
not labour the familiar notion of impulses which are either 
mutually incompatible or which in a lesser degree tend to 
impede one another. The outcome of such a conflict is some 
kind of organisation of the impulsive life; it is saying the 
same thing from another point of view if we call it an 
organisation of objects on the basis of degrees of attractiveness. 
Now, it is in connection with this organisation that the ethical 
meaning begins to show itself. A fundamental distinction, however, 
must be drawn here. As regards the emergence of the ethical 
meaning, the essential question concerns the manner in which 
this organisation takes place. It may be purely the result of 
organic memory. This would mean that past experience is available 
only in the sense that response to the present stimulus or 
situation is modified by the persisting physical effects of 
previous stimuli. This is the kind of organisation which we 
have in view when we talk of the training or 'education' of 
animals. Here we are still on a level w rich is non -ethical. 
But a factor may appear which opens up new vistas of adaptive 
behaviour. This is the factor of Representation. Representation, 
imagination, ideation (as it has been variously and loosely termed), 
the power of imaging objects or situations in the absence of their 
presentation in sense -experience, is the necessary condition of 
(9) 
that organisation which hasethical import. The conflict of 
impulses or goods in this case assumes a different character. 
The object that promises satisfaction is judged, more or less 
explicitly, in the light of a previous experience represented 
in consciousness. Further, the same power increases indefinitely 
the possibility of comparison and contrast of objects in 
respect of the satisfactions they promise. In the sequel 
we hope to show in a more exact way, how closely the ethical 
growth of the individual is bound up with the development of 
this representative activity. here we would insist that the 
existence in consciousness of a previous experience in the form 
of representation and the modification of reaction in the light 
of it (carried out of course with any degree, from the lowest to 
the highest, of deliberation or 'awareness') is the first appear- 
ance of what later becomes the consistent determination of conduct 
by general rules, laws or principles. In the individual's 
development, behaviour comes for the first time within the sphere 
of Ethics in the sense that for the first time it has ethical 
import or significance when the presented or represented object 
which offers satisfaction to impulse, is modified in respect 
of its satisfying quality by another object more or less 
clearly represented in consciousness, and when consequently 
the impulse itself is modified by such representation. 
The analysis offered here agrees in several important 
particulars with that which we find in Taylor's 'Problem of 
(1) 
Conduct' but on the essential question as to what constitutes 
the simplest form of ethical situation we find ourselves at 
variance with him. Taylor finds the ultimate ethical fact in 
the 'simple sentiments' of approval and disapproval, approbation 
(1) PP 108-109 
(10) 
(1) 
and disapprobation. Of them he says: "Approval and disapproval 
belong to a more developed and reflective type of mental life 
than the simpler experiences of pleasure and pain; they imply the 
possession of "representative" mental images or "frees' ideas. 
Approbation implies pleasure arising from the contemplation of 
some experience belonging to the past or the expectation of some 
experience awaited in the future; disapprobation, similarly, 
implies pain arising from similar sources. It is not, even 
in the simpler cases the immediately present of which we approve 
or disapprove but the immediately past or the momentarily ex- 
pected. In the simplest form to "approve" our present state is to con- 
template its continuance with pleasure; to disapprove it is to view 
its continuance with displeasure ". Now this description of the 
approval -attitude agrees with our account of the ultimate 
psychological meaning of 'good' with the reservation, however, 
that we cannot accept the statement that the attitude is 
necessarily concerned with either past or future and not with 
present experience. The approval- experience does not seem 
necessarily to imply the possession of "representative " mental 
images or "free " ideas. The sight of food by a hungry dog 
would seem to represent in all essentials the same situation. 
We agree, of course, with the importance Taylor attaches here 
and elsewhere to the power of representation, but our position 
is that such representation is not necessary for the experience 
of approval, but that it is necessary in the case of an approval 
which has ethical significance, however rudimentary. Taylor 
again says: "Wherever you get the comparison of an idea with 
present reality, if the idea is condemned as nugatory, you have 
the beginning of science; if the reality is condemned as falling 
short of the idea you have the beginnings of morality. As 
(1) PP 108 -109 
(n) 
science begins in disappointed expectation, so morality 
(1) 
begins in dissatisfaction." This statement is more adequate, as 
it suggests the comparison of object with object and the result- 
ing modification or regulation of impulse - the situation in 
which we have found the primary fact of ethical development. 
Hobhouse,in his essay on the "Rational Good', similarly tries 
to reduce the notion of good to its simplest terms and arrives 
at a conclusion substantially identical with that outlined above. 
Take this sentence, for example : "! judgment of the form, 'this 
is good' is an assertion but something more than an assertion. 
Unless qualified by some saving clause that makes it "good for 
someone else but not for me ", "good from your point of view 
but from mine ", it is the expression of a practical attitude 
or disposition. It is an acceptance of something propounded 
to the mind, an acceptance which may be expressed in the most 
general terms by saying that something fits in or harmonises 
(2) 
with a mental disposition." The only difference between this 
account of the judgment: 'this is good' and the analysis we have 
offered is a difference of terminology. Hobhouse's notion of 
the expression of a practical attitude or disposition is con- 
veyed in our account by the idea of that 'correspondence' 
between object and impulse which we have in view when we say 
that the impulse finds satisfaction in the attainment of that 
object. We have avoided at this stage the use of the term 
'mental disposition'(a term which has fallen into disrepute, 
perhaps not altogether deserved) because we have been 
occupied with the most elementary fact of the relation of a 
particular impulse to a particular object or situation, which 
(1) Ibid p. 109 
The Rational Good: p.67. C.f also Dewey:,Experimental 
Logic: pp 351 -354. 
(12) 
in the last analysis seems to be the psychological fact - a fact of 
structure - implied in the phrase 'disposition'. Further, just 
because we have been dealing with the most elementary form of the 
'good' experience, the conative aspect implied in the phrase 'practi- 
cal attitude or disposition' has been emphasised more than the 
cognitive aspect in virtue of which the judgment is "an assertion 
of a fact ". So far are we from minimising the importance of this 
latter element in the light of subsequent developement that in the 
sequel we shall find it necessary to protest at some length against 
recent tendencies in psychology to belittle its importance if not 
even actually to leave it out of the reckoning. 
Again, we find this statement which is clearly explicable 
on our view. "Whether we think of the judgment 'this is good' 
as an assertion or as the expression of an impulse feeling, 
it must, to be rational, have a ground and the ground must 
be universal. The end or act or feeling that is good as such 
must be good wherever and in whomsoever found and that which 
is good under given conditions must be good wherever these 
(1) 
conditions obtain ". On our view this universal element, in 
virtue of which the judgment remains true "wherever these con- 
ditions obtain" would be accounted for by saying that in so far as 
the particular impulse has not been fundamentally modified by 
experience, it will continue to find setisf ction in its 
special object or situation. The judgment 'this is good' expresses 
a relation which holds universally wherever this impulse 
and this object are found. 
Summing up.we would express the ethical situation as that 
of the pursuit of certain special objects or ends which promise 
satisfaction to the felt needs or impulses of the individual and 
the realisation of which involves more perfect adjustment and the 
(i) Ibid r.78 
1 
(1J) 
consequent achievement of a more complete exercise of function, 
a fuller measure of life. On the subjective side it involves a 
twofold process of repression and development, on the one hand 
the process of inhibiting and modifying, on the other that of 
broadening, deepening and redirecting the needs or impulses of 
the individual, and thus it results in an organisation or 
systematisation of the life of impulse, which we may as 
an inner adjustment proceeding pari passu with the adrjustment 
to the outer objects or situations which the environment presents. 
In the language of hobhouse, the process would "involve a double' 
-harmony of the mind with itself and harmony of the mind with the 
world, and in both relations the mind has to bend and be bent 
(1) 
in order to attain its good." The ethical situation, reduced to 
its lowest terms, would reveal the representative activity 
of the mind functioning to secure the comparison of one good 
with another, the choice of one good in preference to another 
and the inevitable modification of impulse itself which such a 
choice involves. At all levels of ethical behaviour, from the 
lowest to the highest, this core of meaning persists, and re- 
presents the ultimate consideration that constitutes the act a 
legitimate object of ethical judgment. 
We may anticipate at this point the objection, if it can 
be considered an objection, that the terms 'adjustment', 'harmony' 
'satisfaction' indicate the identification of the 'good' with the 
'useful'. Now, it would seem almost desirable to rule the term 
'Useful' out of court in any discussion of the ethical problem. 
Its introduction seems to be due to a confusion of thought. The 
term 'useful' implies a very definite distinction between means 
and end which does not hold in the field of ethics) not at least 
on our interpretation of the ethical facts. The object of which 
(1)The Rational úood r.80. 
(14) 
we predicate 'good` in the above sense is not strictly a means to 
anything beyond itself, to any final or ultimate good which the 
individual is striving to attain. It means simply a partial real- 
isation of such a good. The distinction is one of whole and 
(l' 
part and not one of end and means . In the second place, it may 
be pointed out that inetrict biological sense of the term 
'useful`(i.e. conducive to the actual physical preservation of 
the organism or the species) we certainly do not assert an 
identity between the useful and the good. The next chapter will 
make it clear that the activities in which the ethically 
developed individual seeks to find his good or satisfaction are 
such as to make possible a considerable degree of divergence 
of the good from the biologically useful. 
So far we have described the form of the ethical life. 
it is a life directed to certain ends or objects which are preferred 
to other ends or objects because they are in a fuller degree 
satisfying or good. It remains now to give content to this form. 
We begin this part of our task by asking the question: What, 
then, in the concrete, are these ends or objects which are valued 
as good? The answer to this question, which will occupy us in 
the next chapter, will incidentally reveal the actt}.al richness of 
content of the developed ethical consciousness. 
(1) c.f. the following: "Our duty is merely that which will be 
a means to the best possible The only fundamental dis- 
tinction is between what is good in itself and what is good as 
a means, the latter of which implies the former." (G.E. Moore, 
Princip is "Ethica, pp.167,168.) A careful examination of this 
"fundamental" distinction will, we believe, shew that it 
refuses to work as a fundamental distinction, and that it 
reduces itself to the kind of distinction drawn in the text. 
(15) 
CRAFTER II 
The developed ethical consciousness, as we conceive it, presents 
a rich variety of content. It reveals the existence of a number 
of goods or satisfying activities each of which has at least a 
prima facie claim to equal consideration with the others. The 
first fact to be noted is that the satisfaction, the nature of 
which we desire to investigate, is the satisfaction of, a human being. 
Aong the activities of which the human being is capable there are 
some that he shares with species lower than himself. The satis- 
faction of the appetites such as hunger, thirst, sex, represents a 
class of goods which leads us to attach a very definite and con- 
crete significance to Spinoza's "homo pars naturae." Now, it is 
clear that in his quest of the good, of those activities that are 
to afford the maximum satisfaction, the individual is not thrown 
on his own resources. The general route has been already mapped 
out by what we may call the consciousness of mankind meaning by 
that the race experience in so far as it is mirrored in the social 
group or, more broadly, in the civilisation with which he is 
identified. He comes to realise that the good must represent a 
distinctively human satisfaction or e_rcellence, that a higher 
value att_z.ches to the peculiarly human activities. He is not 
left, however, to make this discovery for himself; for this general 
estimate of the worth of satisfactions is the contribution of the race 
experience to the solution of his problem - a contribution trans- 
mitted by'social' heredity. We are not at present attempting to 
gauge the truth or error of the estimate; we are merely insisting 
that as a matter of face it exists. 
These distinctively human pursuits, which commend themselves 
to the developed ethical consciousness as good, are represented by 
the so- called human values which we may enumerate and classify as 
follows: (1) The scientific value, (2) The artistic or aesthetic 
value ,) 3) The religious value , (4) The Philosophic value, (5) The 
(16) 
social values (including moral values,. in the narrower sense to 
be presently explained, (6) political values, (7) economic values. 
We have said that the ground of his faith in these values 
is largely to be found in authority and we shall return to this 
statement in connection with the problem of Duty or Obligation. 
In the meantime we have to mention the further basis of belief, 
namely, that his own experience, in so far as ethical development 
has proceeded, tends to substantiate and confirm this deliverance 
of authority. Mere subservience to authority as such is an 
attitude foreign to the ethical consciousness. 
According to the ultimate meaning which we attach to ethics, 
the fundamental significance of these activities is ethical,- ethical 
in the sense that they represent, in their own fields and according 
to their methods, a contribution towards. such a synthesis of the 
elements of experience as will result in the final harmony, that 
satisfying completeness of life, however we may phrase it, which is 
what we must ultimately mean by the ethical ideal. The dumb striving 
of Humanity towards the realisation and satisfying exercise of its 
vital powers has achieved a measure of articulation in these values. 
Hobhouse says that " the Practical Reason is the effort of the mind 
towards harmony with itself and with nature. This harmony the 
mind does not find but creates or, rather, let us say that it 
finds it in dying cadences and catches of which it seeks to make a 
(1) 
music universal.'' And from our point of view these values may 
well be considered the "cadences and catches" of that final harmony 
of the mind "with itself and with nature" which is the consummation 
of human striving. 
We may sum up the situation so far as follows: (1) These 
activities or pursuits which we have classified as the human 
(1) The ietional Good: p.81 
(17) 
values represent the 'appropriate objects ' which we have found to 
be implied in the predicate 'good'. They furnish therefore the 
content of which the concept of satisfaction or harmony expresses 
the form. 
(2) The matured ethical consciousness is most concretely 
described as a certain attitude to these values. It is the attitude 
indicated by the fact that in his deepest volition the individual 
wills these activities, that he believes in their capacity to confer 
the truest satisfaction, in short, that he accepts them for what 
they are, namely, the permanent values of human life. Hence, a certain 
attitude to life as a whole, defining and particularising itself 
in the relation of the will to these values, would represent in 
the concrete the meaning of "the good will'. In this sense the good c P 
would be the ultimate object of ethical judgment and would merit 
the supreme importance attributed to it by Kant. 
(3) But this attitude, as it occurs in practice, can be still 
further defined. Needless to say, it does not mean the equal 
acceptance in the sense of the equal pursuit of these values. To 
ddecribe the ethical ideal as the complete realisation in the 
individual life of each and all of these values would mean a statement 
of the ideal in terms of what is really an abstraction. For the 
individual in the concrete, the ethical problem is that of the best 
possible adjustment, and the nature of this adjustment, i.e. the 
emphasis which is to fall on any one of these particular values, 
will vary according to circumstances anyundamentally,according 
to the circumstance of the individual's native endowment. As 
will be explained chore fully in a later connection, these values 
are data, content of experience, to be moulded and hewn into the 
structure of a Personality. 
(4) When properly conceived and carried out, the process of 
(18) 
education not only creates this general attitude but defines it 
for the individual in the sense that it makes possible his 
discovery of what, in the light of his special circumstances and 
native capacities, is the true line of adjustment for him. 
We shall presently develop. more fully the implications of 
this position in order to obviate misunderstandings and to answer 
possible objections. Before doing this, however, let us examine 
these values more closely so as to realise just what they involve 
and to make good the claim that they are a synthesising of the 
elements of experience that makes for a fuller, a deeper. and 
more satisfying existence. 
The Scientific or Knowledge Value 
The coordinated human activities (with the resulting body of 
organised knowledge) that are indicated by the term Science are 
too familiar to call for detailed treatment. It is necessary, how- 
ever, to make clear what is meant when it is said that this value 
has an ultimate ethical significance. Let it be understood 
at the outset that there is no intention at all of imposing upon 
Science a standard or criterion which is alien to it. On the 
contrary, the preservation of the purity of the scientific 
motive is essential to the very existence of this value. 
The ultimate motive -force or impulse of which Science is 
(1) 
the expression is usually described as the 'curiosity' impulse, 
the impulse which prompts us to know purely for the sake of,ti° 
satisfaction conferred by knowledge as such. We may for the present 
accept this term to describe the impulse in question . The orig- 
inal character of this motive is well indicated by Taylor in the 
passage already quoted where he says: "Wherever you get the com- 
parison of an idea with present rality, if the idea is condemned as 
(1) But see p.105 for examination of what is implied in the 
notion of 'curiosity' in this connection. 
(19) 
nugatory, you have the beginning of Science." The intellectual need which 
desiderates the harmony of the idea with present reality is the 
motive of Science in its pure form. In its effort to reach its 
ideal of completely systematised knowledge, it adopts certain 
(1) 
fundamental concepts And a certain method and it seeks to demonstrate 
their validity in every field of experience. By means of them 
the understanding seeks to cope with the manifold oi: qualities 
And relations which objects present. In the measure in which this 
task is achieved, the intellectual need or impulse is satisfied. 
This is the fundamental motive in .Jcience. The claim is very 
commonly advanced, however, that the so- called utilitarian motive is 
the ultimate justification of scientific enquiry. We cannot of 
course deny that the practical applications of scientific knowledge 
represent the most obvious way in which Jcience contributes to n 
fuller satisfaction and more complete harmony. In fact, there 
appear to be two distinctly separate motives in the acquisition of 
knowledge. The first is that which we have already described. The 
second is that which makes knowledge purely instrumental, that is, 
consciously directed to the satisfaction of needs other than the 
need for knowledge itself. On the one hand, curiosity lends to 
the neauisition of knowledge of the qualities and relations of 
objects. On the other hand, knowledge is acquired in the interests 
of some particular adjustment, in other words, with ̀n utilitarian 
motive. It must be admitted that in practice the two motives are 
very closely bound up with one another. The necessities of the 
practical life have repeatedly furnished science with definite 
problems. In spite of this, however, one finds that the scientist 
himself is inclined jealously to insist on the freedom of science 
and to resent any de .}ure urging of the utilitarian motive. 
(1) We are not here concerned with the problem of the 
(20) 
ultimate validity of the concepts,i.e. the question as to the kind 
of knowledge which they yield, as to whether it is the only kind, 
and so forth. These are metaphysical considerations 
Further, with the advance of icience, the tendency is for the ouestion 
of practical Ppplications to give rise to subsidiary and relatively 
independent sciences. The essentiel thing from our present point 
of view is that knowledge is pursued ae P value only in so far As 
the motive is the pure impulse to know. Pursued merely As an 
instrument, knowledge is not vsluable but simply useful -- P case 
where the distinction between means and end is legitimately drawn. 
Lest it appear that we are unduly 1Pbouring this point, let 
us remark that, while in our view of the ethical training of the 
individual this motive is of supreme importance, educational 
theory often dismisses it with the lip service of P passing 
reference tends to lay an exclusive emphasis on the appreciation 
of knowledge as an instrument, andAto find in that factor the 
ruling motive for its accuisition. A very real element in the 
developed ethical consciousness is the love of knowledge if we 
mean by that phrase such a fruition of the primary curiosity 
impulse as will mean the capz -city and inclination to find satis- 
faction or a 'good' in knowledge as such. The tendency to neglect 
or belittle this motive is probably due to the impression that 
the existence of it in a pronounced degree is comparatively rare. 
On this we would remark, in the first plaice, that the important 
consideration for ethics is not so much the strength of a motive 
but, given its existence and the possibility of its being 
fostered, its intrinsic value. In the second -ranee, its Apparent 
rarity is largely to be explained by the fact that more than any 
other impulse, perhaps, this one is usually allowed to atrophy 
from lack of effective exercise. Finally, the subtle, elusive 
(21) 
manner in which it operates in the different spheres of human action 
leads us to overlook its importance if not even its presence. In 
the political and social life. for example, we assume that the 
knowledge which the relevant sciences, psychology. sociology, 
economics, etc.. seek to discover has the purely instrumental 
importance of contributing to the realisation of some constructive 
social purpose: but we are apt to overlook the fact that our 
very social and political experimentation, our restless groping 
for more satisfying social and political forms is itself largely 
motivated by something at least closely akin to curiosity. by 
a persistent desire to discover that adjustment of human relations 
which is true; in other words there is a certain challenge to 
the scientific as well as to the moral interest in these relationships. 
The exact nature of the ethical import which we have 
attributed to knowledge as such will become apparent if we consider 
for a moment the statement usually made as to the function or 
meaning of science and the comparison usually drawn between this 
and the other values. It is usual to say that Science aims at the 
exact statement, in the form of ageneral laws, of what uniformly 
happens - it seeks to answer the Question: That is? From this 
standpoint it is contrasted with what are called normative sciences, 
which set out to answer the question: what ought to be? '/Je have no 
quarrel with this mode of statement, as it serves to bring out 
the twofold character of the ultimate end or interest -- on the one 
hand/the need to make the idea conform to the reality, on the other, 
to make the reality conform to the idea. The normative 
enruiries would be represented by Logic. Aesthetics, and what for 
the present we shall call Morality. This division is explicitly 
admitted in the present essay. But our objection begins with the 
identification(usually made at the outset but not consistently 
(22) 
mAintained) of morality with ethics. One serious difficulty is 
that, when we attempt to find a basis or ground for the 'ought` of 
morality. we are either forced to fall buck on a more or less 
unconvincing intuitionism or we are driven to :accept such an 
extension of the concept of morality as will no longer leave it 
one value among others but will represent it as somehow concerned 
with all the other values; and in this latter view there is implicit 
the wider notion of 'ethical' which we have outlined. The sequel will 
show that considerable confusion of thought has resulted in ethical 
theory At this point through a failure to formulate the ethical 
Question correctly at the outset. We need only remark here that the 
emphasis on individuality implied in our statement of the ethical 
ideal oAn, we believe, be justified even in the face of the criticisms 
that distinguished ethical thinkers have levelled Against such an 
(1) 
"individualistic" conception. 
So much for .science. Bet us next consider .art and enquire as 
to how, generally, this value makes for kinds of activity which 
give it ethical import. We can distinguish at least two fundamental 
way in which Art contributes to a fuller exercise of distinctively 
human capacities. The first and less important function is that . 
of simple expression. Here the artist devises a medium and a 
technique for the adeauate expression of emotions which the 
individual actually experiences and with which he is more or less 
familiar. In this case, it is expressive rather than creative, and 
is represented by the simpler, more unpretentious kinds of artistic 
production. InAsmuch as it serves to give some form of articulate 
expression to feeling (remembering the psychological fAct that the 
normal terminus of feeling is expression, that is, in a wide sense, 
action) of some kind))this form of .brt contributes directly to the 
(1) See foot -note to page 62. 
(23) 
individual's inner adjustment. ß'1e are not concerned here with 
the source or explanation of the satisfaction, the question, for 
instance, as to whether this satisfaction is altogether traceable 
to the mere fact of emotional expression, or whether there 
is a more distinctively) intellectual element present such, for 
example, es Aristotle urges, viz., satisfaction accruing from the 
intellectual apprehension of the fidelity or appropriateness of 
the expression. At the same time, while we may admit the existence 
of simpler or lower levels of Art, of which the function seems 
adequately described as the expression of feeling, it must be 
pointed out that to identify the function of all Art as such with 
the expression of feeling(in the sense that the artist finds an 
expression for the feelings which the individual experiences but 
(2) 
cannot himself express) is altogether inadequate. Except in a 
sense t000bvious to have any pointy Art is not exactly an expression; 
but even though we were to grant that it is, it is not the 
expression of mere feeling or emotion. 
Oie have, in fact, to recognise the second, and much more 
fundamental role of Art, in which it is, in the fullest sense of the 
term, creative. girt creates feeling; in virtue of the special and new 
combinations of the cognitive elements of experience, its special 
synthesis of the presentations and images, it brings into being 
new affective experiences which represent a genuine widening and 
deepening of the emotional life. This is true generally of the 
creative artists, in i iterature, fainting, Music. Architecture and 
Sculpture. It remains to add (although it 4ould take us too far 
'?field into a discussion of the nature of aesthetic enjoyment to 
justify the statement) that in the artistic situation the affective 
and the cognitive factors are so bound up with one another that 
(i) Netagis 4, 2.hetoric 1371 b 4.(Jebb) 
(2)See criticism by 72. Leon in 'MIND' N.J. No, l20. 
PP 435 -443 
(24) 
it is idle to try to separate them and to find the artistic 
fact to either in the one or in the other. Our concern here is 
with the reality of the creation, intellectual and emotional 4.n 
Art7and with the enhancement of human capacity which such creation 
implies. It therefore possesses direct significance for the 
ethical life. 
Whatever view we may take of the many special psychological 
problems raised by the existence of Art, it is clear that Ethics 
is concerned with Aesthetics in precisely the same way in which 
it is concerned with the other values. The situation is justly 
described by Sentayene when he says: "In Aesthetic activity we 
have accordingly one side of rational life; sensuous experience 
is dominated there as mechanical or social reälities ought to be 
dominated in science or politics. "(1) As to the source of the 
satisfaction conferred, while recognizing the sensuous element in 
aesthetic enjoyment, it may safely be asserted of Art generally 
that this satisfaction proceeds fundamentally from the fact of 
the free exercise of human capacity as an end in itself. It is 
an "activiid de jeu ", its psychology being essentially the 
psychology of Play. As Bosnquet puts it: "The delight 
1 
in art is no mere psychical accident" but the manifestation 
of joy in self -expression, the ultimate root and ground of 
aesthetic pleasure." (2) On the view we have adopted, it is 
clear that this side of human activity cannot be a matter of 
indifference to Ethics. It might of course be said that the view 
we have taken of the ethical ideal as the harmonious realization 
in a single life, according to the special capacities and circum- 
stances of that life, of the human values is itself the expression of 
(1) Life of Reason: p. 171 
(2) History of Aesthetic,p.67 
(25) 
embodying the principle of 'unity in variety'! And we have no 
objection to this purely formal identification because. while it 
does not help us much. it is at least intellectually innocuous. 
We come now to the question of the religious value and its 
ethical significance. It is not difficult to shew that the 
activities properly described as religious are valuable in our 
sense of the term, that is, they make for the satisfaction of A 
Permanent need of human nature. and, in their own way. achieve a 
synthesis of the conflicting elements of experience. The term 
'religion' itself has suffered equally At the hands or enthusiasts 
and detractors because of the wide, vague And often definitely 
mistaken meanings which have been Pttached to it. In the present 
connection we have to do two things: (1) to analyse the psychological 
situation in the religious experience so As to isolate the distinctive 
elements of it and thus to define the kind of situation which 
normally tends to give rise to this particular kind of adjustment: 
and (2) to justify our view of religion As simply one value among 
others- coordinate with the others and having no prima facie 
claim to supremacy; And to indicate what is really meant when, Ps 
so frecuently happens, such a claim is Asserted. 
On the cognitive side, we have the individual standing in a 
certain relation to an object of a special kind. It has been said 
that religion presupposes the concept of a personal a-od Ps its object, 
but the existence of Buddhism, numerically speaking the greatest 
of the world's religions, and with.1 A religion without P 
Personal God, serves to disprove this. But the object must have 
sufficient affinity to personality to be conceived as capable 
of influencing and being influenced by human behaviour. _as such, 
it represents a kind of supplementing of the individual's personal 
powers. This is well brought out by Galloway when he says:. "In 
(26) 
all religion we have a subject, an object, and a bond of relation - 
ship between them. On the subjective side, the consciousness of this 
relation is piety, and it appears as worship, reverence and adoration. 
In the individual himself there is always a sense of need. 
a feeling of defect of some kind, which impels him to go beyonU 
hinself. Then, on the other side, the object worshipped is always 
the embodiment of e value which distinguishes it from other things, 
and it is believed to be able to do for the worshipper what he 
could not do for himself. And through the fulfilment of the 
religious relation, man wins an inner satisfaction, a harmony 
(1) 
with himself and his environment, which lies beyond his own powers." 
So much for the cognitive side of the religious situation. 
With regard to the affective aspect, a difficulty, which would 
seem to be somewhat gratuitous, has been found by several writers 
in the attempt to answer the two questions: (1) is feeling the 
distinctive, peculiar fact of the religious consciousness? and (2) 
(1) Principles of Religious Development: ch.2, p.58. c.f. Leuba: 
"That which differentiates religion from other forms of con- 
duct is the kind of power on which dependence is felt, and 
the kind of behaviour elicited by the power. A natural line of 
cleavage between religious and non -religious behaviour is made 
possible by the presence in man of ideas of forces of different 
character. Some of these forces are of the sort to which the 
name physical is applied; others respond to intelli:ence and 
feeling as if they themselves had mind and heart" (A Psychological 
Study of Religion p.52) 
c. f. also Santayana: Life of Reason: Reason in Science p. 235 
An excellent account of the synthesis which Religion seeks to 
achieve will be found in Boutroux: Science et Religion pp.383 -388. 
This account is interesting also as illustrating a failure to 
distinguish clearly between the 'ethical' and the ' religious'. 
(27) 
is the emotion in religious experience simple, ultimate, 
unanalysable, or can it be shewn to be a blending of complex of 
more elementary emotions? The first question must be answered, as 
we answered a similar question with respect to art, by pointing out 
that the separation of the emotional and the cognitive, which is 
implied in the question, is sheer abstraction, calculated to lead 
us very far from the psychological realities of the situation. When 
Bradley, for example, says: What, then, in general is religion? I 
take it to be a fixed feeling of fear, resignation, admiration, or 
approval, no matter what may be the object, provided only that this 
feeling reaches a certain strength, and is qualified by a certain 
(1) 
degree of reflection. ", his meaning is rather ambiguous, for 
everything depends on how much we read into the phrase: "no matter 
what the o jest may be ". If the phrase be understood literally, we 
have only to point out that the fixed feeling only appears when the 
object is broadly speaking of a certain kind; so that there is no 
good reason for finding the essential fact in the "fixed feeling" 
more than in the fixed object. But if he means, as the context seems 
to suggest, that the object9while always remaining the same in 
certain general features, may vary immensely with respect to its 
particular content, just as, for example, the puissant but erratic 
spirits of the savage differ from the God of Christianity, then it 
is beyond question that the feeling undergoes profound modification 
together with the object and retains its identity just to the degree 
that the object retains it. 
The second question as to the possibility of the analysis 
of the religious emotion into simpler constituents need not detain 
us. We may admit such an analysis as that of Bradley, for instance, 
who finds its roots in fear and admiration, or that of MacBougall 
who resolves reverence, which he calls the distinctively religious, 
(1) Appearance and Reality p.439 note. 
(28) 
attitude, into "wonder, fear, gratitude, and negative self -feeling" (2) 
With regard to the whole question of 'complex' emotions and 
their 'analysis' into more elementary constituents, it is perhaps 
permissible to submit a caveat. Are we not here possibly the 
victims of an analogy or, perhaps, of a figure of speech - a source 
of error against which MacDougall has himself given us a very 
necessary warning ?(2) For example, it is not clear that introspection 
detects the presence of these constituent emotions. Are they then 
inferred -from the presence of certain features in the complex 
object? In any case, whether this difficulty is or is not real, 
we can safely describe the religious emotion as 'sui generis' in the 
sense that it represents the affective aspect of a total situation 
possessing distinctive, peculiar features. 
It remains to consider briefly the view of religion that 
regards this value as in some way higher than and inclusive of 
the others; and the question here really concerns the exact sense 
in which this claim to supremacy is meant. In so far as the 
issue is purely metaphysical, it is irrelevant to our purpose, 
which seeks to estimate the general rule of religion in the actual 
economy of the individual life, and which must therefore attach to 
the term such a meaning as will faithfully represent the actual 
cases of its effective operation. The 'raison d'étre' of religion 
is often found, for example, in the notion of the conservation of 
the human values and we may admit that this is probably the 
deepest, most permanent `motif in religion. But to say) as Hoffding 
says in his Philosophy of Religion, that "the feeling which is 
determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence 
(1) Introduction to Social Psychology p.132. 
(2) See interesting and important remarks in 'Body and Mind' 
pp 155 -156. 
(29) 
[of these values) is the religious feeling (1) ", is unsatisfactory- 
-- it ldoks perilously like the tautological assertion that the human 
values are appreciated as valuable. It is only when this concern 
about the fate of the values results in the ideal construction 
of an order (of whatsoever kind it may be ) in which they are 
conceived as permanently rooted and conserved that the distinctively 
religious attitude appears. A consideration of the nature of this 
ideal order and of the motive which underlies its construction 
enables us to understand the real significance of the fact that 
the religious value is regarded as somehow concerned with the whole 
of life, not merely with a particular phase of it. In this 
respect it resembles the ethical value from which, as a consequence, 
it is not clearly distinguished in the ordinary consciousness. 
Philosophically, however, these values are to be distinguished. 
The ethical consciousness decrees that a certain kind of life is 
good. This judgment is based, as we have seen,partly on 
individual experience, but partly too, on authority, The ethical 
life is a progressive verification or vindi'ation of this judgment. 
Butte far as the individual is concerned, this verification is 
in the nature of the case never complete. The externality of the 
authority is never completely and finally overcome. The need is 
felt for a justification once and for all of the verdict of the 
ethical consciousness and the ideal order of religion is the out- 
(2) 
come of this need. Nor is it surprising that this order should 
often be so conceived as to motivate the will in a peculiarly 
direct and effective way. This is particularly true of the lower 
levels of ethical life. But it would seem that even at the 
highest levels of ethical development this need for an ultimate 
(1) The Philospphy of Religion: p 104 
(2) Needless to say,we are only arguing here the significance 
of religion , not its origin ins history. 
(39) 
rationale will still be felt. In this sense we may admit the 
supremacy of the religious value and interpret its claim 
to concern itself with the whole of life. It represents, 
however, neither the sole nor the primary source of the truly 
ethical individual's allegiance to the values. While all the 
activities of the religious man are doubtless shot through 
and through with strands of the religious spirit, the appreciation 
of any particular value ought to rest mainly on the peculiar 
satisfaction which that value confers. Religion is itself only 
one value among others and it achieves its own particular kind 
of adjustment. In the sense in which we have interpreted the 
religious value, we shall recognise in the sequel its importance 
at certain stages in the ethical growth of the individual. 
The philosophic value may be briefly mentioned. The need 
which finds its more or less adequate satisfaction in philos- 
ophic pursuits is the need to think experience as a whole and 
to find it coherent and self -consistent. Philosophy is rooted 
in that furthest demand of the intellectual part of our 
nature, the demand that knowledge should grasp the innermost 
informing principle underlying the intellectually unsatisfying 
manifold of experience and giving it unity and self- coherence. 
It is thus at the very outset concerned to characterise the 
ultimate nature of reality. As professor Baillie expresses it; 
"Philosophy seeks to secure a special kind of mental satisfaction 
and the pursuit of this satisfaction is in the long run 
literally a matter of selective choice on the part of the 
individual. Philosophy at its best seeks to supply a connected 
intellectual grasp of the world which will satisfy a man's 
capacity for thinking out the nature of things. When attained, 
it brings a peculiar consciousness of intellectual repose in 
(31) 
face of the changing course of events and the endless 
(1) 
array of finite phenomena." But when the same writer asserts: 
"The philosophic mood has no better justification than any 
special instinct or than any mere intuition; it forces itself 
on some minds, and these minds must follow it if they are to 
(2) 
fulfil their peculiar mental needs " he appears to confine 
the philosophic mood to the full -blown philosopher. We may 
admit at the outset that the cases in which this interest 
dominates are rare, but this does not justify the denial of its 
universality. The supposition is reasonable that the definitely 
philosophic interest is inseparable from human consciousness 
as such, admitting that in most cases it is perhaps represented 
by little more than a permanent mark of interrogation -- a mark 
which, it may be conceded, the mind of the average individual 
does not seem to find unduly disturbing. 
We come now to consider the social and the political 
values. Although the meanings of these terms overlap to some 
extent, on the whole there is justification for according them 
separate treatment. The root fact of which all the social and 
political values are the outgrowth is that, among the 
many and diverse objects or situations to which the individual 
is called upon to react, there is one object which possesses 
special interest and significance for him. This is his fellowman. 
The member of his own species represents an object or situation 
which demands some kind of adaptive response. Further, this 
object is peculiar by reason of the unexpected complexities which 
it often presents, of the numerous possibilities of maladjustment, 
of the nearness and urgency of it, and of the subtle and far- reaching 
(1) studies in human Nature, p 203 
(2) Ibid. p 190 
(32) 
effects of faulty response on the development of the individual's 
human capacities as a whole. Consequently, it possesses a special 
interest for tle student of genetic ethics. In its efforts to 
cope with this highly intractable object, mankind has arrived 
at certain generalisations which claim to be at least a partial 
solution of the problem. These generalisations are represented 
by the rules, principles or standards of conduct which aim to 
regulate the relations of men with one another. This is the 
true meaning or function of the so- called "social virtues"- - 
landmarks to point the most promising path through the arduous 
regions of social relationships. And(if we be pardoned for sus- 
taining a somewhat commonplace metaphor) these landmarks have 
been erected partly by the painfully garnered experience of 
ordinary men but mainly7perhaps,by the intuitions and reasoned 
insight of the thinkers and teachers of the race. Here and 
there these landmarks may have become overgrown and obscured, 
or changes have occurred in the terrain itself -- changes 
of which a custom -loving creature like man fails to take note; 
and hence they no longer guide the traveller as unerringly as 
heretofore, and some alterations ought therefore to be made. 
But in the main they indicate the true direction. 
We would distinguish between the social and the political 
values by saying that the latter are incidental to man's life 
as a member of a group, while the former are concerned with the 
relations of individuals as such. Examples of this distinction 
will be given presently. There is, of course, no question of 
any absolute distinction; but a distinction between the 
problems incidental to the more personal or individual relation- 
ships and those that arise in connection with the political or 
group life is desiràbie,partly because the distinction is commonly 
(3.3) 
recognised in moral theory and partly because it enables us to 
envisage more clearly the history of the individual's ethical 
growth. 
Again, with reference to the social values, it remains to 
point out that, to be strictly consistent with our general view, 
we on ht to talk in the singular of the social value by way 
of indicating the special, peculiar type of situation to which 
satisfactory adjustment is sought; and the different values 
of the social life would rather represent the special forms in 
which the single ideal of social adjustment presents itself. 
The fundamental value, which embraces the particular social 
values, we might designate in a broad way as 'social intercourse'. 
Social intercourse, in the degree to which it is truly 
realised, involves the quickening, development, and satisfying 
exercise of human capacities and is thus ultimately 'good'. 
The general nature of the satisfaction to which this value 
finally leads is probably best illustrated by the ideal of 
Friendship as it presented itself to the mind of Aristotle. 
(1) 
In the account of perfect friendship in the Ethics , we have 
simply an outline picture of such perfect adjustment in the case of 
two individuals. Needless to say, under the rubric of the 
social value is included what is ordinarily termed morality. 
Our reason for not using the term morality to designate this 
value is that the common usage of the term gives it a denotation 
which is somewhat too narrow, for its etymological(and very often 
its practical) identification with 'mores' tends to obscure 
the more fundamental implications of the term. 
As already pointed out, the so- called social virtues are -mss- 
to be considered here; that is, the virtues which have directly 
(1) Nicomachean Ethics: :'Ielldon's trans. ßk.8, ch.4. 
(34) 
in view the relations of the individual to others and which "have 
no meaning except on the supposition that the individual man is 
(1) 
acting in social relations with others" As these have been 
described in detail in the standard works on ethical theory, 
only brief mention of them need be made here. 
Justice. The widest sense of this term, familiarised by the 
'Republic', the sense in which it seeks to express the essence 
of the entire life of virtue, is of course not intended here. 
The narrowest sense in which it essentially refers to the making 
of laws and the impartial administration of them, is more properly 
treated under the rubric of political value. There is an 
intermediary sense which shades into these two extremes and the 
nature of which is adumbrated in the Benthamite formula: "everybody 
to count for one and nobody for more than one "; or in Sidgwick's 
'maxim of equity'(2). As Rashdall puts it: "As subjects of mere 
natural, spontaneous emotions, one man's or one woman's satisfaction 
may be more to us than that of a thousand others. And yet there 
is something in the intellect which protests against acouiescence 
in the view that thousands should be sacrificed to one" The 
statement illustrates the nature of the demand made by Justice 
in this sense although we do not commit ourselves to the 
Intuitionist theory lurking in the phrase 'something in the 
intellect'. Here, as in all similar cases, we are on safer ground if 
we hold to a thorough -going teleology in trying to understand the 
(1) Ladd,Philosoo11y of Conduct,p 219. 
(2) "It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which 
it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that 
they are two different individuals, and without there being 
any difference in the natures or circumstances of the two which 
can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of 
treatment." (Methods of Ethics,Bk 3, p.300) 
(3) Is Conscience an Emotion? p. 163. 
(35) 
origin of the virtues. 
Benevolence. The active promotion of another's good is 
one of the values of our social life. Sidgwick indicates the 
nature of this value in his 'Maxim of Benevolence' which, 
however, expresses it from the standpoint of 'duty': "Each one is 
morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as 
much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be 
less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or 
(1) 
attainable by him." For our purpose it is sufficient to 
recognise the demand that, under conditions, the individual 
should actively interest himself in the good of others, with- 
out committing ourselves to the exact sense of Jidgwick's qual- 
ification. 
Veracity. Though it is possible to consider this virtue 
as already implied in Benevolence, the situation which it has 
in view is sufficiently specific and familiar to justify 
independent mention. It is not difficult to see why the 
standard of conduct erected by this virtue(which disapproves on 
the one hand the misleading of others by the wilful distortion 
of the facts, and, on the other hand,.the failure to correct our 
neighbour's mistake when such correction is immediately 
possible and desirable) should have been accorded a prominent 
emphasis in the pursuit of the social value. As - aulsen s &Ts,°oGr 
the disregard of it in social life: " it destroys faith 
and confidence among men; and consequently undermines human 
social life, the foundation of all real human, of all 
mental- historical life. and this explains its particular 
(2) 
reprehensiveness ". And Rashdall, who would of course 
(1) Methods of Ethics, Bk.3, p 382. 
(2) System of Ethics, p. 666, 
(36) 
unreservedly accept that statement, would do well to remain 
content with it instead of proceeding to the following highly 
debatable assertion: "I believe that we do on reflection 
recognise something intrinsically fitting in the rule which 
prescribes that a rational being, endowed with faculties which 
enable him to pursue, to communicate, and to love the truth, 
should use those faculties in that way rather than for the 
purpose of making things appear otherwise than as they are. 
So much appears to me to be the clear result of introspection, 
and to be implied in the strongest moral convictions of other 
(1) 
men ". To say that introspection discovers an idea is in itself 
to say nothing about how that idea came to be there. Is it not 
better to surrender altogether the somewhat naive claim, implied 
in the above statement, that we can somehow stand outside of 
the content of our ethical consciousness, that we can so 
externalise it as to be able to discriminate between a 'fitness' 
that is 'intrinsic' and a fitness that is the result of authoritative 
teaching plus the individual's own reflection upon and more or 
less partial appreciation of the teleological sanction of such 
teaching, or, if we may so express it,A its justification by 
its results. 
The Political Values. It is permissible to regard these 
three values, Justice, Benevolence, Veracity, as fundamental to 
the pursuit of social satisfaction, although,indeedias in the 
case of all terms which imply generalised psychological attitudes, 
the meanings shade into one another and no very precise definition 
of boundaries is either possible or necessary. The endless 
refinements of the individual's social reactions we may regard 
as exemplifying special developments of the attitudes implied in 
(1) Theory of Good and Evil, Vol.1, p. 193. 
(37) 
the pursuit of these values. Coming now to the political value, 
we would describe the pursuit of this value in a general way 
as the progressive discovery of the best form of group life. 
Social anthropology reveals the fact that some form of 
organised group life is to be found at all known levels 
of human development, and hence in this sense at least we may 
say that group life is natural to man. Hence, again, do we find 
that the long process of political experimentation, guided and 
inspired by the insight of the thinkers and teachers, has 
resulted in the placing of a premium on certain kinds of 
behaviour or, to express the same fact from the subjective point 
of view on certain qualities of character. Here therefore we 
find another direction in which true ethical training demands 
the appreciation and practical acceptance of certain values. We 
may mention the following as more fundamental illustrations 
of them. It will be seen that they simply convey the basic 
ideas on which rests the system of so- called political rights 
and duties. 
Justice. As already suggested, we use this term here in 
the narrowest sense, the sense in which it is strictly a demand 
of the political life. Here it has in view the impartial 
framing of laws,and demands that the incidence of these laws 
on the individual should not be affected by irrelevant or 
extraneous considerations. What considerations are extraneous 
and constitute, therefore, an interference with the course of 
justice is a question of practical interpretation, the fundamental 
ground for the decision of which is to be found in the true 
appreciation of the further, more basic political values of 
(1) Equality,(2) Liberty, (3) Loyalty or Fraternity. Hence we 
may concern ourselves with these three. 
(3e) 
In a sense the notion of equality simply reaffirms the 
notion of justice -- the very essence of any law is that it 
decrees equality in a certain sphere of conduct; and the 
demand of justice is simply that practical effect should be 
given to the decree. The more positive and deeper inplications 
of the idea of political justice are best indicated in 
connection with the notions of equality and liberty. The root 
notion in equality, again, is that of men as the bearers of a 
common personality, that implied in the dictum that "men are 
unequal but they are all men ", and this notion as applied to 
the political life gives rise to the demand for some practical 
realisation of the equality idea, such,for example as would 
be implied in the phrase 'equality of opportunity''. Consider 
also the value of liberty. The negative aspect of this value 
is adequately summed up in the statement that it involves 
the removal of all unnecessary obstacles to the free, untramelled 
development of the individual. some of these obstacles are 
incidental to defective group organisation and therefore conflict 
in a more obvious way with the ideal of liberty. Other 
obstacles such as lack of knowledge, lack of training, removable 
taints of heredity and so on, present a problem for education. 
But if we look for the fundamental positive implication 
of liberty, we seem to strike the bed -rock idea of true 
political life in the notion of self- government or autonomy. 
As far as the ethical life as a whole is concerned, Kant has 
familiarised us with the notion of the autonomous will. The 
group life presents a special field for the operation of the 
principle of autonomy -- a field in which the problems raised by 
this principle are of a special kind and are becoming 
more insistent and more clearly articulated. The underlying 
(39) 
demand is that the laws or standards of the group or community 
should not be felt by the individual as a purely external 
control but rather as somehow expressive of his own deepest 
volition. There must be fundamental consent to, if not actually 
the sense of authorship of, the laws which he obeys. The 
realisation of this ideal will doubtlessinvolve a long process of 
political experimentation and individual training' nevertheless) it 
is only in the degree to which we approximate this ideal that we 
achieve the organisation of the group on an ethical basis. Again, 
there is another aspect of self -government, an aspect which 
emphasises not so much the notion of 'self' as the notion of 
'government'. Healthy group life not only involves the con- 
sciousness, on the part of the individual, of the group stand - 
ares and laws as his own, but it demands his identification of 
himself with them in the sense that he obeys them even though 
obedience involves the sacrifice of present impulses and inclin- 
ations. Here the emphasis falls on that aspect of the political 
conscience which stresses the idea of duty rather than that of 
right. The same notion is still further emphasised in what 
we have classified as the third political value, viz. loyalty, 
sympathy, or fraternity. Any one of these terms may be 
conveniently used to indicate the demand made on the individual 
by a kind of association with his fellows which is both 
initiated and regulated by conscious community of purpose. It 
is perhaps better,however, to avoid the term sympathy which is 
so commonly used to express the mere fact of gregariousness; 
and it may be remarked that the present essay agrees with the 
(1) 
vigorous protest of a recent writer that our social psychologists 
have lately done much to distort our views of human association 
(1) Follet, The New State. 
by giving almost exclusive attention to the 'herd' or 'mob' 
factors in social psychology. As we admit elsewhere, such factors to 
some degree enter into and colour all forms of association; 
nevertheless in the experience of the normal individual, there 
occurs a kind of association, the conscious, deliberate association 
for the prosecution of a common purpose, where the influence of 
those factors is of very minor importance. The terms loyalty 
or fraternity indicate what is demanded by participation in such 
associations, namely, the capacity and preparedness to think 
and act in the light of a purpose, the achievement of which concerns 
more than the individual himself, may involve the sacrifice of 
immediate personal satisfactions and calls for effective 
cooperation with others. 
The Economic or Material Value. We come now to the last of the 
principal human values specified above, viz. the 'economic' value; 
and all that is necessary here is the specification of the exact 
meaning which we attach to that rather ambiguous phrase, to 
point out the precise sense in which it is legitimate to speak 
of a 'value' of this kind. Among the manifold needs of the 
organism there is a group which is biologically basal, in the 
sense that it directly concerns the physical existence and 
well -being of the organism. These needs assert themselves as 
the principal bodily appetites, hunger, thirst, sex, sleep. The 
objects or situations appropriate to the appetites(for the 
hungry animal, food, for the tired animal, cessation of all but 
the automatic bodily activities and so on) are 'valuable' or 'good' 
directly and absolutely. But if we thus find the ultimate meaning 
of the economic value in the struggle with the physical 
environment, we may logically extend our conception of the pursuit 
of the value to include the wider range of activities which seeks 
 1 l 
to further to the utmost limits the comforts, conveniences, 
amenities of modern civilised life. Our vast modern industrial 
system is in large measure the outgrowth of this interest. We 
have already seen how this interest diverts to its own use 
the activities of science in its effort to achieve the maximum 
of mastery over environment with the minimum of physical effort. 
The assertion is commonly made that the economic goods 
are not in themselves valuable but are merely instrumental to 
the pursuit of the other values. We may accept this if we are 
clear as to what exactly is meant. We have pointed out how 
certain objects or situations satisfy certain fundamental and 
permanent bodily needs and are valuable or good simpliciter. 
Further, these bodily needs, when denied proper satisfaction, 
become increasingly insistent and imperious and occasion a 
consciousness of maladjustment so acute as completely to 
monopolise the attention. We can therefore say that a certain 
degree of economic or material well -being is a condition of 
effective interest in the other values, in other words, is a 
condition of ethical growth. In short, we need not try to 
improve on Aristotle's sane deliverance on this question when 
he says: "Man, as being human, will require external prosperity. 
His nature is not of itself sufficient for speculation, it needs 
bodily health, food and care of every kind. It must not, however, 
be supposed that, because it is impossible to be fortunate 
without external goods, a great variety of such goods will be 
necessary to happiness -T.. It is enough that such a person 
(1) 
should possess as much as is requisite for virtue" 
We recognise,of course that under the conditions of 
modern civilised life, there are economic activities that 
(1) Nicomach. Ethics, Bk. 10, ch. 9. 
(42) 
are merely instrumental in the strict sense, i.e. they 
contribute to non -economic interests. These activities find 
their justification in the value they are intended to further 
and raise no new considerations. Finally, the need is becoming 
increasingly urgent for a just estimate of the importance 
of the economic interest in modern life, and especially 
pertinent at the present time is the question as to whether the 
more and more engrossing pursuit of this interest is not exacting 
a toll on our energies out of all proportion to its intrinsic 
importance. Ethics, with its insistent "quo vadis "` invites us 
to scrutinise and evaluate the nature of the life -synthesis, of 
the ideal, which is implied. 
Before leaving our statement of the values, there is one 
further point to be considered. That is the question as to the 
rt)le pleasure. Ve have already referred to the fallacy of 
psychological hedonism and pointed out how pleasure is an 
incident of successful activity - activity directed normally 
to an end other than pleasure. But we must not forget that 
pleasure may be and often is the deliberated object of choice. 
The anticipated affective thrill( the fact is obvious enough 
at least in connection with the pleasures of the senses) sometimes 
does constitute the actual content of the object. Now, the 
psychical and physical effects of pleasure, the extent to which and 
the conditions under which it is beneficial to the life of the 
organism as a whole, is a point which is still obscure. But 
enough is known to make it a reasonable supposition that the 
psychical and physical processes are benefiCially affected by 
the pleasure experience. Critics of Hedonism have been given 
to striking the pessimistic note and urging the unsatisfactoriness 
of pleasure; and their view is amply justified of psychology 
(43) 
where it is a cyuestion of the systematic pursuit of pleasure. 
But experience seems to shew that the occasional choice of 
pleasure is possible and natural, possessinglindeed, a value which 
may be described as recreative in the strictly literal sense 
of that term. It is of course a far cry from this admission 
to the attempt to elevate pleasure into the one worthy object 
of human endeavour. 
Chapter 3. 
We have already explained how ethics is concerned in a 
special way with the human values outlined above. It is concerned to 
conserve them, to assert their claims where social or political 
circumstances might lead to neglect of them, and to commend 
them to the individual will as the true and worthy objects 
of its allegiance. The ethical value, therefore, is not to be 
regarded as one value coordinate with the others. It is 
misleading, perhaps, to speak of it as a more ultimate value; for 
we can call it more ultimate only in the sense that it represents 
the unifying principle which seeks to construct ,out of these 
different values an ideal of the best life, -- best, that is, with 
regard to all th'special circumstances of the individual himself. 
Now there are some additional points of interest with reference 
to these values which we may mention here as they are further 
illuminative of the general situation. 
To begin with, ou.. conception of these values and of their 
relation to the ethical value enables us to envisage in a clear 
way the ethical aspects of the problem of progress. Each of these 
interests or pursuits, the scientific, the artistic, the political, 
etc., tends to become more and more highly specialised and to 
developeindependently of, and it may be at the expense of, the 
others, We must therefore, in the first place, think of human 
(44) 
progress in the plural as consisting of different 'progresses' -- 
progress in science, progress in art, progress in religion, 
progress in political forms and so on. It must be further 
remembered that one kind of progress has no connection, at least 
prima facie, with any of the others and indeed may actually come 
into conflict with them. Historical illustrations are not far 
to seek. Among the Greeks, for example, where society was based 
on slavery, it might fairly be said that a high level of progress 
was achieved in certain values at the cost of the sacrifice of other 
values. The devotee of religion would probably find the high - 
water mark of religious development in the Middle Ages --Ithat 
period of the saint, the mystic, the hermit, the period in which 
the resources of the Church were organised on so comprehensive 
and effective a scale, and in which the choicest intellects 
were enlisted in its service -1 but the ethical thinker, interested 
in the human values as a whole, would protest against the 
relentless intolerance that sought to fetter science, and 
against the indifference, if not antagonism, to all attempts 
at the amelioration of the social and economic condition of 
the masses. The conflict between science and religion in the 
nineteenth century is interesting from the same point of view. 
Under the stimulus of its many and great successes, science 
sought, justifiably enough, to extend its own point of view 
over the whole field of experience, and to impose its own 
particular kind of synthesis on every department of life. 
But it sometimes went on to advance the claim, with all the 
symptoms of arrogance and intolerance, that that synthesis is the 
only one possible. :Pragmatism, as a philosophic theory, is 
probably to be traced to an ethical motive, that is, to a demand 
for the recognition of all the human values, leading to such a 
(45 ) 
conception of the nature of truth itself as would, if we may so 
express it, guarantee by definition the human values as a whole. 
The criticism, from an ethical standpoint, of the political and 
economic life of our own day raises some serious questions. It 
is a pertinent question whether the ideal of maximum economic 
production, often implicitly accepted in practice if not in 
theory as a just and reasonable end for society to propose to 
itself, is compatible with an ethical organisation of the human 
instruments of production. Such an aim makes for an organisation 
which tends to deprive the workers of all real opportunity or 
inclination for self- culture. urther/^ produces a few who 
become so filled with the zest of the industrial battle(itself 
an engrossing thing under modern conditions) that another equally 
one -sided type is the result. And we have the large parasitic class 
which is not called upon to pull its own economic weight, whose 
only conception of well -being is the exploitation of the 
comforts and pleasures which economic progress has made possible, 
and which frets under the weight of a leisure it has not been 
trained to use. Hence the melancholy spectacle of vacant and 
aimless lives , of lives clouded by ennui and indifference, which 
is perhaps the most disquieting commentary on the ethical results 
of our educational system. 
Again, it would be easy to give instances, from Plato 
onwards, of the magnification of the political value or values. 
What appears to the present writer to be a good example of the 
tendency to invoke one principle of really limited application 
to effect the solution of our multiform social problems is to 
be found in a recent work,(1) the thesis of which will serve as an 
illustration of the main point of this section. 
(1) The New State: M.P.Follett. 
(46) 
The writer finds the panacea for our social ills in 
the thorough -going extension of the group life and the group 
spirit. By the group life is meant that kind of association 
which originates and is controlled by "collective ideas ", 
"collective feelings" and "collective will ". The "collective 
idea" is the resultant of the deliberate interchange of ideas, 
with the consequent modification of individual ideas, among 
the members of the group; and hence emerges a 'composite idea', 
not identical with any one of the individual ideas. Tacitly, 
it is assumed to be somehow superior to them. Similarly 
arise ' collective feelings' and 'collective will'. We 
are told that "the object of group life is not to find 
(1) 
t1e best individual thought, but the best collective thought ". 
Further, on the ground that, from the very beginnin, the 
individual life is indissolubly bound up with a social 
milieu, that it is impossible to abstract from the social 
relations and to think of the individual 'in vacuo', the 
conclusion is drawn that the only true and adequate kind 
of life is to be found in the group activity thus 
described. We learn also that the thorough -going and, indeed, 
exclusive fostering of this group attitude will resolve 
immediately the 'old' difficulties of the individual and 
society, egoism and altruism, self and other, etc. 
(1) The New state p. 
(47) 
Now,this writer has analysed in a very thorough manner 
one special form, and admittedly a very important form of 
political activity. In this form there is fully effective 
cooperation in the determination of the ends themselves as 
well as in the prosecution of the activities which are the 
means to those ends. But in practice, the extent to which 
this kind of group life can be realised would seem to be 
somewhat limited and, besides, there are other important factors 
in human association which have to be taken into account. 
We cannot assume that the "collective thought " is the be -all 
and the end -all of human association. The "best individual 
thought" ought sometimes to prevail - in other words, real 
leadership on the one hand and intelligent obedience on the 
other are attitudes occasionally demanded in our complex 
political life. Again, while we admit at once that 
the mere individual in abstraction from all social relation- 
ships is a myth, nevertheless individuality, involving at 
least the distinction,if not necessarily the conflictibetween 
the individual and society, between self and other, is a 
fact which appears later as a result of development within 
this social environment. On the further statement: "our 
sundering (of the individual and society) is as artificial and 
late an act as the sundering of consciousness into subject 
and object ", we would remark that. while it is certainly 
a late distinction, it seems fundamentally mistaken to 
consider it artificial in the sense of unreal. It would 
seem, on the contrary that the distinction foreshadows one of 
the basal problems of ethics; and in practice the problem 
(48) 
somehow always recurs. To call it artificial and so to dismiss it 
is a method of solution which seems much more artificial than 
(1) 
the problem itself. 
We have thus shown how each of these values in the growth 
of society tends to develop independently of the others and to 
extend its dominion as widely as possible. The converse process 
is also worthy of mention, that is, the process by which the 
ethical interest, strictly in our sense of the term, tends 
(1) Consider, also, this passage: "Properly understood, the 
interests of the individual" are the interests of society. 
We are here talking not of two things but of two aspects of 
one thing. Oppositions there are within society numerous 
and endless, but these are all partial They will be 
discussed in their proper place - here we need only shew .. 
how the doctrine of essential opposition distorts our 
practical philosophies." (MacIver, Community, Bk.2, ch.l, p.90.) 
Now it is doubtful whether such statements as this do not 
obscure much more than they illumine. "Two aspects of one 
thing "implies a dangerous metaphor. Does the writer not 
really mean that in an ideal society, the kind of society 
towards which it is permissible to hope that Humanity is 
slowly groping its way, the interests of the individual and 
the interests of society would be two aspects of one thing? 
Or, could we but discover the nature of the true life for 
the individual, we would solve ipso facto the problem of 
social organisation. But as things are, these oppositions 
"Within society" may well prove "essential" - essential in the 
sense which the "practical philosophies" probably had in view. 
(49) 
positively to assert itself and in more or less subtle ways to 
interpenetrate or permeate the other values and thus profoundly 
to influence what we might call the purity of their motive. Two 
illustrations - one from art, the other from religion - will 
make this clear. ... It will be recalled that the ethical interest 
is the practical interest in these values as a whole, the 
interest that seeks to fabricate out of them a unitary ideal 
of personal life. Now, in the world of literary art, for 
example, the artistic production which makes for a general de- 
pression of our sense of the value of human life as a whole, 
whether by means of a pessimism which preaches the final 
frustration or meaninglessness of human purposes and ideals, 
or by means of a cynicism which would mock into unreality 
those fundamental qualities or traits of our human nature which 
we have learned to value, generally finds its claim to be 
placed in the highest rank of art disallowed. However perfect 
the technique, however skilful the execution, it encounters 
an antagonism of a permanent kind. It would be generally 
admitted, for instance, that one important element in the secret 
of the abiding appeal of the Shakespearean tragedy is the 
fact that the aneantissement of human effort and human life 
which is there depicted is never absolute. Though the 
denouement presents what appears to be a final defeat of 
the dearest purposes of the actors, and the curtain finally 
falls on a stage blood -drenched in the best Elizabethan style, 
nevertheless there remains, after the long story of weakness, 
misfortune and futility has been told, a subtle, pervasive, 
but unmistakeable impression of the inalienable human dignity 
of those actors and of the essential worthwhileness of their 
torn passions and defeated hopes. Santayana says: "A child 
(50) 
plans towers of Babel; a mature architect, in planning, would 
lose all interest if he were bidden to disregard gravity 
an`economy. The conditions of existence, after they are known 
and accepted, become conditions for the only pertinent beauty "(l) 
And we may adapt that statement to our present topic by 
arguing that the consciousness of mankind is dissatisfied 
with the artist who constructs in defiance of the spiritual 
gravitation represented by these rermanent values. In short, 
into our judgments concerning the higher levels of art, there 
seems to enter a factor which is not really rooted in the 
artistic impulse itself but which represents an underlying ethical 
demand. In art, as we have seen, we have a certain synthesis 
of the cognitive and affective elements of experience, and 
the ethical aemand is not merely that this synthesis should 
not finally and patently conflict with the other kinds of 
synthesis to which the human mind is impelled, but that it 
should in some measure contribute in a positive way to their 
furtherance.(2) 
An even more obvious instznce is to be found in the 
case of religion. While it is true that religion has played 
a noteworthy part in the drama of human progress, we are apt 
to forget that religion itself has frequently had development 
thrust upon it by the growing ethical consciousness of mankind 
with the result of a profound modification of the 6ontents of 
the religious consciousness. Galloway says: "It is now generally 
agreed that the movement towards a higher stage of religion 
did not have its origin in a conscious and deliberate criticism 
of traditional beliefs, but arose out of the practical needs 
which accompanied a fresh advance in social organization. It 
(1) Life of Reason, Reason in Art: p. 221. 
(2) c.f. the development of this point in Ruskin's "The 
Seven Lamps of Architecture." 
(51) 
was the emergence of new wants and the rise of larger ideas, 
through the blending of tribes in the greater social whole 
of the nation, which became the ground .of a further development 
of the spiritual consciousness."(1) 
We may now proceed to elucidate further our conception of the 
nature of the ethical consciousness and of the ethical ideal 
This part of our task will be best achieved by a defence of our 
position as already stated -- a defence which will serve to indicate 
its more important implications. The topic will be developed along 
three principal lines. (1) We shall endeavour to justify our 
view with regard to the place which it accords to the different 
values, and especially to science and art, in the conception of the 
ethical problem. (2) One important implication is that the ideal 
must be conceived and expressed in terms that are intimately 
personal or 'individualistic'. This implication is essentially 
bound up with the notion of the social and political values as 
co- ordinate with the other values and acquires considerable 
importance in the sequel. Hence it will be desirable to offer 
some further justification of our general viewpoint. We have 
(1) The Principles of Religious Development, p.51. 
c.f also Maclver: "The power and the claim of ethical thought 
is -Jost triumphantly revealed in the transformation of religion. 
Even though religion continues to provide a sanction for conduct, 
it is the ethical spirit that is the primary, the transforming 
power in the creation of that sanction. Religion is brought 
into harmony with that spirit, for its conception of deity 
cannot resist the fierce ethical claim of awakened personality ". 
(Community, Bk.3, ch.5, p.295.) 
(52) 
hitherto avoided the use of any one formula in which to express the 
ethical ideal. If any one term is to be used, the above account of 
the ethical problem clearly points to the term 'self -realisation'. 
We shall endeavour, then, to justify this much abused term, as it 
appears to represent the only possible formula for the expression of 
the ideal. Incidentally, we shall attempt to indicate the ultimate 
meaninglessness of certain other forms of statement which pretend 
to a greater concreteness and adequacy. This does not mean, however, 
that we are subscribing to any particular ethical theory. The 
term self -realisation is fully recognised as representing a 
purely formal statement of the ideal. As regards the content which 
we have ascribed to the term, it is submitted that this content 
would in practice be acceptable to the advocates of rival ethical 
theories. 
(3) Our third task will be to raise the question as to what, 
precisely from the present standpoint, is involved in the 
consciousness of moral obligation', the 'ought' consciousness, 
and as to how, metaphysical considerations apart, its existence 
in the individual is to be explained. 
With regard to our first problem, we would preface our 
remarks with the following statement of Santayana: "It seldom 
occurs to modern moralists that theirs is the science of all good 
and the art of its attainment; they think only of some set of 
categoric precepts or of some theory of moral sentiments, abstract - 
ing altogether from the ideals reigning in society, in science and 
in art They divide men into compartments and the less 
they leave in the one labelled'morality', the more sublime they 
think their morality is; and sometimes pedantry and scholasticism 
are carried so far that nothing but an abstract sense of duty 
remains(i the broad region which should contain 811 human 
goods." This stricture on modern moralists is possibly an 
overstatement, but(t;ere is some justification for it. The 
same writer argues that the primary question is, not "what 
ought I to do ? ", but "what ought to be "? In other words, what 
actually are the activities or pursuits which Humanity values? 
The strictly ethical question remains still to be formulated, viz 
Ming into consideration all the relevant facts of my special 
capacities, circumstances, and opportunities, is the attitude of 
my will to these values what it ought to be? From this point of view, 
the question of ethical responsibility is seen to be double- edged. 
There is not only the question of the individual's responsibility 
for living up to the light he possesses, but also the question of 
society's responsibility for making this light available in as 
full a measure as possible. 
The chief source of the difficulty is the idea, either 
taken for granted or explicitly argued, that the field of ethics 
is essentially social. It is held that ethics is concerned from 
first to last with the relations of the individual to his 
fellow -men. In short, the field of ethics is regarded as co- 
extensive with what we have described above as the social and 
the political values. When this is the conception of ethics, 
the existence of activities such as are represented by science 
(3) 
and art invariably constitutes a difficulty. Various attempts 
(i) Life of reason, Reason in Common Sense: introd. p.30. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) For one among the many cases of the occurrence of 
this difficulty in ethical theory, see Green: Prologomena, 
Bk.3, sections 289 and 390, and note. 
(54) 
are made to surmount the difficulty. For example, the facts of 
experience are strained and it is argued that the life devoted 
to scientific or artistic pursuits is indirectly contributing 
to the service of others and that the ethical import resides 
in this fact of the individual's relation to his fellows. 
Or, again, the clear verdict of the ordinary ethical 
consciousness that 'pushpin is not as good as poetry', that 
it is somehow the duty of the individual to developethat part 
of his nature to which science and art appeal, is explained 
by resort to the unconvincing argument that such personal 
self- culture adds to the individual's capacities for social 
service. Let it be clearly understood that we do not mean 
to deny that there is an important element of truth in these 
arguments. Our contention is rather tha4_ the partial nature 
of the truth which they express points to an inadequacy in 
the original conception of the ethical problem. 
Consider the following statement of Rashdall: "We shall 
attach a high intrinsic value to such pleasures as actually 
include a benevolent element, andAlower degree of intrinsic 
superiority to such pleasures as are actually conducive to 
the public good, though the public good may be no part of the 
motive of the person indulging in them. Under the first head 
we should include the actual pleasures of benevolence or 
personal affection, and even to some small extent the pleasures 
of sociability and friendship in so far as these imply some 
degree of unselfish good -will to others. Under the second, 
we should include the pleasures of ambition or emulation and 
the whole range of aesthetic and intellectual pleasures 
In this way it would probably be possible to justify, on the 
whole, that preference for what are commonly called higher 
(55) 
pleasures which is so clear an element of the ordinary moral 
consciousness; since it will be generally admitted that in the 
long run indulgence in social and intellectual pleasures is more 
beneficial in its indirect social effects than indulgence in mere 
(1) 
sensual gratification or unintellectual amusement.TT Now the 
fact that this writer is here concerned with the special question 
of the relative value of pleasures does not alter the general 
effect of the statement; and that effect is to darken counsel 
on a basic question. For the suggestion is strongly conveyed, 
(though it is probably not intended in this case) that these 
indirect social effects actually constitute the fundamental 
ethical justification of these intellectual pursuits. The real 
nature of the ethical situation is more adequately suggested 
in the following statement of the same author: "There are intellectual 
and other accomplishments, to which I at least cannot refuse the 
title of virtue. But I cannot assume that, without exception, 
these must all somehow add to what is called social welfare not', again, 
doc/it see how to make a social organism the subject which 
directly possesses them. But, if so, it is impossible for me to 
(2) 
admit that all virtue is essentially and primarily social". 
If we are driven to insert the thin end of the wedge in this way, 
is it not better frankly to recognise at the outset that the field 
of social relations is only one source -- admittedly a most important 
source -- of those values with which the ethical consciousness is 
directly concerned. 
Another method of meeting the difficulty presented by those 
valuable pursuits which are not in their essence social is to 
resort to the distinction between two classes of virtues, the 
social and the self- regarding virtues; and, on the whole, this 
(1) Theory of Good and Evil, vol p.73 
(2) ibid vol 2, p.87. 
(56) 
line of argument can give us a sufficiently accurate picture 
of the ethical situation. But for several reasons the distinction 
is unsatisfactory, and principally because it suggests an 
essential difference between the individual's attitude in the one 
case and his attitude in the other. From the standpoint of the outside 
observer, the distinction seems to be valid and useful enough. 
But from the point of view of the agent, in truly ethical 
behaviou there would appear to be no such clear consciousness 
of distinction between self and other. In the one case as in 
the other, the individual indentifies himself with an end of felt 
value, and, ultimately, the one attitude is iIR no more 'personal', 
'individual`, or 'self- regarding' than the other. 
In some cases the present difficulty arises as the result 
of a form of statement which carries a misleading suggestion. 
Consider, for instance, the following statement: "Virtue is 
fundamentally and always personal; and when we have discovered 
the law of the individual life, we have already discovered that 
of the social life. Since men are not mere individuals, but the 
bearers of a common personality, the development in the individual 
of his true selfhood means his emancipation from the limitations 
of individuality, and the path of self- realisation is through 
(1) 
the service of others." Now, translating this statement 
into the terms of our own thinking, we would recognise a funda- 
mental truth(a)in the assertion that the discovery of the law of 
the individual life is ipso facto the discovery of the law of 
the social life; and(b) in the notion of the emancipation 
from the limitations of individuality if by this phrase we 
understand the complete indentification of his will with any 
(1) Seth Ethical Principles, Part 2,pp 275 -276 
(57) 
or all of the human values as such; then, indeed, will he find 
his true nature by losing himself in the pursuit of intrinsically 
valuable objects. If, however, the phrase is to be interpreted 
in the narrower sense, it can only mean the development 
of his sensitivity to what we have called the social and 
political values, and the p hrase,'the service of others; is to 
be construed in the ordinary philanthropic sense in which it 
expresses the ideal of self -sacrifice or benevolence. In that 
ease, may we not ask whether the service of others, in the 
restricted sense, is necessarily the path to self -realisation? 
May it not happen that 'the law of the individual life; in the 
case of a particular individual) is such that the service of 
others is not for him the main road to self- realisation? An 
obvious case, for example, is that of the individual who is 
exceptionally one -sided in native endowment, so that in certain 
directions,e.g. the social and political values, he can only 
achieve a minimum of adjustment, while in other directions, e.g. 
science or art, he is capable of contributions which, though 
the benefit of others may be no part of his motive ix. making them, 
may nevertheless be well characterised as 'the service of others' 
in so far as they further those interests which are of vital and 
permanent concern to humanity as such.. Or, without these loftier 
capacities, his nature may be only specially responsive along 
the line of these latter interests. In either case, his ethical 
growth need not directly or essentially involve the service of 
others. While self- realisation then, must always be the 
expression of the form of the ethical ideal, just what kinds 
of activity are predominantly to furnish the content of the ideal, 
just what the balance is going to be among the different values, 
is a question which cannot be answered in general terms. From 
(58) 
first to last, the answer is conditioned by the individual's native 
endowment. The education which society provides ought to furnish 
the means for the discovery and actualisation of this endowment; 
it is in this sense that society shares with the individual himself 
the responsibility for his ethical development. 
We have seen, then, that the attempt to make the individual's 
social relations the primary and essential factor in ethics 
cannot be consistently maintained. As Bradley skews in 
(1) 
the 'Ethical Studies', the effort 
cannot avoid doing violence to the deliverance of the ordinary 
ethical consciousness. As he very definitely expresses it: "The 
realisation for myself of truth and beauty, the living for the 
self which in the apprehension, the knowledge, the sight and the 
love of them finds its true being, is (all those who know the 
meaning of words will bear me out) a moral obligation, which 
is not felt as such only so far as it is too pleasant.... It is 
a moral duty for the artist or the enquirer to lead the life of 
one, and a moral offence when he fails to do so. But on the other 
hand it is impossible, without violent straining of the facts, to 
turn these virtues into social virtues or duties to my neighbour. 
No doubt such virtues do as a rule lead indirectly to the welfare 
of others, but this is not enough to make them social: their 
social bearing is indirect, and does not lie in their very essence. 
The end they aim at is a single end of their own, the content of 
(2) 
which does not necessarily involve the good of other men" 
In justification of the attention which we have given to this point, 
we can but plead again that the ignoring of it has done much to 
produce a one -sided picture of the ethical growth of the individual 
(1) See especially Essay 6, on 'Ideal Morality.' 
(2) Ethical Studies, Essay 7, p.201. 
(59) 
in the case of the few writers who have dealt with the problem. 
One of the chief difficulties in the way of an account 
of the ethical consciousness which will be at once wide enough 
and yet will not appear to do violence to what people actually 
eel on the subject is really to be found in the ambiguity of 
the term morality. It is a aduleirg term which passes easily from a 
narrower sense in which it is essentially concerned with social 
relationships to a much wider sense in which it is somehow 
concerned with the whole of the individual's behaviour. 
The following statement of a recent writer makes it clear that 
the difficulty is not gratuitous. «It does not seem right to 
speak of a moral faculty as something coordinate and competing 
with the rest( That is, philosophic, artistic, scientific and 
like them capable of being the source of special interests. 
Morality or character pervades the whole man and all his 
pursuits and transfuses and gives them value. According as he is 
moral or not, his pursuits have moral value or not, and it 
is doubtful whether, if he is moral, they are not all alike 
valuable without a hierarchy of higher and lower values. On 
the other hand, if he is not moral, whatever his pursuits are, 
(I). 
they are equally valueless morally" It is clear, however, 
that we must specify much more exactly than it is customary to do 
just that is meant by this "morality or character" which 
"pervades the whole man and all his pursuits and transfuses 
and gives them value." Such an analysis (attempted in the 
preceeding pages) would seem to suggest that the absolute dis- 
junction, "either moral or not moral, either morally valuable or 
morally valueless" is hardly applicable to the normal human 
being. 
(1) P.Zeon, in _lind n.s. vol.28, p 436 
(e 
It might be objected at this point that our own view is 
in manifest conflict with the verdict of common sense. Is it 
not the case, it miLht be urged, that the ordinary ethical 
consciousness considers those standards, which seek to regulate 
social relationships, in some way fundamental to ethics, even 
though some degree of ethical significance cannot be denied 
to the other values? Is not the individual's susceptibility 
to the values of science and art much more a matter of 
indifference to ethics than his attitude to the social and 
political values? Is ethics not much more concerned, for example, 
with his love of veracity than with his love of knowledge? Now, 
we may admit at once that such is ordinarily the case, but we 
would suggest that this deliverance of the ordinary consciousness 
is largely the result of extraneous considerations and that it 
represents rather the more unreflecting, superficial pronouncement 
than the better -considered and deeper convictions on the subject. 
Society is, of course, much more immediately and directly 
affected by the individual's attitude to the latter values 
and is therefore more vitally interested in securing a certain 
minimum of adjustment to them. For the same reason, it is in 
connection with these norms that regulate social relationships 
that the 'ought' of the ethical consciousness becomes, for the 
first time in the individual's ethical history, more or less, 
clearly defined; and, indeed, it too commonly fails to pass 
beyond this restricted reference. If it be argued that 
acceptance of these social values and conformity to the 
standards of conduct arising out of them is essential to the 
very existence of all social, and hence of all distinctively 
human life, it seems sufficient to answer that it appears 
equally difficult to conceive a human type of existence from 
61) 
which any or all of the other values would have completely disappeared. 
in fine, each of the values, without qualification of more or less, 
is essential to distinctively human life. 
With regard to the 'ought' consciousness, again, it may be 
further pointed out that, just because the social effects of 
the individual's attitude to the other values are, as we have 
seen, essentially indirect and often remote, it is not surprising 
that the 'ought' in the ordinary consciousness should, as a result 
of social forces, tend to become associated almost exclusively 
with those behaviour norms which are more or less explicitly 
social. Again, (and here we seem to touch the substratum of 
truth in the common -sense attitude) indifference or opposition 
to existing social values is construed, and as a rule rightly 
construed, as indicating a general disposition to flout all 
authority as such. We have already pointed out that, even in 
the case of the fully developed ethical consciousness, a 
certain element of submission to authority is inseparable from the 
individual's attitude to the human values; and on the whole, it 
is a sound intuition of common -sense that finds in the individual's 
indifference to the ordinary definite valuations of the social 
life a fairly reliable symptom of a disposition inimical to 
the growth of that sense of personal responsibility, to the 
development of that spirit of seriousness in deliberation and 
choice which is of the very essence of the ethical attitude. 
But while these considerations serve to explain the 
paramount place accorded to the directly social values, even 
the ordinary, unsophisicated ethical consciousness, when it 
begins to reflect on the ethical situation as a whole, does 
not hesitate to admit that something more than a merely 
supplementary importance attaches to those other values of the 
(62) 
more strictly individual life. For example, common -sense rightly 
insists that a certain measure of acceptance of the current values 
of the social life is a sine qua non of morality. But if it be 
pointed out that something more is needed than this minimum of 
social adjustment, and the question be asked as to what constitutes 
a high degree of ethical development, it is true that common -sense 
might offer the answer that this higher ethical development is 
to be found in the furtherance of these social values to the 
fullest possible extent, that is, in effect, in the active promotion 
of the good of others. In short, it might identify the ethical 
ideal with an ideal of consciously benevolent activity. But, on 
the other hand, if we pointed out that the successful prosecution 
of such an ideal presupposes certain special qualities and 
aptitudes which can only to a very limited extent be cultivated 
by training, that these qualities are often absent in individuals 
who possess valuable aptitudes of a different order, and that the 
conception of the ethical ideal exclusively Or essentially in 
terms of the social values, would preclude the possibility of the 
higher ethical development in the case of such individuals; then 
common -sense would recognise that a far broader conception of 
the ethical life had been implicit in its ordinary judgments of 
'good' and 'bad', and'right' and 'wrong'. 
Our notions of the demands of the ethical life and our 
conception of the nature and method of ethical training are in 
danger of dwindling into a mean and shabby preoccupation with 
what we may call the bare minimum of negative morality. To train 
the individual so that he will not openly disregard the more 
obvious social restraints and standards, to guarantee, in a word, 
that he will not prove positively troublesome to society, that 
is the spirit in which the end of ethical training tends to 
(63) 
be conceived. It is little wonder that we often find high value 
attached to attitudes of mind and forms of behaviour which 
represent only the spurious sociality of the herd the profounder 
vision of the meaning of ethical training would look forward 
to the time when the wilful failure on the part of the individual 
auttvely to identify himself, in the degree to which his capacities 
and circumstances allow, with these permanently valuable pursuits 
will be visited with a judgment of condemnation as direct and 
uncompromising as is at present evoked by, let us say, the dishonest 
repudiation of a debt. This may appear immUtopian view of the 
issues involved in ethical training, but it is the only view 
that promises results which, however partial or incomplete in 
the light of an ideal standard, will nevertheless be profoundly 
and permanently valuable. 
We have suggested that, if any one term is to be used, the 
term which best expresses the nature of the ethical ideal is 
the term self- realization This "ambiguous, mysterious term ", as 
Rashdall calls it, has been subjected to a considerable amount 
of what appears to be rather irrelevant criticism (1) A con- 
sideration of these criticisms suggests a misunderstanding, 
wilful or other, on the part of the critics as to what the self - 
realisationist really means to assert. It is contended, for 
instance, that the phrase amounts to "self- contradictory nonsen9e" 
because "you cannot make real what is real already, and the 
self must certainly be regarded as real before we are invited 
(2) 
to set about realising it ". But all that is meant, of course, 
(1) For a summary of the usual objections to the term, see 
Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil, Vol.2, pp.62 
(2) Ibid, 
(64) 
is that certain kinds of activity mean a fuller and more satisfying 
life for the self than is enjoyed when these pursuits are omitted, and, 
far from finding any absurdity in that notion, we must confess to 
an utter failure to find even a difficulty in the idea. Or, it is 
suggested that it may mean an all-round, equal development of 
all the capacities of the self, and it is then promptly pointed 
out that such impartial development involves the realisation 
of the immoral as well as of the moral propensities and that 
(1) 
this "leaves out the whole differentia of lorality ". We 
need only temark that no self- realisationist, with any pretensions 
to a consistent ethical theory, has ever really suggested 
this sense of the term. Against the notion of a 'harmonious' devel- 
opment of capacities, the harmony involving modification and 
repression of certain tendencies, it is objected that the formula 
'self"!realisation' gives no indication as to hew this harmony is 
secured, as to what tendencies are to be fostered and what 
tendencies must be repressed. This objection is pertinent, 
but the point of it disappears when we admit that the concept of 
self -realisation is in itself purely formal, and if we proceed 
to give content to this form. This we have endeavoured to do in 
the above account of the nature of .self- realising avtivity. The 
human values, with the pursuit of which we indentified the 
Good, must be regarded as a more or less partial realisation 
as well as an indication of the nature of, the best impulses, 
the most abiding needs of the self as a whole. On the other hand, 
the description of the end as self- realisation, though in itself 
formal, serves an important purpose. It gives to the tRe enquiry 
its true orientation at the outset by its recognition of the fact 
that, whatever be the ethical ideal, its ultimate nature must be 
somehow expressible in terms of individual excellence; and 
(, ) Opp. cit. 
(65) 
that emphasis is desirable for many reasons. As one writer 
eloquently expresses what appears to be essentially the same idea: 
"Upon what basis does that historic claim to liberty rest if 
not upon the truth, seen darkly by some, by others clearly envisaged, 
that freedom for each to conduct life's adventure in his own way and 
to rake the best he can of it is the one universal ideal sanctioned 
by nature and approved by reason; and that the beckoning gleams 
of other ideals are but broken lights from this? That freedom is, 
in truth, the condition, if not the source, of all higher goods, 
apart from it duty has no meaning, self- sacrifice no value, 
(1) 
authority no sanction ". 
It remains to deal more fully with an aspect of our subject 
which we have hitherto mentioned in a merely incidental way. This 
is the question as to the kind of consciousness implied in our 
use of the categories 'right' and 'wrong', the 'ought' consciousness, 
or, to use the customary phrase, the consciousness of moral 
obligation. At this point in our discussion, the question is: 
4hat, as a matter of psychological fact, is the origin and meaning 
of this consciousness? Our question is not; what psychological 
conditions must be present, what level of general mental develop- 
ment must be attained, before this consciousness matures? 
(1) T. P. Nunn: Education: Its Data and First Principles,p.9. 
c.f. also: "We must insist, in the face of misinterpretation, 
that the service of one's fellmws or one's country or one's 
race is not the complete end of life, nor fitness for such 
service, "fitness for citzenahip ", the complete end of education. 
To make such fitn ̂ssfor service the ethical end is to reason in 
a circle, and to darken the very meaning of that vital fitness 
for service," (tiacIver,'Community', Bk.2, ch.l,p. 91). 
c.f.also the very clear statement of the same point by Guyau, 
`'Education and Heredity`p.81. 
(66) 
That question will occupy us later. .:till less are we concerned 
with the purely philosophic question: what is the ultimate sig- 
nificance of the fact that such a consciousness appears at all? 
We have indicated how the striving of Humanity towards a 
more expansive and satisfying exercise of its powers has become 
articulate in certain activities which represent the ultimate 
objects of which the term 'good' is predicated. Behaviour 
which is more or less clearly apprehended as promoting the 
good in this sense is summed up in certain .rules, principles, 
or generalisations -- a synthesis of experience which 
represents a social heritage of which the individual must be 
led to possess himself. It is,)of course, in connection with 
these standards which are already operative in his social 
environment that the consciousness of obligation appears. 
Partly because of his own unreflecting imitation, and partly 
because of express social compulsion, the individual more or 
less conforms to these standards. But if ethical growth is 
to take place at all, his conformity must not remain either 
a matter of mere imitation or of mere compulsion. It must be 
conscious and deliberate, and the authority vested in these 
standards must not remain purely external. If the standards 
themselves reflect the permanent needs of human nature and 
thus represent a truly ethical synthesis,(however incomplete 
it may be) the individual learns not merely to react to them 
as external controls, but to appreciate them, and to find 
their authority rooted in the fact of their abiding value. 
The authority is then self- imposed, the will is autonomous. 
But none the less, the consciousness of obligation remains; for 
the character is still in process of formation, that is to 
say, the organisation of impulses is still incomplete; so 
that the isolated impulse may still claim that independent 
tut 
satisfaction which is authoritatively denied to it by the standards 
of conduct which have become operative in the individual's life. 
The consciousness of obligation or duty is thus inseparable from, 
and is the reliable symptom of. real ethical development. It is 
also clear, then, that the ultimate ethical category is not that 
of 'right', but that which was made basal in Greek ethical 
speculation, nanely, the category of 'good'. 
It might be objected that we have not laid sufficient 
emphasis on the notion of the development of qualities of character, 
the development of the so- called virtues, as the end of ethical 
training. The reason, however, ought to be now apparent without 
further elaboration. The viewpoint which stresses the development 
of such qualities or virtues as the end of ethical training really 
represents an abstraction, and an abstraction which is particularly 
unfortunate when the interest is in the genesis of ethical behaviour. 
The virtues represent different forms of organisation of individual 
tendencies, an organisation incidental to the pursuit of the good. 
They thus represent the inner aspect of the general process of 
self -realisation. Superficially, and for practical purposes, we 
may say that these qualities of character, the virtues, are ends 
in themselves. More careful reflection might suggest that they 
are means. But the fuller understanding of their significance 
would chew that both views are an abstraction; these qualities 
not only grow out of the pursuit, but they furnish the guarantee 
of the continued existence, of these values. And the special virtues 
but represent specially significant contours, so to speak, of the 
whole personality which we are concerned to de:,cribe. 
This examination of the ethical consciousness has necessarily 
involved 
a statement of much that is now commonplace in ethical 
theory. It has been necessary also to omit, as irrelevant to our 
(6e) 
main interest, the detailed consideration of many questions which 
we have raised by implication and which are rich in controversial 
matter for the professional student of ethics. But the general 
outcome of the process of ethical growth has been indicated, and 
may be briefly summarised. The individual experiences impulses or 
needs which crave satisfaction. This satisfaction of impulse is 
ultimately what we have in view when we characterise an experience 
as good. The individual further becomes familiar with the fact 
that one line of satisfaction may be incompatible with another, 
that one kind of activity may involve a satisfaction which is 
less immediate but eventually greater than that conferred by some 
other kind of activity, and so on. Further still, he comes to find 
that there are certain kinds of activity on behalf of which the 
claim is advanced, with all the authority of social experience, 
that they confer a truer and more lasting satisfaction- a claim 
which,as a rational being, he cannot altogether ignore, and the 
recognition of which, partial or complete, generates that sense of 
duty or obligation which is henceforth a permanent element in 
his ethical consciousness. The ethical problem, the problem of 
the practical reason, is for him, in the first place, the 
identification of his will with these valuable activities. In 
the second place, however, the problem of ethical development is 
in essence individual or personal - it is his problem. That is to 
say, it is that of fabricating out of these values (with his 
inherited equipment and his special circumstances as conditioning 
materials) the structure of the best possible life, the life 
Which Will mean the maximum satisfaction on the whole, in a word, 
the realisation of his highest self -hood. As we have shewn 
already, the details of the ideal life cannot be filled in by gener- 
al theory, just because this detailed content is to be the 
9 
(ó9) 
expression of a true individuality, and the process of self - 
realisation is actually the process of discovering this content. 
Now, that kind of attitude to life as a whole which is here 
implied - the attitude which attaches fundamental significance to 
the alternatives presented to the will, to the processes of 
deliberation and the acts of choicer is the distinctively ethical 
attitude, and, as suggested above, we may regard this attitude as 
a working description of the somewhat mysterious 'good will' of 
ethical theory. Needless to say, it is not contended that 
behaviour, to be ethical, must be uniformly on this elevated 
plane. But this attitude, in an explicit form, must be a 
frequently recurring factor in the individual's experience, and 
whenever "live options" are presented to the will, the choice, 
however im:_ediate and apparently unreflective, must embody 
the results of this attitude -- in which case the choice is 
implicitly ethical. 
The interpretation of the nature of the ethical consciousness 
which has been elaborated in the preceding chapters has many 
advantages from the point of view of the geneticist. Some of 
these may be mentioned at this point. 
It supplies, for the process of ethical training, one aim 
at least which is capable of being definitely conceived and stated. 
v1z., that of so presenting, in education, these valuable objects 
or pursuits to the individual that we may actualise the relation 
which potentially exists between these basal values and the 
Permanent needs of his nature. But in connection with the 
accomplishment of this general aim, it focusses certain important 
Psychological considerations, such, for example, as the question of 
the special psychological characteristics of the different periods 
Of development -- characteristics which will profoundly affect the 
(70) 
strength of the appeal of these values at different stages. 
Again, with regard to the problem of the method of training, 
and especially with regard to the rather unnecessarily vexed question 
of the possibility and desirMbility of direct moral instruction, 
it is clear that, if the general nature of ethical development is 
justly conceived, the question suggests its own answer. The 
fundamental method, it would seem, must always be that which is 
called or rather perhaps, miscalled indirect. It would seem, 
also, that direct moral instruction, that is, the effort to impart 
an understanding and an appreciation of values or standards 
by verbal teaching,is incidental to the general process. 
Though incidental, however, its role is important. For instance, 
in acquiring the knowledge of language generally, not only does the 
word serve to sum up in a readily available way a certain mental 
content, but also the strange or relatively strange word constitutes 
a direct stimulus to further mental exploration and thus accelerates 
general mental development. Similarly, in direct ethical teaching, 
the individual is incited to a fuller apprehension and appreciation 
of values which he has hitherto but vaguely felt. In general, we may 
say that direct moral instruction represents the stressing of 
the element of authority which we found an inseparable feature 
of the ethical consciousness; and indirect ta84m4af training would 
befit process which this authority is stripped of its externality, 
and tends to be self- imposed. Both methods would, therefore, be 
necessary in ethical training. 
The most important corollary, however, which our point of 
view suggests is the fact that ethical development must be conceived 
as in some way a function of the growth of the individual's mind as 
a whole, and not merely a function of the development of certain 
specific tendencies, however fundamental. While there can be little 
is 
(71) 
doubt that historically, the tendency has been to lay exaggerated 
emphasis on the purely intellectual factors, it seems clear that 
recent tendencies reveal a movement towards a different, but an 
equally false simplification of what we have shewn to be a highly 
complex process. For example, the `instinct psychologists', as they 
have been called, have beyond a doubt made a permanently valuable 
contribution by directing attention to man's instinctive equipment 
and urging its importance for all later development. nut in the 
present essay we hope to shew that the interpretation of the part 
played by these instinctive factors in the development of 
personality (in the few cases where an attempt has been made to deal 
systematically with this problem) has given us a picture the broad 
outlines of which seem to be falsely drawn. Essential factors in 
the process -- factors which are not instinctive in any ordinary sense 
of the term -- have been either ignored or obscured, with the 
result of a one- sided4mphasis which is likely to prove as 
barren as the intellectualism against which it protests. 
In connection with our next topics, viz, native endowment 
and motivation, we shall meet cases in point of the tendencies in 
question. 
CHAPTER IV 
Native Endowment and the Problem of motivation. 
Our general criticism of the writers who have treated the 
problem of the genesis of the ethical attitude is to the effect 
that their contributions suffer from an attempt at over -simplification. 
This takes the form of using one principle of explanation so 
widely that not only is there a strain put on the interpretation of 
the facts, but the principle itself loses all real explanatory 
value. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish the theories which we 
(72) 
have principally in view as 1.'Sympathy' theories, 2. 'Imitation' 
theories, and 3. 'Instinct' theories. In i. and 2, we find a 
particular instinctive impulse, in 3, we find the concept of instinct 
itself, magnified with respect to its significance as a principle 
of explanation. To begin with the last- mentioned class, we have 
the most distinguished and influential example of this class in 
McDougall's 'Introduction to Social Esychology'. Now, as the title 
(1) 
states and as the author elsewhere reminds us, this work is 
intended rather to outline the groundwork or first principles of 
a social psychology than to represent an actual contribution to 
that science. Still less is it intended to be an explicit treatment 
of the problem of the growth of the ethical consciousness. On the 
other hand, this justly famous work does treat the problem at least 
incidentally; and, moreover, the position taken up on certain 
psychological issues is of vital concern to any treatment 
of our problem. Hence we may fairly regard it as at least in 
broad outline a contribution to genetic ethics and shall therefore 
examine certain of its more fundamental contentions. 
McDougall's account of the original instinctive and impulsive 
endowment has occasioned a considerable amount of discussion in 
recent psychological literature. Criticism of his position has 
ranged from an attempt to modify and supplement his account of 
the instincts to a challenging of the validity of the very 
concept of instinct. It does not fall within the scope of 
this essay to offer any direct, systematic discussion of this 
problem. We shall merely outline the general view of native 
endowment which we are prepared to accept; and our discussion 
will be more particularly concerned to shew the significance to 
be attached to these native factors in subsequent development. 
(1) "The Group 'And." Introd. p.2. 
(73) 
In fact, it may be defi.nitelJ stated at this point that we see 
no adequate reason, in the present state of psychological knowledge, 
to dissent in any fundamental way from McDougall's account of 
the instincts; but we shall have to take serious exception to 
the weight of explanation which is thrown upon them. Generally, 
then, we would accept the account of instinctive endowment as 
offered by McDougall and as modified and supplemented by Dreyer. 
Drever's revision of the innate tendencies(1) seems adequately 
to supplement .ÌcDougall's account, and, pending further 
investigations of an experimental kind along behaviouristic and 
neutological lines, we may safely accept this account of man's 
instinctive endowment. 
There are, it is true, certain tempting psychological 
questions raised in connection with some of the instincts which 
these writers recognise. For example the recognition of the 
twin instincts of self- assertion and self- abasement might well 
raise a question. Whether the facts of behaviour, which the 
advocates of these instincts have in view, are properly to be 
attributed in each case to a separate instinct seems a debatable 
point. While it does not appear necessary to enter into a 
discussion of special points of this kind, it does seem desirable, 
On the other hand, to come to terms with certain attacks of a 
more radical kind which have recently been made from -two 
:directions on the very concept of instinct itself. 
G. C. Field sees in the procedure of these psychologists a 
.movement in the direction of resuscitating the fallacy of the 
Faculty Fsycholo`y. While accepting the notion of 'instinctive' 
pss 
legitimate and fruitful, of the notion of particular 'instincts' 
and the practice of explaining behaviour by means of them, he says: 
(1) Instinct in Man, ch.6. 
(74) 
"But now what happens when we cease to talk about Instinct and 
begin to talk about the instincts? What information does it convey 
to us when we are told that a certain action is due not only to 
Instinct but to some particular instinct? If such a statement is 
to give us any real information, it must tell us something more 
than the general facts which are conveyed to us by saying that 
the action is instinctive, and what is more important, it must 
tell us something more than we can gather from an inspection of 
the action itself. Thus if we see bees building cells and someone 
tells us that they do this because they have a cell -building 
instinct, the word "instinct ", it is true, tells us something 
important about this action, but the word cell- building is entirely 
superfluous and tells as nothing at all that we did not know 
directly from the inspection of the action. Particularly it must 
be remembered that, when we are talking of our own actions or 
of those of being like ourselves, the ascription of an action 
or of any kind of conscious experience to any particular instinct 
must, if it is to give us any genuine information, tell us something 
that cannot be derived from an inspection of our own consciousness 
(1) 
at . the moment of the experience ". The criticism of the Instinct 
Psychology implied here is serious and, indeed, fatal, if it be valid. 
McDougall's own answer, however, to this line of criticism seems to 
(2) 
meet the needs of the situation. He points out that the 
ascription of an action to a particular instinct does indeed 
give us important additional information about it, as it serves 
to connect the action with the larger whole of action to which 
the term 'instinct' refers and thus really makes prediction to some 
degree possible. 
(1) Mind, July, 1921, "Faculty Psychology and Instinct 
Psychology". 
(75) 
The 'explanation' in 
such a case takes the form of connecting the 
isolated act with other acts and sheaving that these supposedly 
separate acts are special manifestations of something more basic 
or general, -- in the case quoted in the note, the impulse to shield 
(2) Note: IvlcDougall's reply is as follows: TtLlr. Field is 
mistaken in supposing that the ascription of an action to a 
particular instinct conveys no Tore information than can be attained 
by the inspection of the action or conveyed by the statement that 
it is instinctive or due to instinct. Consider a concrete example. 
I return to its cage, after handling it, a young white rat. Its 
mother hops about it in an agitated manner, then seizes it in her 
mouth and drags it to the back of the cage. An onlooker, knowing 
that rats when short of food sometimes eat their young, says: "She 
is going to eat it ". I reply confidently: "No, it's all right. It's 
the maternal instinct'.-',. In saying that I imply much that is 
given neither by simple introspection of the action nor by-the 
statement that the action is 'instinctive. If the mother rat . 
proceeds to devour the young one that shews that I was mistaken. 
But if I had merely remarked that her behaviour was instinctive, 
I could not be accused of error: for the act of dragging the 
young one to the back of the cage was instinctive in this case 
also, though perverted; was an expression, not of the maternal 
instinct, but of a very different one, the food -seeking instinct. 
Thus, in such a simple case, the correct ascription of an action 
or of a phase of behaviour, to a particular instinct enables us 
to forecast the further course of the train of behaviour, and 
enables us, if desired, to intervene to modify the further course 
of behaviour." (Journal of Abnormal I''sychology and Social 
PaYchology, 
Dec. 1921, March,1922.) 
(76) 
or protect. In principle, this kind of explanation seems indentical 
with that which 'explains' the fall of the apple by connecting that 
phenomenon with planetary movements. 
We may admit, then, the legitimacy of the concept of a 
particular instinct and also of the practice of psychologists 
in attributing explanatory value to such a concept. On the other 
hand, Yr. Field's caveat is well -timed in view of the extent to which 
certain psychologists have apparently been obsessed with the 
idea of the enormous significance of certain particular instincts. 
Ir. Field himself quotes an unmistakable case in point in 
Trotter's "Instincts of the Herd in eace and war ". Here we find 
levels of behaviour, ranging from the simplest herd activities 
of the animals to the most highly socialised activities of man, 
'explained' as due to the operation of the gregarious instinct. 
While we would agree with Field as to the futility of this 
procedure, we would suggest, however, that the fallacy here is not 
that of the Faculty Psychology ; for the gregarious instinct, like 
the other instincts, has a certain explanatory or prognostic value. 
The fallacy is that of using a principle, which possesses a 
certain limited explanatory value, in an unlimited manner. The 
difficulty, for example, is not that the gregarious instinct is not 
a factor in the highly developed socialised behaviour of man, 
but simply that it leaves the really important aspects of such 
behaviour unexplained and without even a hint of explanation. 
In itself it tells us nothing, and apparently cannot tell as 
enything,as to why its operation in one case, namely among the 
lower animals, results in one kind of behaviour, and in another case, 
e. among human beings, in a kind of behaviour which presents new 
and special characteristics too obvious to be denied. 
The second line of criticism of which we have made mention 
(77) 
is that which boldly denies the very fact of instinct, conceived 
as an inherited response, and asserts that the phenomena treated 
under the rubric of instinct are in the last resort phenomena 
of habit. In a recent contribution(1) LIr. Zing Yang Kuo takes 
up this uncompromising position. The so- called instincts are 
here regarded as highly complex responses which häve been inte- 
gated, in the course of the individual's experience, out of 
numerous units of reaction; these units of reaction are described 
as "what we find in the child's spontaneous activities and random 
acts". (2) "Such spontaneous and random acts are all that we can 
credit to the native endowment of man" . (2) It is not relevant 
to our problem to undertake a full consideration of duo's 
interesting article. The following comments will suffice for our 
purpose: A much more exact study than psychology has yet 
attempted of the details of the neuro- muscular processes in 
instinctive behaviour is urgently needed., butt at the same time) 
is unfortunately a matter of extreme difficulty. In the absence 
of this more exact knowledge, which is needed if we are to 
distinguish sharply between reactions which are really inherited 
and reactions which are grafted on them as the result of experience, 
it is of course difficult directly to refute Kuo's position. But even 
though we were to admit that the so- called instincts are in reality 
acquired reactions, integrated in the manner of habits out of 
more elementary units, we have still to explain the inevitableness 
so to speak, with which these highly specialised reactions are 
acquired by all the members of the species; and if we attempt to 
eZlain this, it seems very difficult to avoid reintroducing 
somehow the notion of an inherited predisposition to certain 
(1) Journal of Ehilosophy,Nov. 24, 1921. 
(2) Ibid.p.658. 
(78) 
rinds of reaction. Knots notion of a similar environment acting upon 
similar organisms(1) does not escape the implication. It lurks 
both in the idea of similarity of organic structure and 
similarity of environment. Similarity of original nervous 
)rganisation, with the 'selection' which this entails, is connected 
3ausally with environmental similarity. But Kuo takes exception 
to any kind of a priori relation between organism and object. 
le says: " To assume any inborn tendency is to assume a priori 
relation between organism and stimulating objects 
such an assumption is no less objectionable than the theory of 
innate ideas "(2). Kuo' himself assumes here that any theory of 
innate ideas must necessari&y be objectionable -- a most 
unwarrantable assumption. For modern psychology has employed 
the notion of innate ideas in this special sense only after 
rejection of the tabula rasa theory for which Kuo apparently 
pleads. In fact, he cannot logically adopt this line of criticism, 
for his own notion of original units of reaction seems equally 
open to it. If we mistake not, the real difficulty which quo has 
apprehended here is the very fundamental 'structure and function' 
difficulty; the question as to the priority of the one or the 
other() He is simply assuming the priority of the structure concept, 
while a consideration of the more ultimate biological aspects of 
this problem suggests the unwisdom of any dogmatism cone rnin ït. 
Thorndy1 e has endeavoured to show that the objects and 
responses in instinctive behaviour are much more specific than 
they appear to be in McDougall's and Drever's accounts. Thorndyke's 
attempt to carry out a more precise analysis of the behaviour 
(1) Journal of Philosophy, Nov. 24, 1921. p 652. 
(2) Journal of Philosophy, Nov. 24, 1921. 
(3) c.f.the more :andamelItal aspects of this difficulty as 
stated by (a) Childs,Se,.escence and Rejuenesenc'pp26 -31 
and (b) Russell, Form and Function,ch.17. 
(79) 
facts represented by the various instincts is a valuable contri- 
bution and further study along such lines is desirable. But 
with regard to the problem of the ultimate psychological facts 
in instinct and of the correct enumeration of the instincts, it is 
fortunately not necessary for our purpose to await its solution. 
It will be helpful, however, to summarise what appear to be 
the general lessons of the discussion in prol5ositions; 1"" 
1. No enumeration of the human instincts ought to be construed as 
other than a provisional working hypothesis, pending further 
examination, with all the resources at the command of a scientific 
psychology of the exact nature of the mechanisms involved. 2. The 
tenor of the discussion as a whole gives nothing but support to 
the view which the present essay will develop as to the basic nature 
of our habit adjustments. 3. The more precise investigation of the 
processes ultimately involved in instinct may well uncover more 
basal difficulties; such, for example, as the question of the 
validity; for the more ultimate purposes of science, of the 
ordinary distinctions of 'inherited' and 'acquired', organism and 
environment.(1) 
The real issue for our purpose, however, is the 
question as to the soundness of what is perhaps the central con - 
tentibn of ilcDougall's account: viz, the explanation of motivation at 
all levels of behaviour in terms of instinct and instinctive emotion. 
As against this contention it will be urged that, while there is 
a sense in which McDougall's position is sound, the problem of 
motivation on the higher levels of human behaviour is considerably 
more complicated than it is represented to be by McDougall; that 
there are factors concerned in motivation of which he takes 
altogether insufficient account; and that, therefore, his statements 
as to the role of instinct in motivation are not so much wrong 
(1) For an interesting discussion of the meaning of these 
terms, 'see Art. in Journal of Abnormal Psychology,July-Sept. 
19 22. "The meaning of Inherited & Acquired in reference to 
Instinct." (Wells)` 
as seriously misleading. The examination of this problem of 
motivation,to which we now proceed,will reveal, not the error, but the 
incompleteness of %IcDougall's statement of native endowment in 
so far as the human being is concerned; and the more complete 
statement of human native endowment, which is demanded by the 
facts of motivation, will be attempted. 
We may quote in full the important passage in which I:IcDougall 
defines his position, -- a position which he has not appreciably 
modified in later contributions.(1) 
We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts 
are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative 
or impulsive force of some instinct ( or of some habit derived 
from an instinct) every train of thought, however cold and 
passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and 
every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive 
impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the 
driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and 
all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly 
developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the 
by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure 
and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the meansS' 
Now, there appear to be two quite clearly distinguishable 
senses of the term 'motive' ; and the above statement obscures, 
if it does not ignore the distinction between them. The first 
sense is the literal one, viz., that which 'moves' or urges the 
organism to action. The reference here is to those original 
tendencies virtue of which the organism does not remain 
"inert and lifeless like a clock whose main spring has been 
removed 
". The existence of some such original tendencies seems 
in the last analysis inseparable from the idea of an 
(1) c. f.'Itiiind' July, 1920: "Motives in the Light of Jeciwnt Discussion 
(81) 
organism as such, that is t o say, something that makes more or 
less adaptive responses to changing environmental conditions. 
It may be admitted that these tendencies are the basis of all 
later activities in the sense that in their absence these 
activities could not have come into being. It may further 
be granted that their influence continues to make itself 
felt on the higher levels of behaviour, although we shall find 
it necessary to take issue with the Instinct psychologists on 
the question of the precise amanner and the extent of this 
influence. These tendencies, therefore, represent in some way 
the ultimate origin or source of what has been called the 
element of 'drive' in behaviour. They have been likened by 
Woodworth to the motive power which drives a machine. Using 
7oodworth's analogy we would point out that there are three 
factors of which account must be taken, viz.. the motive power, 
the mechanism and the work done or result produced by the machine. 
In the human machine(on the higher levels of behaviour), this 
result is foreseen; and, further, the notion of 'motive' is often 
identified with this 'object' or 'end' of activity. There are thus 
two senses of motive between which a prima facie distin.ctiot 
at least must be drawn. As one writer expresses t (2) , there 
is motivation in the sense of the 'vis a tergo' and in the sense 
of the 'vis a termini.' From the phrasing of the passage quoted, 
it is clear that McDougall considers that the explanation of 
both forms of motivation is to be found in the instincts. 
We have admitted, of course, the existence of native impulses 
of the kind described by McDougall, so that our present concern 
is rather with these objects, ends, or aims which the individual 
(1) Introduction to Social Psychology, ch. 2. p.44. 
(2)Psychological Review, July, 1921. 
(82) 
comes to value and which, therefore, are ordinarily said to 
motivate him. The fundamental question that/ appears to be: is the 
problem of motivation satisfactorily solved if we :phew, as 
ItcDougall has attempted to chew, that these valuable ends or 
activities can be analysed into elements which appeal to one or 
more of the instincts? In that case, inasmuch as these objects 
represent simply a later development and organisation of the 
primary instincts, the problem of motivation is to spew exactly what 
organisation of primary instincts is represented by these objects. 
Let us put our question from a somewhat different angle and ask: 
.what factors go to determine or constitute these valued objects 
or ends of activity? In answer to this question, it will be argued 
that the factor which the Instinct psychologists exclusively stress 
namely, instinct, is not the sole and not even the most important 
factor. Analysis will reveal the fundamental influence exerted in 
the determination of ends by two other factors, viz., what we may 
refer to as the intellectual factor on the one hand, and the 
factor of habit on the other. 
Let us consider the intellectual factor first. The modifi- 
cation of the ends which are set by native impulse, in so far as 
that modification takes place on a distinctively' human level of 
behaviour, is clearly a function of a certain intellectual process; 
without the intellectual process, this particular kind of 
modification would not occur. In the case, for instance, of a 
conflict between two incompatible impulses, A and B, the resulting 
action may be either(1) the simple suppression of A and action 
in the line prompted byE. This process may be predominantly 
determined by either (a ) organic memory as when the dog's impulse 
to pursue a rabbit is immediately checked by the 'memory' of a 
whipping; 
or the kitten's impulse to 'paw' a wasp on the window is 
(ft3 
arrested by a similar kind of bodily reminiscence; and (b) do idea- 
tional or representative process, as when the c Fild overcomes the 
deductive influence of a can of jam through the representation 
of a similar situation in the past and of the consequences of 
yielding to temptation. Or (2) the action may involve the 
complete suppression of neither impulse, may be of the form Al B1 
involvin` a modification of both impulses in a more or less 
successful attempt to reconcile them. This may possibly take 
place within narrow limits on the level of organic memory, as, 
ptehaps1 in the case of the well- trained dog that, imp ediately 
aster a misdemeanour, obeys his master's call with a complicated 
series of Qovements, approaching, withdrawing, crouching, moving in 
a circle, and so on. But an effective adjustment of this character 
would seem to demand a fairly high level of ideational or 
representative activity; as when the child, instead of 
immediately yielding to his impulse to steal, postpones the act 
to a safer occasion. In discussing a similar illustration(l), 
McDougall makes his own interpretation clear; he would say that 
the end is the possession of the jam and that the rest of the process 
(where, he would admit, intelligence appears) is merely the means 
for the realisation of this end. But a truer interpretation 
would say that the end itself has been altered. The child no 
longer wills 'the jam here and now' for the fact of punishment 
¡snow seen to be an inseparable aspect of this end; the end as it 
has now been constituted is" the jam- without -the -punishment -an- 
hour -hence." This end is an intellectual construct. If we arply 
a similar analysis, not to a simple choice of this kind, but to 
those permanent ends which have been constituted as the result of 
long experience and repeated reflection, the case becomes clearer. 
(i) Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 178. 
(84) 
we shall then see that the notion of instinct as determining 
the end and of intelligence as solely concerned with the means is based 
on a falsely accentuated distinction between means and end. The 
limits within which this distinction is valid and serviceable will 
be presently considered. 
We seem to have here only a special case of the old fallacy 
of completely separating the intellectual or cognitive factors 
in experience from the affective and conative factors. Another 
form of this fallacy is the assertion that, because we can analyse 
the object of sense -perception into certain sensational elements, 
these sensational elements therefore constitute the object; whereas 
apart from the synthesising, integrating activity of the mind 
with respect to these elements, the object as we know it could 
not appear in our experience at all. We may recognise this 
psychological fact without committing ourselves on the question 
of its philosophic implications. ;loreover, as Äobhouse reminds 
u(l) s, the situation is similar with regard to the objects or ends 
of volitional activity, and the thought process interpenetrates the 
impulse -feeling process in same way. Hence the first step in any 
approach to the study of the ends with which volitional activity is 
concerned is to recognise the basic fact that, «s, , in the construction 
of the percept out of the original sensation, the ego recognises, 
discriminates between, from and combines the sensations 
presented, and thus forms out of them an object of knowlege; so, in the 
construction of the end out of the original impulse, we find the 
same recognition, discrimination, selection and organisation of 
the crude data of sensibility. Tl (2 ) 
There is a factor here, therefore, which 'have referred to 
(1) The Rational Good, chs. 1 and 2 
(2) Seth, Ethical Principles, pp 195 -196. 
(85) 
above as the intellectual factor, of which account must be taken 
in explaining how the objects or ends of volitional activity 
are determined. It is desirable to examine this factor more 
closely in order to indicate in a precise way the nature of it 
and the process by which it modifies the ends of behaviour. 
Common -sense would dismiss the problem with the assertion 
that, in the case of human behaviour, intelligence exerts or may 
exert a determining influence on the ends or purposes of conduct. 
While that is the conclusion at which we shall arrive, we must 
nevertheless describe the kind of psychological processes we have in 
view when we make that assertion. Whatever attitude we adopt to 
the recent efforts on the part of psychologists to find some re- 
liable and readily applicable objective tests of intelligence, it 
must be aditted that their researches have at least indicated the 
complexity of the processes concerned in intelligent behaviour. 
There are apparently many aspects of intelligent activity and, 
further, the question as to which aspect we are going to make 
prominent is largely determined by the special nature of the 
adjustment which is under consideration. This point is unaffected 
by the truth or error of any particular theory, such as the 
unifocal theory. For example, in the case of opening a puzzle -box 
and in the case of intelligently resolving a conflict of impulses 
(such as we have illustrated above) , different aspects or, if 
the term 'aspects' is vague, different special processes in the 
group of processes which constitute intelligence seem to become 
prominent, Our concern here is therefore to shew what 
special features of the process of intelligent adjustment are to 
be emphasised when intelligence is concerned with competing 
ends of behaviour. 
Taking the more satisfactory of the various définitions of 
(86 
intelligence, we find one feature of the process uniformly 
recognized, sometimes emphasised, This is the notion of the 
conscious, deliberate use of, or reference to, past experience in 
effecting present adjustment. In connection with the intelligent 
reaction to a conflict of impulses, to mutually incompatible 
objects of choice, such intelligent reaction seems to be bound up 
with the question as to the sense or way in which past experience 
becomes available for the solution of the present problem. Past 
experience may, of course, operate through organic or `habit' memory. 
When the reaction is determined in this way, we have the operation 
of what is commonly referred to as sensori -motor intelligence. But 
in the conscious resolution of a conflict of the kind suggested, 
intelligence is usually taken to imply or presuppose what we have 
previously referred to as representative activity.' Apart from 
the level of ideational development implied in such representative 
activity, no conscious, deliberate use of past experience 
would appear to be possible. But this representative activity 
itself may be found in various stages of development, ranging 
between two extremes. At one and the lowest extreme, there is 
the mere ability to conjure up objects or situations not presented 
in sense experience. At the other extreme, we have highly 
controlled representation, in which the objects or experiences 
represented are recalled only with respect to their essential 
features and in which there is an appreciation of their 
temporal and causal relations. This level implies the possession 
of 'free' ideas in the technical sense, the sense according to 
which "elements of the whole situation and the corresponding 
reaction must be selected and then these elements must be freed 
from their connection with any a eseries or situation. "(1) 
(1) Kirkpatrick, Genetic Psychology, p. 131. 
(87) 
To mote the same writer again: "The process of forming free ideas 
by both men and animals involves attention to the elements of the 
situation, and reaction to these elements not simply as e part of 
one situation leading to an end of a certain kind, but as elements in 
a variety of situations leading to a variety of ends. "(1) The 
most highly developed form of representation implies that the 
objects or situations represented are 'free' in this sense, that 
they have been integrated into a well- ordered series, and that 
the individual apprehends the temporal and causal relations between 
the members of the series. 
The bearing of these remarks on our present problem is 
twofold . In the first place, genetic psychology can describe, 
with a fair degree of accuracy, the growth in the individual of this 
capacity for the higher form of representative activity. In the 
second place, with regard to this ordered, highly synthetised 
representation)we can, without serious error, simply identify 
'intelligent' modification of behaviour with modification by a 
representation -series of this kind. But this synthesis or ordering 
of the elements of the individual's experience is to some degree, 
probably to a large degree, affected by definite educational 
influences. Hence a genetic psychology of ethics must give an 
account of these influences. It must be recognised, of course, 
that the degree to which these environmental influences prove 
effective in particular cases depends on some ultimate, innate 
individual peculiarities, the nature of which is obscure, but 
which we must regard as so to speak,setting a limit a priori 
to the degree of intelligent control of which the individual is 
capable. The recognition of this fact, however, will make no 
difference at the outset to the question of our use of the 
(l) Kirkpatrick, Genetic Tsychology, p . 133. 
(38) 
various educational means, for it is only in the individual's 
reactions to such means that these innate limitations reveal and define 
themselves. In any case, it is clear that the study of the 
intellectual factor in choice has unmasked a problem which is 
profoundly relevant to the study of the development of 'conduct' 
or ethical behaviour. 
McDougall's statement that instinct determines the end 
while intelligence is only concerned with the means doubtless 
possesses the merit of simplicity. But this simplicity is 
extremely misleading. Take, for example, h valuable conception 
of a sentiment as the organisation of primary emotional 
tendencies around certain objects. Clearly -che object may be 
either (a) perceptual or concrete as when we develop a sentiment 
of love for some individual, or (b) conceptual or abstract, as when 
a similar develops reference to such objects 
Jtatice, Truth, Human Perfection and so on. As far as the con- 
ceptual or abstract type of sentiment is concerned, the role of 
intelligence is clear. It is an essential condition of the existence 
of such an object at all. 
Intelligence, then, modifies the simple object or end of the 
present impulse by expanJin and complicating that object. 
Beginning with an impulse and a certain object which will satisfy 
it, the lessons of past experience are intelligently brought to 
bear on the present situation with the result that a different 
kind of response, from which is anticipated a greater satisfaction, 
is substituted for the original act; and this is tantamount to 
saying that intelligence is an important factor in determining 
the kind of activities from which the individual is to anticipate 
satisfaction. 
The main source of the confusion in this connection turns 
(89 
) 
out to be the ambiguous use of the terms 'end ' and 'means': This 
distinction has been already referred to as a fruitful source of 
fallacy; and we may attempt to shew here the precise sense in 
which the distinction is valid and useful. We have séen how the 
raison d'etre of all behaviour is the satisfaction of some need 
or needs. Such a satisfaction may involve a more or less protracted 
process, consisting of what is to all intents and purposes a series 
of separate acts. Merely to say that the satisfaction is the end 
and that the separate acts together constitute the means, is a 
false method of statement. The satisfaction is the raison d'étre 
of the activity but the end is the attainment of some object, in 
fact, it is somehow a part of the total activity. Hence the 
distinction between means and end falls within this series of 
separate acts. Further, the distinction is relative -- relative to 
the kind of need which is in process of being satisfied. Now, 
certain of the acts of the series constitute a partial but more 
or less direct satisfaction of the need. Each act of this kind 
which partially satisfies the need is a part 'of the end, and the 
end itself is simply the sum -total of such acts. There are certain 
acts of the series the performance of which does not in itself 
Confer a direct satisfaction. But the performance of these acts 
is seen to be a necessary preliminary to the performance of the 
directly satisfying acts. The former, therefore, are properly to be 
regarded as purely instrumental, in other words, they constitute 
the means. For example, when the artist is painting a picture, 
the actual process of painting involves a long series of acts. 
The satisfying end is the totality of these acts. But such an 
act on the part of the painter, as for instance, taking a journey 
to secure some necessary materials would obviously be described 
as part of the means. 
(9 0 ) 
Again, just because the distinction is relative in the sense 
described, just because it has a subjective and not an objective 
existence, it is true that we cannot in any particular case lay 
down a rigidly exact line of demarcation between the 
means and the end. Nevertheless, the distinction is real and 
important. Two kinds of error have been commonly committed with 
respect to it. In the one case, the end has been understood 
in too narrow a sense and an absolute distinction implied; in the 
other, an attempt has been made to deny all validity to the 
distinction. With regard to the first kind of error, the instinct 
psychologist seems guilty of this when he says that instinct 
exclusively determines the end. This may mean, for example, that 
a certain object 0 arousesan impulse I in virtue of an inherited 
disposition. Owing to intelligent deliberation, however, instead of 
the simple situation I - --0, we have the complex situation, I - -- 
0 0,003- 11+ï Iii,LNT . ,The instinct psychologist says that the end 
is simply 0, and that the entire remainder is of the nature of means 
to attain this end. Our view asserts that the end is to be found 
in the complex object or situation 0 0, 0,0, and that we find the 
means in vertain special acts, M,MArie The point is that the mere 
fact that an instinct has initiated a certain train of activity 
does not of itself mean either that it solely determines the end 
or that it solely sustains the activity -- a truth of which we shall 
presently give illustrations. 
With regard to the second type of error, this takes the 
form of arguing that the distinction is purely artificial inasmuch 
as any activity can be resolved psychologically into a series of 
separate acts or immediate ends; and hence the true distinction 
is said to be that between nearer ends and ends that are more 
remote. If we are to talk in the singular of the end, the term 
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must refer to the activity as a whole. Such is Dewey's view of 
the distinction. "End ", he says, "is a name for a series of acts 
taken collectively, like the term army. 'means' is a name for the 
same series taken distributively -- like 'this soldier' 'that 
officer'. To think of the end signifies to extend or enlarge 
our view of the act to be performed To say that 
an end is remote or distant, to say in fact that it is an end 
at all, is equivalent to saying that obstacles intervene between 
us and it. As soon as we have projected it, we must 
begin to work backward in thought. The end thus reappears 
as a series of "what nexts", and the what next of chief importance 
is the one nearest the present state of the one acting "(1) 
This seems sound as a piece of psychological analysis but 
it in no wise abolishes the possibility of drawing a distinction 
-- a distinction both real and important -- between means and end. 
The important fact which the distinction tries to express is the 
fact that the realisation of any purpose implies a process, and 
the separate stares or steps of the process may shew any degree 
of intimacy of connection with the overt, avowed purpose; the 
nature of the connection may be anything from a purely external, 
accidental connection to a closer, s of connection which 
constitutes the acts an integral part of the purpose itself. 
The example already given of the artist's painting of a picture 
makes this clear. Certain acts which do not really constitute 
a part of the satisfying end are nevertheless, owing to the 
accident of circumstances, a precondition of its being realised. 
The distinction between means and end is useful as indicating 
a situation of this kind. 
This suggests the correct use of the distinction in Ethics. 
(1) Human Nature and Conduct: p.36. 
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The ethical end is essentially of the nature of an activity, 
it is a certain kind of life. Certain actions or decisions 
appear to have no discoverable effect on the realisation of 
this kind of life. They seem neither to hinder nor to further it, 
and are therefore classed as ethically indifferent actions. 
The question as to whether my afternoon walk is going to be 
to the farm or to the river means a decision of this nature. 
Under special circumstances, of course, such decisions may 
become ethically significant. Certain other actions, again, do not 
appear to constitute directly a part of the kind of life which 
is the end , but these actions must nevertheless be performed. If 
I am actively interested., for instance, in schemes of social reform 
I must be willing to undergo a certain amount of perhaps highly 
specialised training with a view to the successful prosecution 
of this kind of activity. Such a training might reasonably be 
considered in the licht of mere means. But the distinction here 
is purely relative. The relativity of it becomes apparent when 
we raise the old question: does the end justify the means? The 
real fallacy in the argument that reprehensible means is justified 
in the light of the worthy end, is found in the fact that 
in such a case, when the entire process of means and end is viewed 
as one whole of action 
, 
it is seen to be inherently self- 
contradictory. The same fact is expressed from another viewpoint-- - 
the inner or subjective viewpoint -- when we say that the carrying 
out of the reprehensible means tends to affect the character in 
away that is incompatible with the kind of character or self -hood, 
which has been accepted as the ethical end. Ethical development, 
indeed, may be viewed as the process by which this very distinction 
between means and end is gradually transcended in all its phases 
and finally vanishes before such an appreciation of the organic 
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inter -relatedness of the elements in the life of thought and 
action, such a capacity to see life singly and see it whole, as 
can find in the details of conduct the reflection of Chose larger, 
permanent issues, of which they are, in however small a degree 
and however indirectly, the partial realisation. 
It may be concluded, then, that the attempt to use the notion 
of instinct to account for the existence of the larger ends of 
human behaviour is based on a superficial reading of the 
distinction between means and end and is in practice seriously 
misleading. We have seen how Intelligence, in a sense of the 
term which we have tried to explain, operates in a fundamental 
way to constitute these ends what they are. It remains to 
consider a further problem, a problem which arises out of the 
first meaning of the term 'motive' which we distinguished. 
This first meaning represents the more fundamental and 
correct sense of the term. The problem may be formulated thus: 
given certain more or less complicated activities or objects, 
representing the valued ends which the human being endeavours 
to realise, in virtue of what quality or qualities do these objects 
attract the individual? Supposing that, at the end of a process 
of intelligent deliberation, we decide: 'this is the line of 
conduct that will confer the truest satisfaction', the question 
remains for the psychologist: 'what is the basis or explanation 
of this satisfaction? Intellience, working on the basis of 
satisfactions experienced in the past, pilots our route to 
future satisfactions. As Practical Intelligence, it is not 
concerned with the primarily theoretical question of the 
psycholoical basis of such satisfaction. In fact, we have now 
to consider the old, but still involved and vexed question of 
the dynamics of behaviour. Our question is as to the source of the ' 
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'urge' or 'drive' (to use terms recently much in vogue in 
psychological literature) which prompts us to seek satisfaction 
in certain directions rather than in others. In 'connection with 
this question we shall suggest our next thorough -going modification 
of the position of the Instinct Psychologists. Just as we have 
attempted alcove to reinstate the intellectual factor in its ttue 
place, so in the following chapter we shall endeavour to accord 
a much more fundamental Ale to the factor of Habit. 
CHAPTER V 
Some of our most familiar experiences seem to ill strate the 
main thesis of the present chapter. This is, briefly, that 
there is a source of impulse, of urge or drive, which is, strictly 
speaking acquired, and which must be therefore distinguished 
from the congenital sources of impulse, namely, the instincts 
and inherited appetites. Consider some familiar experiences: a man 
has become habituated to sleeping with the head of the bed in a 
certain position relative, let us say, to the window. An 
alteration of this arrangement perturbs him to a degree which 
appears to the onlooker utterly irrational.. The boarding -house 
resident finds that a change in his accustomed position at the 
table occasions a discomfort for which he cannot find any obvious 
explanation. The city man may take a long time to discover the 
fact that he walks to business every morning on the same hide of 
the street and probably mz.kes the discovery only when for some 
reason he is compelled to walk on the opposite side; at the 
same time he makes the further discovery that he entertains 
e more or less intense aversion to the new arrangement. It is 
notoriously difficult to persuade people to consent to be taught 
a new game - at cards, for instance- a game for which they 
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eventually develop enthusiasm. The cyclist finds in himself a 
dislike for the illegal side of the road and attributes this to a 
law -abiding disposition. 
Such examples, which could be multiplied without end, are 
commonplaceoto the psychologist, commonplaces which have been 
used to illustrate a variety of theories. Common -sense finds 
the explanation of all experiences of this kind in the notion 
of habit; and it would seem that here, as in the case of the 
meaning of the ethical consciousness, a careful psychological analysis 
will justify the common -sense explanation so far as it goes; 
but it will also find that there are implications in the common- 
sense category which must be made explicit and which, when 
thus made explicit, reveal the fact that the category has a much 
more comprehensive and penetrating application than was suspected 
by common -sense. 
We need not offer at this stage any formal definition of 
habit. The meaning which we attach to this term does not involve 
r 
any serious departure from ordinary psychological terminology 
and that meaning will become sufficiently clear as the discussion 
proceeds. McDougall began by according to somewhat half- hearted 
recognition(1) to the rôle of habit in furnishing part of the dynamic 
of behaviour, but that recognition has been difinitely withdrawn 
in a later contribution.(2) In the later discussion, McDougall 
ohallengeS the position, as argued by Woodworth in particular, that 
habit is in itself a source of drive, and he confines the discussion 
to the simple case of a simple motor habit. For the sake of 
clearness, we shall examine the question in connection with a 
particular instance of habit. We shall hake the case of a simple 
motor habit, and, as a result of examination of it, we shall 
(1) Introduction to Social Psychology. p.43 
(2) Mind,Juiy,1020:CMotivea in the Light o f Recent Discussion" 
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endeavour to answer the question which is fundamental to the whole of 
our subsequent discussion;viz., under what conditions does habit 
involve such a drive and in what sense, precisely , can such a drive 
be said to be something acquired, something actually created by 
experience itself and in no real sense a datum of our native 
endowment? And what is the basal significance of the fact in ethical 
development? 
Woodworth asserts that any new mechanism of response which 
we acquire involves the acquisition of a corresponding drive. 
He says: "Drive, as we have been led to conceive it in the 
simpler sort of case, is not essentially distinct from mechanism. 
The drive is a mechanism already aroused and thus in a position 
to furnish stimulations to other mechanisms. Any mechanism might 
be a drive ".(1) We gather from this statement that drive means 
that when any particular mechanism is active, its activity 
is sustained by its own particular . urge. This is stated 
explicitly where he says: " As a general proposition we may say that 
the drive that carries forward any activity, when it is running 
freely and effectively , is inherent in that activity. It is only when 
Qn activity is running by its own drive that it can run thus 
freely and effectively; for as ions as it is being driven by 
some extrinsic motive, it is subject to the distraction of 
that motive : (2 ) 
As a result of his reconsideration of the question of 
drive in connection with acquired mechanisms, McDougall, on the 
contrary, assures us that he is forced to the conclusion that 
a habit- mechanism involves no dynamic of this kind. He instances 
the motor habit of repeating the alphabet, and points out 
that in repeating the alphabet up to a certain letter in 
(1) Dynamic Dsyhhology, p.42. 
(2) Ibid,p.70 
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order to determine the immediately preceding letter (as is often 
done in using the dictionary) he can find no evidence of an 
impulse or urge to carry on the repetition beyond that 
particular letter. He concludes, therefore, that the drive is 
not inherent in the habit itself but is purely a function 
of the particular end or purpose for the sake of which we 
( 1 
) set the mecahnism in operation. Several critical comments 
on this line of argument immediately suggest themselves. In the 
first place, the evidence of introspection on: a question of 
this kind is more than usually unreliable. The habit is of 
a highly specialised nature, and any drive involved in it 
would be hard to detect by introspective means. It is possible 
that an experimentally obtained record of the movements of the 
vocal organs by delicate apparatus(such as the Behaviourist 
desiderates to establish his contention with regard to implicit 
word habits) would .ins icete tho o : o;2 ite conclusion. In the 
second place, the habit in question represents a motor series 
which we are so accustomed to interrupt or break off at different 
points that the absence of noticeable drive is understandable. 
Finally, McDougall admits that if he begins the repetition with 
the idea in his mind of arriving at the end of the alphabet 
and the repetition is interrupted, he can then detect the 
element of drive. But is not such an anticipatory idea of the 
end, with a more or less vague, schematic representation of the 
whole activity, an essential feature of the true exercise of 
any habit2 
The most reasonable view of the whole question, however, 
would appear to be that the amount of drive which the habit 
involves if not even the very existence of a drive at all, is 
(i) Mind, Julv,ID92O otìv s in the Li `g- of Recent 
Discussion.¡ 
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entirely a question of the nature and extent of the coordinations 
involved. If we think of the drive rather in terms of the greater 
or less degree of satisfaction which is conferred by the 
carrying out of a particular set of acquired coordinated 
movements the whole problem of the drive inherent in habit 
becomes more intelligible. The exercise of one habit for example, the 
dexterity.of tossing a number of balls into the air and 
catching them; must be regarded as in itself conferring 
e certain measure of satisfaction just because it represents 
the exercise of certain capacities which the organism 
possesses. The exercise of another habit, figure skating/for 
example, may confer a much greater satisfaction. If we are asked 
why the satisfaction here is greater, we can answer.in a general 
way by saying that the measure of satisfaction is greater in 
this case either because of the number of the capacities involved 
or because of the special nature of them, or for both reasons. 
A detailed answer to the question would call for the thorough 
psychological study of all the special adjustments involved, and 
an investigation of the basal reasons for their satisfying 
,quality. For example, it would mean, among other things, a full 
understanding of the basis of the satisfaction which seems 
inherent in rhythmical movement as such. 
For our present purpose, it is sufficient to admit the 
fact of a drive in Woodworth's sense and to regard that drive 
as an illustration of the general principle that any free, 
effective exercise of capacity is satisfying, the degree of 
satisfaction depending on special factors in every particular 
ease. Habits, though they cannot be themselves described as 
native capacities, are nevertheless to be regarded as 
representing 
the more or less satisfying integration of such 
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elementary native capacities. The question as to the nature of 
those inherited capacities of which our habits are the expression 
inevitably leads us to adopt a much wider view of the native 
endowment of the human organism than is taken by the Instinct 
psychologists. Woodwortht., in fact, suggests a 
more satisfactory survey of that organism's inheritance. As 
he expresses it: " Be-sides sensations,emotions,and reactions, 
native equipment also includes aptitudes or 'gifts' for certain 
activities or for dealing with certain classes of things. We 
recognise this type of native aptitude when we speak of one 
person as having a natural gift for music, another for 
mathematics, another for mechanics, another for salesmanship. No 
doubt many such aptitudes are complex and demand analysis at 
the hands of the psychologist; but it is equally ttrue that 
there is something specific about many of them such that an 
individual who is gifted in one direction is not necessarily 
gifted in another. "(1) Now we consider that this suggestion 
is in the right direction. When we have completed our examination 
of certain further fallacies and ambiguities touching the 
question of native endowment and motivation, we shall attempt 
a more precise statement of what we consider to be the essentials 
(2) 
of human native endowment, conceived in this broader way. 
We are now in a position to state definitely our basal 
position with respect to the motivating value of habit. On the 
basis of its rich native endowment, the organism bdtilds up 
organised reactions of a more or less complicated kind. These 
reactions are satisfying in a greater or less degree for the 
reason that, as we expressed it in an earlier chapter, they 
(1) Dynamic Psychology, p.59 
`(2) See pp 153 --155. 
(ion) 
mean simply the realisation of a fuller measure of life. Now, 
1 
from the statement of Woodworth quoted above (` 
) 
it appears that 
this writer considers that the drive or urge in habit is 
something experienced only when the habit mechanism is actually 
in operation. This is further borne out by the fact that 
elsewhere he accords to i!ICDougall's instincts the role of 
initiating the process. But there is an additional point 
which does not receive adequate recognition from either McDougall 
or Woodworth. This is the fact that not only are these habit -activities 
satisfying when actually operative and there is thus an impulse to 
continue the activities, but they further tend to generate a permanent 
conscious need for such satisfaction. It is this permanent sense of 
need for such exercise of capacity as these organised activities 
afford - a need created and fostered by experience -- that represents 
for us the most significant meaning of the dynamic of habit. Here 
we have one sense at least in which it is profoundly true that 
education is something more than a mere process of development. 
in a real sense it involves creation. Apart from actual experience- - 
an experience involving the development and satisfying exercise of 
these native capacities - we may well hold that no conscious 
need for, or urge towards - - such satisfying activities would 
appear. But where the experience and training have been effective, 
these acquired needs or drives may become dominant motive forces 
in life. 
In this manner, an acquired vis a tergo, if we may use 
such a phrase, results from habit. This source of motivation may 
be an important factor in enabling us to understand why, in a 
particular case, when he is actually faced with alternatives, 
the individual finds one line of action preferable to another. 
(1) Dynamic lsychology,opp.cit. 
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But it helps us to understand motivation in a further important 
sense, namely, in the sense in which we might say that the 
organism, as it were,'goes out to see01) satisfying experiences. 
In other words, it offers a purely psychological interpretation 
of the notion of self- activity. This interpretation, moreover, 
does not necessarily commit us to any strictly vitalistic 
hypothesis. The conations which it has in view are considered as 
having originated in experience itself. The differentia of a 
vitalistic hypothesis , on the contrary, is that there is an urge 
or drive which is not altogether accounted for by the action 
of external stimuli; such stimuli serve only to give it 
particular determination or direction. Brever states the 
essenee of vitalism, as far as psychology is concerned, when 
he says: "A. very strong case can be made for the view, that 
our whole experience is determined by an activity which 
is also experienced, but which does not arise from experience. 
For the origin of this activity, we must look, as it were, 
behind experience. "(21 Z11 that our own view has asserted is 
that there are urges, impulses, conations, felt needs,(whatever 
term we use to express the fact) which have been brought into 
being by the particular kind organised activities which 
the individual has come to acquire. These activities are 
the result, generally speaking, of the nature of his whole 
environment, and, more specifically, of the consciously educative, 
directive influences to which he has been systematically subjected 
On the other hand, a more ultimate consideration of all the facts 
of behaviour which the psychologist sets oat to discover, the g 
fu damentals of sensation, movement, and so on, might very well 
(1) See p.240 for illustration of what is really meant by 
this phrase. 
(2) Instinct in Man, p. 84. 
(1::0 2 
commend 
some form of vitalism to us as a philosophic hypothesis 
For in the last analysis, the question turns out to be: why 
does the organism act or respond at all? We simply put the 
same question when we ask: what is the fundamental fact 
underlying all organic behaviour? Or, simply, what is life? 
The philosopher is to formulate some special hypothesis 
such as vitalism to enable him to connect together in thought 
all organic phenomena. The psychologist may or may not subscribe 
to such a hypothesis. But as far as science is concerned, the 
hypothesis formulates the basal problem of a particular science, 
and that science is, not psychology, but biology. 
In the present connection, the important point is that the idea 
of such a relationship between organism and environment 
as is implied in .icDougall's definition of Instinct does not 
seem necessarily to imply a vitalistic hypothesis. For this 
definite and complex kind of relationship is considered as 
being itself the product of race experience. Hence, when we 
endeavour to trace the relationship to its origins, we seem to 
be brought back to such elementary facts of organic behaviour 
as the sensitivity of a receptor organ to changes in the 
physical environment, the connection of such receptors with 
effector organs, the tendency of a satisfying response to be 
'selected 
f -- in short, the fundamental:' of sensation, affection 
and movement. .It is at this point that the psychologist may 
resort to some ultra- experiential hypothesis, such as vitalism. 
We are now in a position to indicate the connection 
between the preceding discussion.of the motivating value of 
habit and our account of the ethical consciousness. cart of the 
native endowment of the human organism is of the nature 
of special capacities which seem to be peculiarly human. 
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Such is the capacity for language which involves , among other 
things, the capacity for a vastly extended and varied social 
experience. Other examples are the capacities to apprehend and 
be interested in the causal aspect of objects, -- their seeming 
dependence on one another- to apprehend and be interested in their 
numerical aspect, and so on. a statement of what appears to be 
the most fundamental of those capacities will be found on pag61 3_1,t. 
Each of these capacities, of course may in itself present the psychologist 
with a special and complicated problem. But for our present pur- 
pose, it is enough to recognise their existence; our problem is 
rather to appreciate their subsequent importance. We are probably 
not far from the truth in suggesting that they are all inherited 
in much the same sense as language is inherited. That is, the 
essential mechanism is inherited but the activities themselves 
are learned; in other words, they are essentially habit phenomena. 
Further, the integrations or synthes`s which have been achieved out 
of these elementary capacities are satisfying in a peculiar degree. 
This means that they represent par excellence the source of our 
higher acquired motives, impulses, or needs, in the sense already 
explained. Now, the activities which we have designated the 
humAn values and of which we have endeavoured to spew the 
vital importance for ethics, must be regarded as themselves the 
progressive integration, in the race experience, of these 
elementary capacities into the most satisfying reactions. These 
valuable activities are thus of the nature of race habits, 
acquired race adjustments, transmitted by the precess which has 
been called 'social heredity'. The individual, as the result of a 
process of education, must make these adjustments his own. 
But he must not do this in any merely mechanical way. He must 
appropriate them in the deeper sense that he comes to acquire a 
permanent impulse towards, or need for the kind of satisfaction 
which these activities offer. 
An important incidental result, we believe, of the fore - 
going discussion is to shew the somewhat ambiguous or unillumin- 
ating, and, perhaps, essentially misleading half -truth which we 
express when we say that our actions proceed from inherited 
motives. The statement is misleading not because it is not correct 
so far as it goes but because of what it omits. How such state- 
ments conceal the real complexity of the motivation question is 
well shewn in the use to which McDougall puts the curiosity in- 
stinct in finding in it the principal motive - force in that disinterested 
pursuit of knowledge represented by science and philosophy. Many 
other writers would follow McDougall in thus accounting for those 
higher human activities. But it would seem that the motives that 
actuate the scientist are considerably more complex than this. That 
the curiosity instinct is not the sole factor and probably also 
not the most important factor in the higher scientific pursuits 
becomes clear the moment we reflect that a large endowment of 
curiosity finds adequate satisfaction in some cases in a daily round 
of gossip and small talk, while in other cases it produces a Darwin. 
The scientist himself, when he considers the question, is apt 
to offer an explanation which points rather to psychological 
factors other than the curiosity instinct, Poinearee for example, 
tells us: "The scientist does not study nature because it is 
useful to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure 
¡hit, and he takes pleasure in it because it is beautiful. 
If nature were not beautiful it would not be worth knowing, and 
and life would not be worth living. I am not speaking, 
of course, of that beauty which strikes the senses, of the 
beauty of qualities and appearances. I am far from despising 
this, but it has nothing to do with science. What I mean is 
that more intimate beauty which comes from the harmonious order 
of its parts, and which a pure intelligence can grasp. It is 
this that gives a body, a skeleton, so to speak, to the shimmering 
visions that flatter our senses, and without this support the 
beauty of these fleeting dreams would be imperfect, because 
it would be indefinite and ever elusive. Intellectual beauty, 
on the contrary, is self- sufficing, and it is for it, more perhaps 
than for the future good of humanity, that the scientist condemns 
himself to long and painful labours. "(i) 
The question really concerns the psychological inter- 
pretation of the term 'beautiful' as used in this passage. An 
appreciation of what is implied in this use of the term will make 
it clear that the phenomenon under consideration is very 
inadequately described as curiosity satisfaction. Two things must 
be remembered about the satisfaction in such cases. 1. It is a 
peculiarly systematic kind of satisfaction, and the 'curiosity' 
"grows by what it feeds on ". 2. It is peculiarly specialised. The 
absorbing curiosity is limited to certain special parts or aspects 
of reality and the satisfaction is somehow a function of this 
specialised content. This consideration suggests the direction in 
Which we must seek an explanation both of the nature and of 
the peculiar strength of the motive. The underlying fact is some 
Peculiarity of native endowment but not, however, in respect of 
some instinct or instincts. The essential congenital fact is 
the existence of a special capacity which will mean that a 
(1) Science and ilethod,p. 22. 
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particular kind of synthesis not only tends to be carried out 
with peculiar ease and effectiveness but also tends the confer 
apeculiar satisfaction. Take, for example, the mathematician. The 
important fact of endowment is his possession, in an exceptional 
degree, of the capacity to apprehend and find satisfaction in 
dealing with the number and the space aspects of the objects of 
the external world. This will mean that the syntheses based on 
these aspects will prove peculiarly interesting and satisfying, 
But it will mean something more. The individual will be 
particularly quick to detect and highly sensitive to gaps or 
lacunae in a synthesis of this kind; and he will feel powerfully 
impelled to try to complete the synthesis. The discovery of a 
new fact which exactly fills the gap will occasion a profound 
satisfaction. The reason for this satisfaction, however, is not 
to be found in the intrinsic interest of that fact in the removal 
of the particular question to which that fact supplies the answer. 
The reason is rather to be sought in the completion, per se, of 
the intellectual structure, The mind finds satisfaction in the 
achievement and contemplation of the new and seemingly perfect 
synthesis. What is the ultimate basis of this satisfaction? This, 
again, raises a compie psychological issue. The full treatment 
of it would involve the discussion of the principle of 'unity in 
variety' and of the pleasure proceeding from the discovery of an under - 
lYing principle which serves to bind together a large aggregate of 
isolated facts and enables the mind easily to view them as a whole. 
But if we are to appeal to any particular instinct for the explan- 
ation of the satisfaction incidental to this process of synthesis, 
one instinct largely concerned is probably the instinct of con- 
struction. 
The innate tendency to construction or 
eDerimentation would seem to be fundamentally 
concerned in the pleasures of scientific discovery as well as in those 
of artistic creation. The antithesis here between 'discovery' and 
dreation' is only apparent. When it is a question of the scientist's 
personal satisfaction, it must be remembered that the joys of 
creation belong to him in as real a sense and as full a measure 
as they belong to the artist. As in our illustration of the 
mathematician, specialised native endowment determines the 
direction in which this creative tendency will assert itself. 
When koincare, then, says that the scientist finds nature 'beautiful' 
he means that it lends itself or yields to the special kind of 
synthesis which he tries to impose upon it, and thus affords him a 
pleasure essentially akin to the pleasure of artistic creation. 
It would seem, therefore, that the part played by curiosity 
'in knowledge acquisition has probably been much exaggerated. 
Dreyer has pointed out one kind of motive which cannot be 
classed under the rubric either of utility or of curiosity. ( 
1) 
We have suggested above a much more thorough -going revision 
of our ideas as to the real nature of motives which are 
commonly traced to the curiosity instinct and so dismissed. 
Garnett, in discussing this same problem of the nature of the 
motivation in scientific pursuits, realises the complexity 
of the processes involved. Garnett's prir:ary interest is in his 
special hypothesis as to the neurological basis of the scientific 
impulse. With this we are not concerned. But he concludes by 
using the term curiosity to cover the complicated kind of 
process which we have discussed aboveq° On this we need only 
remark that the term 'curiosity', used in this sense, can no longer 
be taken to refer to a single primary tendency. 
(1) Instinct in Lan, p.202 
(2) Education and World Citizenship, ch. 13. 
(1C@ 
It seems better to reserve the term curiosity to indicate 
the primary instinct which man shares with the higher animals. 
As regards the higher intellectual processes, the analysis of 
them would present a special psychological problem. We have 
suggested above the general lines which such an analysis would 
follow. Finally, it may be remarked that the present discussion 
explains why we have talked of developing in the individual 
the 'knowledge' or 'scientific' interest instead of talking of 
the development of the 'curiosity' instinct. 
Needless to say, the foregoing remarks are not intended 
to mean a denial of the statement that in such an activity as 
scientific pursuit special instincts, such as curiosity, self - 
assertion, pugnacity and so on, are involved. It is the 
assertion that such satisfaction of specific instincts is 1,// 
coextensive with the total satisfaction involved that is denied. 
Such instincts may be and often are the means of initiating an 
activity; they may also serve as reinforcements when the 
activity flags; but we can hardly accord them a more fundamental 
role without straining the facts. 
The argument of the preceding pages suggests a wide 
view of the meaning of habit, and it seems desirable at this 
stage to indicate more precisely what is included under this 
rubric. While habit includes, of course, all the acquired 
bodily coordinations, it seems impossible, on the principles of 
a scientific psychology, to avoid a much wider use of the term. 
In its most fundamental significance, habit appears to mean any 
acquired synthesis of experiNential elements which has become 
more or less stabilised. Any acquired adjustment which has 
become relatively fixed or stereotyped by repetition, the exercise 
of which possesses a certain satisfying quality and involves an 
(1Q9 
organisation of capacities on a :::ore or less comprehensive scale, 
would be classed as habit. For this reason it is necessary to 
extend the concept to include phenomena of the intellectual and 
emotional life. As regards the intellectual life, this usage is 
already explicitly recognized in psychology, when we talk of 
habits of thought and contrast them with physical habits. In 
the case of such habits, Stout's statement applies: " a compre- 
hensive habitual tendency realises itself on special occasions 
(1) 
by means of special processes which are not habitual." An in- 
stance of such a habit would be the habitual tendency to seek 
out and carefully weigh evidence before drawing conclusions. But 
it would seem that there is a somewhat more fundamental sense 
in which we may apply the concept of habit to the intellectual 
life. The whole process of the organisation of our ideas into 
systems is best regarded as a process of intellectual habit - 
formation. Stout defines Apperception as "the process by which 
a mental system a- ppropriates a new element or otherwise receives 
(2) 
a fresh determination;" and we learn in the same connection 
that "a mental group or system is a grouped or systematised 
tendency» (the context stresses the tendency notion), We are therefore 
not seriously in error if we regard these mental organisations 
known to Psychology as apperceptive systems in the light of 
habit phenomena. They are intellectual habits in process of 
formation. These mental systems are assuredly of the nature of 
acquired adjustments to certain problematic situations with which 
the environment has confronted the organism. IIoreover, they are 
adjustments which tend to become, under certain conditions more 
and more stereotyped, impervious to further modification. It must 
be noted, however, that a considerable degree of fixity or stability 
(1) Analytic Psychology, vol.1, p 262 
(2) Ibid vol.2, p 112 
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must be reached before we are justified in describing them as 
habits. Otherwise, we are in danger of depriving the term of its 
usefulness, if not of its meaning. 
Looking at the matter from this point of view, we can .detect, 
and express in the language of modern psychology the basal truth 
in the Herbartian view of action as the inevitable outcome of 
'the circle of thought; and we can understand the enormous 
importance attached to 'instruction' in his conception of moral 
education. For the overt act would represent simply the terminal 
point in(( the operation of a habit, -- a habit of thinking, believing 
or judgiii1 
Whatever attitude we 'adopt to the behaviourist view of 
the nature of thought (i.e. the identification of thought with 
the operation of language mechanisms), one real merit of 
Behaviourism is the fact that it assigns such a fundamental rale 
to habit. In dealing, for example, with the problem of theT'Aufgabe' 
th- 'central rDblemi, purpose or end which dominates the thinking 
activity, the consistent Behaviourist would explain this as 
a total, unique bodily'set' or attitude. He would then describe 
the whole process as the unrolling of a mechanism- series 
associatively bound up with this attitude. This thinking process 
would involve the conflict between more or less antagonistic motor 
mechanisms, and the outcome of the process would be a more satisfying 
muscular series, involving the partial modification of existing 
muscular(or glandular) adjustments. This view at the least serves 
to emphasise the truth that the natural terminus of a process of 
thinking is somehow a larger adjustment, a fuller satisfaction; 
that the process proceeds on the basis of already existent 
adjustments, which are of the nature of habits, and that mental 
growth itself finds its raison d'4tre either in the inadequacy 
(i)c.f. Davidson: A New Interpretation of Herbert's Psychology. 
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of existing adjustments to meet the demands of new situations, or 
in their failure to afford the organism a sufficiently satisfying 
exercise of its capacities. And, indeed, a similarly wide view of the 
rôle of habit is frequently found, in an explicit or implicit form, 
in psychological theory. Such a view is implied, for example, in 
Baldwin's account of habit and accommodation, especially in his 
distinction between the self of habit and the self of accommodation, 
in his account of invention, and in other connections. 
But the concept of habit must be regarded as having a still 
wider field of application in mental life. Not only does habit 
appear to be the basic fact in intellectual organisation, but the 
organisation of the emotional life seems to reveal, on a final 
psychological analysis, the operation,on a large scale,of the same 
principle . In their valuable discussion of the sentiments, both 
Shand and ì,íc Dougall have taught us how these sentiments are 
essentially of the nature of the organisation of emotional dispositions 
around certain specific objects or situations. The root notion 
of McDougall's entire theory of emotional development is that the 
primary instinctive emotions, originally bound up with the 
presentation of certain specific objects, develop through a gradual 
extension of their objects, with the result that, for example, the 
Parental instinct and its 'tender emotion', originally the character- 
istic response of the parent to its offspring, may come to function 
in connection with much more highly generalised situations such as 
cases of social injustice, of the oppression of the weak by the 
strong, and so forth. (1) A 'process of growth or expansion around 
the Tina-1 nucleus of the original primary *emotion and its 
specific object is thus the explanation of the rich variety 
of subsequent affective experience. 
(1) Introd. to Social Psychology.pp.73 -74. 
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Now a closer examination of this whole notion suggests 
some interesting reflections relevant to our present topic. In 
the first place, it is clear that the fundamental method of this 
process of expansion is really identical with the method of the 
so- called conditioned reflex. In Favlow's well -known experiment, 
it is shown how the action of the dog's salivary glands, originally 
associated with the actual sight of food, comes to be directly 
provoked by the ringing of a bell which has hitherto preceded 
the actual presentation of the food. Other experiments of a 
similar kind have shown how our simple reflexes come to be 
'conditioned' in this manner, that is actuated by a stimulus 
other than the specific ones. Behaviourism would trace a very 
large proportion of our habit reactions to this process of 
conditioning reflexes; the remainder of our habits it would 
explain by the principle of the integration of the original 
random movements of the organism. While we do not mean to 
subscribe here to the Behaviourist account of the nature 
of emotion any more than we agreed above to its account of 
the nature of thought, nevertheless it would seem that we 
must, from the point of view of a scientific psychology, regard 
this extension of the object of emotion, which McDougall has 
described, as identical in principle with the process of 
conditioning a reflex. In other words, it is the same rp5'inciple 
of habit that is operative in both cases. 
Again, the instinct psychologists appear to regard this fact 
that the specific objects of the instinctive emotions become 
thus extended and profoundly modified in experience as itself 
proving the truth of their contention that these primary 
instinctive emotions are the sole springs or motive -forces in 
action. The argument is that the satisfaction, for instance, 
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of the public man in the plaudits of his admirers is still 
merely the satisfaction of the self -assertive instinct)i but 
with the specific object modified by experience, But may we 
not suggest that the really important consideration is not the 
fact(admitting for the sake of the argument that it is a fact) 
of an identical core of instinct underlying reactions from the 
simplest to the most complex levels, but the fact of the enormous 
extent to which the original inherited reaction has been 
modified. Moreover, if we ask how far this modification of the object 
can go, whether that object always retains some discoverable 
resemblance to the original object, or whether it can be modified 
to such a degree that all trace of the original object is lost, 
we find no clear answer to the question. But the facts of experience 
seem clearly to suggest that the modification may be so complete that 
the instinctive origin cannot be detected from an inspection of the 
act itself. In any case, our main contention here is that the 
evidence of experience, even as marshalled by the instinct:_ 
psychologists themselves, goes to shew that the fact of habit 
permeates our mental life to a much greater degree than the fact 
of instinct; and while we do not consider that the recent radical 
attacks on instinct have done anything more than indicate the 
advisability of still further and more careful study of that 
phenomenon, nevertheless the whole trend of recent psychological 
discussion seems to suggest that the concept of habit is fitted 
to bear a heavier weight of explanation with respect to the facts 
of both the intellectual and the emotional lifefthan the concept 
of inst inct3- . (1) 
(1)(Footnote) Consider the following statements from Bertrand 
Russell's Social Reconstruction "The chief chief ̀ sources of 
good relations between individuals are instinctive liking and 
a common purpose. Of these two a common purpose might seem more 
Important politically, but, in fact, it is often the outcome, not the 
cause of instinctive liking, or of a common instinctive aversion, "(p,34) 
And again: "A nation when it is real and not artificial is founded 
upon a faint degree of instinctive liking for compatriots and a 
common instinctive aversion for foreigners. Then an Englishman 
returns to Dover or Eolkstone after being on the continent, he feels 
something friendly in the familiar ways; the casual porters, the 
shouting paper boys, the women serving bad tea, all warm his heart and 
seem more natural, more what human beings ought to be than the foreigners 
with their strange habits of behaviour ". (p.37) And yet again; 
"Instinctive liking, resulting largely from similar habits and customs, 
is an essential element in patriotism and indeed the foundation on 
which the whole feeling rests ". (p.37) The last statement is an admission 
of the unpsychological use of the phrase 'instinctive liking' in the 
preceding statements, and the three statements present a convincing 
illustration of the penetrating influence of habit and of the dynamic 
created by it. 
Note 2. An itteresting illustration of the topic under discussion is 
afforded by one part of the problem of the psychology of laughter, namely 
that part which treats of the nature or the essence of comedy. A large 
variety of theories of the ludicrous ha1Vrheen offered, from Aristotle's 
somewhat narrow principle which traces it to Tithe contemplation of some 
(1) 
defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive ", to Bergson's 
comprehensively philosophical notion of the imposition on life of a 
mechanism which is radically alien to it and into which it cannot be 
Wade to fit. In philosophy, in addition to the authorities mentioned, 
tile distinguished names of Kant and Schopenhauer, Hobbes, Bain 
and Spencer are associated with the discussion of this problem. Now 
the notable thing in connection with all these theories of the 
comic is the fact that it is so easy, howevepomprehensive 
(I) Poetics, 5, 1. (Butcher) 
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the theory may be, to adduce instances which the theory can 
only meet by an obvious strain. The explanation probably is 
that no single formula can be found to cover all the possible 
instances; and the reason for this seer,Is to be that the things 
we laugh at are so radically influenced by social training or 
education, in other words, by habit. Remembering that the punitive 
or 'social censure' function of laughter is probably fundamental, 
it seems clear that the occasions of laughter will be intimately 
bound up with the whole fabric of values of a particular 
community or civilisation. This means two things. First, 
that the study of the laughter of a particular people or race 
will be likely to throw important sidelights on the nature of their 
valuations; and, second, that the traditional quest for the 
'essence' of the comic is foredoomed to only a very partial success. 
To sum up the results of the present chapter. Habit, in the 
sense of relatively fixed or stabilised acquired adjustments, 
is of basic importance for several reasons. ' Whether we are con- 
sidering habit in the more elementary sense of simple motor 
habit, or in the sense in which it reveals itself in intellectual 
and emotional organisation, it represents an acquired coordination 
of elementary-capacities, the exercise of which is per e 
satisfying. The degree of sstisfact. on which such an exercise 
affords is a function of the nature and extent of the 
coordinations i.nv olve _ that is, of the degree to which they 
rel)resent the expression or realisation of the organism.'s 
capacities. 
There are thus three ways in which habit gives rise to- 
a dynamic or drive in mental life. In the first place, there 
is the familiar, basic fact of the tendency, disposition or 
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impulse to carry out a particular response merely because it 
ís the one which we previously carried out, -- the tendency, 
other things being equal, to repeat the previous reaction.(1) 
(1) This aspect of habit is well expressed by McDougall 
himself in the following passage the sense of which we find 
it very difficult to reconcile with his position on the 
question of a habit dynamic; "A universal tendency which is so 
familiar as to run the risk of being neglected, must be briefly 
mentioned; namely, the tendency for every process to be repeated 
more readily in virtue of its previous occurrence and in pro - 
pportion to the frequency of its previous repetitions. The 
formulation of this tendency may be named the law of habit, 
if the word "habit" is understood in the widest possible sense. 
In virtue of this tendency the familiar as such is preferred 
to the less familiar, the habitual and routine mode of action 
and reaction, in all departments of mental life, to any mode 
of action necessitating any degree of novel adjustment." 
(Introd. to Soc. Psych. pp 115 -116.) In the light of this 
passage McDougall's refusal to attribute dynamic value to habit 
can only mean that he would regard as separate and distinct 
phenomenal, the general tendency to habit formation, that is, the 
tendency described in the quotation; and 2, the impulse or tendency 
to continue the exercise of a particular habitual activity which 
one has begun. It is this second tendency that he would deny. 
But is not the distinction itself in the last analysis unreal? 
And if we admit a dynamic in the one case, must we not logically 
admit it in the other? Let us state the situation in this way. 
Of two actions, A and B, A is preferred because it is the action 
previously performed. This is the tendency admitted in the 
quotation. The performance of(an acquired activity involves the 
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performance of a series of a ets ,4, Q, x02,2,.. Now A was chosen 
because there was a readiness of the neural connections to 
function in the direction of A. But we must also admit, then, 
that when a is performed, there is a readiness of the neural 
connections to function for the performance of a, and then of 
as and so on. In short, this is the habit dynamic for which 
we contended in the present chapter. McDougall's denial of this 
dynamic would really seem to imply that kind of partial, abstract 
view of an act which leads, for example, to a sharp separation 
of act and motive, to the failure to see that the inner and 
outer parts or aspects of an act are not really separate or 
separable facts, but integral parts of a single unitary ct. 
When dynamic value is attributed to habit at all, it is usual 
to allow a dynamic in this sense at least. As we have seen 
above, the motive of habit in this sense is an important factor 
in the explanation of many of the satisfactions and 
dissatisfactions of later life. The sequel will shew, ¡,moreover, 
that the fact is of special interest in connection with our 
present purpose. For the strength of the habit motive in this 
sense seems to vary considerably as between one stage of the 
individual's development and another. 
There is a second, more fundamental sense, however, in which 
we may conceive the dynamic of habit. This is the sense already 
explained in which the satisfaction conferred by the habit depends 
on the degree to which it gives expression to the organism's 
capacities. It is evident that the problem of the dynamic 
has here brought us back to the question of native endowment. The 
important thing is to be clear as to the precise sense in which 
this factor of native endowment comes into the question of 
(n.8) 
motivation. In point of' fact, in connection with any question of 
this kind we are necessarily driven back upon the fact of 
the native constitutión of the particular organism under discussion 
Now part of this native endowment, namely the instincts, is of 
. the nature of adjustments already highly stabilised and prepared 
to function apart from training. If we merely say that all our 
habit adjustments are formed in the service of these, then the 
statement that our actions proceed from inherited motives is 
both intelligible and legitimate. But we have seen that we 
cannot truthfully say this. A large number of the capacities to 
which our acquired coordinations give satisfying expression are 
such that they probably would not make their appearance at all 
as conscious needs or impulsions( and certainly not as strong needs 
or impulsions) had it not been for a process of training or education 
in the carrying out of certain organised activities. Such activities 
must be therefore regarded as carrying their own dynamic. They are 
directly, intrinsically satisfying. Specific instincts may be 
incidentally involved in the exercise of these capacities, and the 
satisfaction of such insticts forms part of the total satisfaction. 
But the essential quality of the satisfaction is bound up 
with the exercise of these capacities themselves. Any refinement 
of psychological analysis which can throw further light on 
the ultimate reason for this satisfaction means a further step 
in the direction of a complete understanding of the essential 
nature of the organism with which we are dealing. But the 
bedrock psychological fact for ethics is that there are certain 
Pursuits, activities, adjustments which are not merely acquired, 
but, further, acquired as the result of a protracted process of 
training or education; that the verdict of the race experience 
declares these activities basal to the ultimate satisfaction 
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ofthe human being; and that this verdict is confirmed in the 
experience of every individual who has been successfully 
habituated to these activities. 
The third sense in which habit has dynamic value has been 
implied in the preceding paragraph, but for the sake of clearness 
we may give it separate mention. Not only is the repetition of 
the previous reaction as such satisfying, and not only is this 
satisfaction enhanced in proportion as the activity expresses the 
more basal of the organic capacities, but, when this satisfaction 
has been experienced, a conscious need for it tends to be 
generated, the organism tends to acquire a permanent urge towards 
the securing of such satisfaction. 
ClLif Ti:3 VI 
In the two preceding chapters we have been concerned to shew 
the failure on the part of those theories, which make the concept 
of instinct the basic principle of explanation,to do justice to 
certain aspects of mental development which possess special 
interest in connection with the problem of ethical growth. In 
the present chapter we propose to deal similarly with theories 
which select one special instinctive tendency and find the basic 
principle of explanation in it. These theories may be conveniently 
classified as either 'Imitation' or 'Sympathy' theories, 
although that classification by no means covers all the 
theories in question. 3ut it covers the most important of them. 
The suggestion is not intended that any one of those theories 
does not make use of the concepts used by the others, but 
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that it lays special stress on one concept and attaches a 
more fundamental explanatory value to it. The general outcome of 
this has been, as we shall see, the obscuring of the meaning 
of what are perfectly legitimate terms by the lack of proper restraint 
in the use of them. As a consequence, the psychological literature 
of imtitation, for example, makes somewhat bewildering and tantal- 
ising reading for anyone accustomed to a more precise use of 
psychological terminology. 
We shall endeavour to shew that, underlying the hide use 
of these terms, there are indeed certain fundamental facts or 
processes to describe which various terms have been used,- - 
terms such as imitativeness, sympathy, suggestibility, gregariousness, 
according to the special viewpoint or interest of the particular 
writer. We shall further attempt to distinguish such more 
fundam-ntal processes from certain phenomena of a more particular 
character, which are also frequently designated by the same terms. 
The result will be to indicate just how far any one of these 
terms can carry us in the matter of explanation, just what 
group of facts of our mental life we can legitimately adduce 
these terms to explain. We shall scrutinise in particular the 
terms 'imitation' and'sympathy' and indicate their value and their 
limitations in accounting for the growth of personality. 
The best attempt to grapple with the problem of genetic 
ethics is that of 3aldwin who has ende avoured to state the 
fundamentals of the problem in his "Mental Development" and has 
given us the detailed application of these fundamentals in the 
"Social and Ethical Interpretations ". Many fisychologists have 
discussed in a more or less casual way the growth of what they 
call moral ideas, but Baldwin's work is one of the few that 
deserve serious notice, for the reason that here we have a 
(121) 
manifest appreciation of the basal character of the questions 
involved and a real attempt to arrive at a statement of 
illuminative fundamental principles rather than a tinkering with 
the details of ethical growth. But there are certain features of 
Baldwin's treatment which seem to us very unsatisfactory, inasmuch 
as they m4ke to create a general impression of the process as 
a whole which does not seem true. The points especially open 
to criticism seem to be (1) his use of the term 'imitation', and 
the radical importance which he attaches to this process, and (2) 
his use of the term'social', and the false perspective which is 
likely to arise from the way in which this term is employed. 
With regard to the second point, the present essay as a whole 
will furnish the justification of this criticism. The former 
line of criticism we may proceed to examine here. 
In general, Baldwin uses the term imitation in a wide sense 
in which it includes the phenomena of Sympathy and Suggestion as al 4-'0 
the phenomena to which the term imitation is, as we shall see, 
more commonly applies. It is true thatefers specifically to 
(1) 
suggestion and offers a definition of it, and that he devotes a 
separate section to sympathy.(2) Nevertheless, considering the 
basic conception of imitation which is implied in his account 
of the "circular reactio i and considering that he talks of 
imitation as "covering all the phenomena of social contagion and 
atmosphere. (4) and considering that he regards it as the method of 
all mental growth, it seems clear that the prominence given to 
the term is due to its use in the wide sense suggested. Now, used 
in this wide sense, what does it really amount to? To what basic 
fact does it serve to draw our attention? 
(1) Mental Development,pp 101 -102. 
(2) Social and Ethical Interpretations, p.229. 
(3) Mental Development ,pp .250 -251 
(4) Social & Ethical Interpretations,p.238 
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It means simply that the individual is directly affected 
by other individuals in the sense that he tends to reproduce in 
himself some of their mental stetes and some of their actions. 
He responds especially in this way(assuming that we are dealing 
with the human individual) to members of his own species. This 
is simply a basic fact which underlies the possibility of his 
development into a human being at all. For the psychologist it 
raises a very definite problem: viz., what is the explanation of the 
fact that this imitativeness has for its objector not 
to assume its innateness) comes to have for its object% 
predominantly the members of his own species? To say that 
this imitativeness is a function of the direction of the 
attention is not, of course, to answer the question. The 
phenomenon to be explained is indeed better described as 
the tendency to direct the attention especially to members 
of his own species. Two answers have been suggested. According 
to the first, there is an original, native tendency 
to such direction of the attention and this native tendency 
is further strengthened and confirmed by experience. As 
Thorndyke puts it: "The original attentiveness of men to 
the acts movements, positions, sounds and facial expressions 
of other men and the original satisfyingness of the approval 
so often got by doing what other men do, are really the 
tendencies or predispositions or potentialities that do the 
work in question. "(1) The second answer would attribute the 
tendency entirely to an experience of the satisfying 
consequences of directing the attention to other human beings, 
that is, it would be regarded as a habit phenomenon. A 
thoroughgoing behaviouristic explanation, such as we considered 
(1) Educational Psychology, vol 1, p. 117 
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¡flan earlier passage in connection with the problem as to 
the nature of instinct, would advocate such a view. It must be 
conceded, indeed, that certain experimental investigations, for 
example, with regard to the nest -building, the singing, and 
the mating of birds) as well as certain considerations of a more 
general kind, ought to make us cautious about the use of the 
notion of innate endowment in connection with a problem of this 
kind. 
But whether or not we admit an original, innate attentiveness 
to the members of his own species, there can be no doubt as 
to how we must account for the fact that the direction of 
the attention comes to be specialised to such a high degree, 
that is,how we must explain the extent to which the individual 
comes to be especially responsive to the presence of members 
of his own species. To begin with, there is the question as to the 
kind of responses which the human organism as such is 
capable of making, It is inevitable that the responses 
resulting from the direction of the attention to objects other 
than the members of his own species should prove largely 
abortive and be eliminated; while .responses based 
on attention to members of his own species would naturally 
result in successful, satisfying exercise of capacity and be 
'selected'. While such an explanation makes the fact under 
discussion essentially a phenomenon of habit, it is not 
incompatible with the admission of an original, innate factor 
such as Thorndyke suggests. Baldwin's own account of the manner 
in which the child comes to distinguish between persons and 
things and proceeds to imitate persons appears to assume, as the 
only definite innate factor, the well -known reflex which 
might be described as saying that moving objects tend to be 
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brought into the focus of vision(1) 
But however we explain it in detail, the fact itself is 
incontestable that at a very early age the child displays 
especial interest, a peculiar responsiveness or aptitude 
when the actions or mental states of the other human beings 
around him are concerned. Now it seems to be this root 
fact that we find in psychological literature masquerading 
under various names. Baldwin can make good his claim as 
to the radical importance of imitation only by using the 
term to mean this fundamental fact. But certain other terms 
might with equal justice be used and, indeed, actually have 
been used in the very same way in which Baldwin uses the term 
imitation, and on examination they turn out to be simply 
different ways of expressing the same fundamental fact. 
Terms which have especially been used in this manner are these: 
1. Gregariousness, 2. Sympathy, 3. Consciousness of Kind, 
4. Suggestibility. We may examine a case in point with 
regard to each of the first three of these terms. This will 
not only make clear our own attitude to these principles, 
but it will serve to illustrate a tendency which has seriously 
detracted from the value of certain contributions to our 
particular problem; viz., the tendency towards a false 
simplification of the issues by a somewhat exasperating lack 
of precision in the use of certain highly elastic terms. 
Take gregariousness. Aglaring instance of the defect 
in question is to be found in the main thesis of Trotter's 
Instincts of the herd in leace and 'star ". In this work 
gregariousness is called in to explain not only the simpler 
facts of animal behaviour, but highly complex and distinctively 
human phenomena. 
(1) Mental Bevelopment, pp. 119 -120. 
5) 
Consider, for example, the following passages: "Conscience, then, 
and the feelings of guilt and of duty are the peculiar possession 
of the gregarious animal ".(1) "This intimate dependence on the 
herd is traceable not merely in matters physical and intellectual, 
but also betrays itself in the deepest recesses of personality 
as a sense of incompleteness which compels the individual to 
reach out towards some larger existence than his own, some 
encompassing being in whom his perplexities may find a solution 
and his longings peace."(2) "He is more sensitive to the voice of 
the herd than to any other influence. It can inhibit or stimulate 
his thought or conduct. It is the source of his moral codes, 
of the sanctions of his ethics and philosophy. "(3) We have already 
com_aented on the fallacious . procedure exemplified here; viz., 
the use of a principle of explanation in such a way that the 
things of greatest consequence are left unexplained. Here it is 
more pertinent to remark that, as far as concerns the element of 
truth in Trotter's position, this is simply an insistence 
on the fact which Baldwin has argued at length in his account 
of the development of the ' socios', the fact of the ultimate 
social origin and reference of our judgments of value, the 
fact which Adam Smith, as we shall see, has really in view 
when he assigns the fundamental role to sympathy. Basic to 
all these positions is the psychological fact of man's 
special susceptibility to the mental states and the actions of 
his fellows, the fact that such states and actions are specially 
meaningful to hi), and come to be peculiarly the objects of 
his attention. 
Take again the concept of sympathy as handled by two 
(1) Instinct of the herd in Peace and 'War, p. 40 
(2) Ibid, p. 113 
(3) Ibid, p 114 
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writers, Adam smith and .Leslie > tephen. Adam Smith's reduction 
of all forms of sympathy to reflective sympathy (resulting 
from an indirect process of representing or 'ima'ining' the 
other's situation and how we would feel in it ), has been 
sufficiently criticised by the psychologists. That such is 
indeed his view of the whole phenomenon is clear from the 
fact that when he does recognise the apparently direct 
transmission of feeling in certain cases, he proceeds to explain 
it in accordance with his own principle. For example, he says: 
"Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from 
the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, 
upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man 
to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge 
of what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief 
and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures 
of any person at once affect the spectator with some degree 
of like painful or agreeable emotion. "(1) But instead of 
leaving this sound observation as it stands, he hastens to add: 
"If the very appearances of grief and joy inspire us with 
some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest 
to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that 
has befallen the person in whom we observe them: and in 
these passions this is sufficient to have some little influence 
upon us." (2) At the same time, too much may be made of this 
psychological flaw. It does not affect the main thesis which 
he has in view in his use of the concept of sympathy; and, as 
has been pointed out', 
(3) 
it is the sound thesis as to the 
essentially social nature and origin of our judgments of moral 
value. The basic kind of process which he seeks to describe 
(1) Theory of Moral Sentiments, part 1. p 6. 
(2) Ibid.part 3, p 162 
(3) Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy,p 214 
(12'7) 
by the term sympathy becomes apparent when we consider, 
for instance, a passage such as the following from his dis- 
cussion of the sense of duty: "ldere it possible that a 
human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary 
place, without any communication with his own species, he 
could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or 
demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or 
deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity 
of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot 
easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with 
regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can 
present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is 
immediately provided with the mirror he wanted before. "(l) 
In the "Science of Ethics ", Leslie Stephen attaches 
an equally basic meaning to this term.(2) Stephen's interpretation 
of the term is important and, in our opinion, fundamentally 
just. He states it as follows: "Hence it would appear that 
sympathy is not an additional instinct, a faculty which is added 
when the mind has reached a certain stage of development, 
a mere incident of intelle ftual growth, but something implied 
from the first in thevery structure of knowledge. I must be 
capable of representative ideas in order to think coherently 
or to draw the essential distinction between object and subject. 
I must be able to regard certain modes of thought and feeling 
as symbolic of modes present in other minds, and to my own in 
other positions. To realise the world as a material whole, I 
must have representative perceptions of time and space. To 
realise the world of thought and feeling, that world upon which 
my life and happiness depend at every instant, I must have 
(1), Theory of Poral Sentiments, part 1, p 6. 
((2)' c. f. whole section,pp 219 -229 
(128 
representative emotions. 'Put yourself in his place' is not 
merely a moral precept; it is a logical rule implied in the 
earliest germs of reason or a description of reasoning itself, 
so far as it deals with other sentient beings. To know that a 
man has certain feelings is to have representative feelings, 
not equal in intensity but identical in kind. Sympathy and 
reason have so far an identical factor - each implies the other. "(1) 
Giddings finds in the notion of the 'Consciousness of Kind' 
the foundational principle of his sociological theories. It 
is not necessary to criticise in detail his wide use of this 
concept. One quotation will suffice to illustrate the point. 
"The consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the 
inanimate. Within the wide class of the animate it marks off 
species and races; within the race it marks off ethnical and 
political groups, and social classes: it is therefore the 
psychological ground of social groupings and distinctions. The 
consciousness of kind, again, continually moves men to act as 
they would not if they were governed altogether by considerations 
of utility, fear, loyalty or reverence; it continually prevents 
the theoretically perfect working of economic, legal, political 
and religious motives: it is therefore the cause of the 
distinctively social phenomena of communities." (2) To show how 
little such statements explain, how much they leave unexplained, 
and how largely they suggest false explanations, would be an 
easy task,- a task, however, which would draw as aside from our 
purpose. He tells us, again, that he "could not adopt Adam 
Smith's word "sympathy ", or the familiar term "fellow -feeling ", 
as a name for the primary social phenomenon, because it was 
necessary to recognise the element of perception.TT(3) 
(1) c. f. whole section, pp 220 -221. 
(2) The Principles of Sociology, Preface. 
(3) Ibid. Preface to third edition. 
(lag) 
In so far as this 'element of perception' is intended as something 
more than an innate tendency to direct the attention to members 
of ones own species, in so far, that is, as it implies the 
possession of some special knowledge or insight, there appears 
to be neither necessity nor firm ground for the supposition 
On the other hand, in so far as the hypothesis of the 
consciousness of kind is well - founded, there can be no mistake 
as to the Fundamental truth on which it rests; and this is the 
truth. which we found so variously expressed by different writers; 
by Baldwin, in the notion of an incessant, ubiquitous imitativeness 
on the part of the child, an imitativeness directed essentially 
to his human environment; by frotter, in the notion of an all - 
pervading gregariousness instinct, by Adam imith and Leslie 
Stephen in the notion of a sympathy which is the presupposition 
of all distinctively human development; and further illustrations 
could easily be given from psychological literature. 
With regard to our own problem, the lesson of the preceding 
discussion is that none of these terms can be used by itself to 
cover all the phenomena involved; that each one of them, when 
it is properly defined, can be used to account for certain 
special phenomena; and (a point to be demonstrated in the sequel) 
that all of them together are still inadequate to cope with 
the phenomena which, as we have seen, they have been singly 
called. to explain. 
We may now proceed to a statement of the precise significance 
which we intend to attach to these .;idely used terns. Jith 
regard to the distinction between imitation, sympathy and 
suggestion, the most serviceable distinction .would appear to 
be that which confines imitation to the reproduction of another's 
actions, suggestion to the acceptance, under certain conditions, 
(x.3;0 ) 
of another', idea:3, opinions, beliefs, and sympathy to the 
reproduction of another's affective experience. We may commence 
with this as a working distinction which is accepted by 
EcDougall, Drover and others. ieedless to say, it is not intended 
as an absolute distinction in the sense that any particular 
response may be mere imitation, mere -guggestion or mere sympathy. 
Psychologically, every act involves an inner and an outer aspect, 
the mental process including affective elements, and the overt 
behaviour; and, strictly speaking, the entire process is one and 
continuous. ieverth_eless, the distinction is valuaole. It is 
really a question as to what aspect of the total act happens 
to be the object of the individual's attention, what aspect is 
localised. When the individual's attention is focussed on the 
other's overt behaviour and the starting point of his own 
behaviour is the effort to reproduce this behaviour, we would 
call his act imitation. And so with suggestion and sympathy. 
But the exact scope or significance of these ter-s demands 
further investigation. We may begin with the farm' imitation' . 
There are few terms which have been so largely used and so 
inadequately scrutinised by psychologists as the term 'imitation.' 
We may rule out, to begin with, meanings which are obviously too 
wide to be serviceable. A classic example is the riotous use 
of the term in Tarde's "Laws of Imitation ". In so far as we 
have been able to attach any meaning at all to the term as 
used by that writer, it would be applicable to any form of 
repetition whatsoever. Thus he would call memory a species of 
imitation - self imitation. The temptation to commit such 
excesses in the use of the term will be avoided by recalling the 
essential fact concerning imitation. As Mitchell puts it: 
'We imitate so far only as we are aware of a model, present or 
(131: 
absent, and seek to reproduce it. "(1) Accepting this as the 
differentia of an act of imitation, we come to what arpears to be 
the real source of our difficulties with regard to this concept. 
This is the confusion of two things, nacïely, first, the 
purely descriptive psychology of imitation and, second, the 
causal or explanatory psychology of it. A purely descriptive 
psychology would rightly give prominence to the concept of 
imitation, for a very large proportion of our activities is 
of an obviously imitative character. This is the reason for 
the large part which the concept of imitation plays in the 
writings of the social psychologists. They are concerned in the 
main with description of social behaviour. But they cannot well 
avoid altogether the -_uestion of explanation. They must consider 
the 'why! as well as the 'what' of social behaviour; they must 
account for this ubiquitous imitation. This demand is readily 
met by resort to an 'instinct' of imitation. There may be 
no further enquiry as to the existence of such an instinct. 
The fact of imitative activity itself is taken as the proof of 
the existence of this instinct. It does not seem unfair to 
suggest that this procedure is not distinguishable from the 
procedure of the Faculty Psychologists. 
It is essential, however, that we should come to terms 
with this question as to the causal factor in irritative activity. 
For the question as to whether we shall regard imitation as one 
of the factors in motivation or, on the other hand, merely 
donsider it as a behaviour phenomenon of which the motivating 
factors are to be sought elsewhere, will be decided by the 
conclusion at which we arrive about the causal psychology of it. 
If there is indeed an instinct of imitation in thesense 
(1) Structure and Growth of Lind, p. 143. 
(13ír) 
indicated above, then the difficulty is removed. We must then 
reckon with imitation as one of the most fundamental sources of 
motivation. But the existence of an instinct of imitation in this 
sense is more than open to question. ï.icDougall rightly points out 
that "underlying the varieties of imitative action, there is no 
common affective state and no common impulse seeking satisfaction 
in some particular change of state. "(1) Imitative acts, in other 
words, are due to different kinds of conation, and hence the 
explanatory opychology of imitation will concern itself with the 
study of these conations. LcDougall himself proceeds to give a 
description of some different types of imitative activity, but 
he does not specifically examine the kind of conation, the kind 
of vis- a- tergo, which is operative in particular types of 
imitative activity. Now this is the really important thing, and 
it must be considered here. 
To begin with, is there an instinct of imitation at all? 
McDougall denies that there is a specific e instinct at all, and, 
accepting his own view of the nature of instinct,we cannot agree 
with him on this point. There are certain imitiative acts which 
it seems impossible not to attribute to a specific instinct. 
Such are the imitative reproduction of vocal sounds and facial 
and lip movements. The range of movements to which this kind 
of imitation extends is not clear. McDougall does indeed suggest 
that this kind of imitation is due to a specific instinct, but 
grudgingly characterises it as 'Tan extremely simple, rudimentary 
instinctil.(2) The exact point of this reservation we cannot exactly 
see. In this sense, their, we would admit a specific instinct 
(3) 
(1) Introd.to Soc. Psych.p 103. 
(2) Introd. toSoc. p 106. 
(3 )Thorndyke would deny the existence of an instinct 
even in this sense, but Drever's answer on this point 
seems conclusive.(Instinct in Idan,p ) 
(133) 
and the conation underlying such imitation i3 of courue the 
impulse of this instinct. 
The next type of imitative activities is rightly to be 
classified as simple ideo -motor actions. Any action which is 
for some reason closely attended to, tends to be reproduced directly 
without any express volition. The phrase 'spontaneous' imitation 
is perhaps the best term to describe this kind of response. s 
HcDougall says. "It seems to be in virtue of this simple 
ideo -motor imitation that a child so easily picks up, as we say, 
the peculiarities of gesture, and the facial expressions and 
deportment generally, of those among whom he lives. "(1) The 
conation in this case is to be found in that general tendency in 
virtue of which any action which is closely attended to, which, 
in other words, causes a narrowing of consciousness by a 
monopolisinj of the attention, tends to be reproduced. We 
distinui >sh this from the first kind of imitative acts mentioned 
because the latter seem to be of a more specialised kind 
and may appear at a much earlier age. It must be pointed out, 
too, with regard to spontaneous imitation in general, that such 
imitation comes later to be largely directed to the reproduction 
of actions the constituent elements of which have been already 
separately learned. One may thus easily exaggerate the importance 
of this kind of imitation in the learning process. :'There we 
admit it above as a separate or distinct native tendency, we are 
referring, to the simplest, most elementary forms of ideo -motor 
action; the reproduction of the more complex patterns would in 
the main be otherwise explained.(See par. 2. below). 
So much for the simpler forms. It is when we come to 
consider so- called conscious or deliberate imitation that the 
(1) Introd. to Joc. psych. p 105 
(134) 
difficulty arises . McDougall denies the existence of a specific 
instinct of i :itation here and in this he is doubtless correct. 
But he postulates instead "a general innate tendency" to 
imitate and to this we must take exception. That there is an 
innate factor of some kind involved we do not deny, but 
we propose to give a different account of it. Let us take 
typical examples of deliberate imitation and enquire into (a) 
the kind of conation involved in each and (b) the general 
significance of each in mental development. 
1. A child reproduces his father's movements in unbolting 
the door. He does so because he desires the result of the open 
door and the removal of this impediment to his own freedom of 
movement. Further, he reproduces his father's movements because 
he knows no other way of achieving this result. file is really 
adopting the only means at his disposal to secure an ulterior 
result which is the real object of his striving. To explain the 
conation here would mean to explain the attractiveness of this 
ulterior object. Ad far as the description of the act is concerned, 
it is deliberate imitation in the strict sense, for it involves the 
comparison Of his own action with the pattern or model. To describe 
this action as imitative, however, indicates nothing concerning 
the nature of the conation involved. 
Now when Baldwin characterises imitation as the -method of 
all mental growth(1 }, he has very largely in mind actions of this 
sort. What is the real intere. t or significance of such actions? 
It is that the child is inevitably dependent to a very great 
extent on his social environment for the discovery of effective 
means of realising his own purposes. The devices thus 
discovered prove satisfying and therefore become habitual. Hence 
one obvious reason for the prevalence of imitative activity. 
(1) Regial and Eth. Inter.. ,111,etc. 
(155) 
But the really important consideration io this dependence on 
his social environment for the attainment of his objects. This 
dependence is itself the source of a habit -- a habit which, as we 
shall find in the sequel, is of radical importance in later 
development. A habitual attitude of submission to society begins 
to develop and finally becomes fixed and ineradicable. We may sum up 
the situation, in fact, by saying that the notion of social 
authority begins to germinate in the child's mind in connection 
with imitative acts of this bind. In its final fruition, 
this sense of authority means that the ideas, opinions and actions 
which he finds in society 52e unreflectively accepted as valuable. 
(2) A child sees his father occupied with pencil and 
paper, seizes the pencil and proceeds with every symptom of 
satisfaction to execute his own meaningless scrawls. Here there 
is no persistent attempt to reproduce any copy or pattern. 
The real motive force here is the desire for the new experience 
of grasping and rnanipulatin= the pencil. Action of this 
kind is essentially symptomatic of a rapidly growing self 
which is reachi_no out for new and satisfying experiences. The 
conation in this case is to be found in the fact of growth 
manifesting itself in a need for experiences that are new 
and interesting; and there is again to a large degree the same 
significant dependence on the social environment for the suggestion 
of new lines of exploration and experimentation. Baldwin dis- 
cusses this kind of process at some length and closely associates 
it with what he calls invention. In point of fact, Baldwin's account 
of imitation and invention seems simply to amount to this: 
invention means imitation looked at from the inside, from 
the point of view of the experiencing and interpreting child 
rather than from the point of view of the outside observer - -- from 
(136) 
the latter point of view it would be called imitation. (11 
(3) A teacher adopts a new way, let us say, of wearing 
his watch- chain, knotting his neck -tie or brushing his hair. 
He finds very soon that the new way has been adopted by 
an observant class. What is the nature of the conation 
involved in imitation of this kind? Actions of this sort are 
usually ' explained' as the result of 'prestige suggestion', but 
this fails to make clear the real oric'in or significance of 
such actions. It would seem that the true interpretation of 
this apparently simple act of imitation is extremely instructive. 
Such action is the expression of a powerful conation which 
has been essentially created as the result of a long experience. 
To begin with, we observe that the satisfaction resides in a 
faithful reproduction of the pattern act. Exact reproduction of 
the pattern is the terminus of the process, the end which 
presents itself to the individual as valuable. Hence the act 
is imitative in the full sense. With regard, however, to the 
conation implied, this fidelity of reproduction is the motive(to 
recall a distinction already drawn) only in the sense of being 
the 'terminus ad quem'; the 'vis- a- tergo' of the act has yet 
to be explained. What is it that gives to this intrinsically 
valueless result a high value in the eyes of the child? The 
answer would seem to be found in the growth of that habitual 
attitude to which we referred above. In virtue of this habit 
of mind, which has now become firmly established, not only 
may the judgments, opinions and beliefs of society be accepted 
without question, but trivial acts of behaviour, such as we 
have instanced in the present paragraph, tend to acquire 
a high indirect or associative value. This means (1) that habit 
(1) c. f. Social and Ethical Interpretations,pp 106 -029; especially 
p.114 and pp 128 -129. 
(137) 
is fundamentally the principle to which we must resort for 
the explanation of imitative acts of this kind; and (2) that the 
real significance of such acts is that they are, so to speak, 
symptoms; they are symptomatic of the success with which 
the process of socialisation has been carried on. Imitation 
of this kind would therefore stand to imitation of the kind 
discussed in par (1) in the relation of effect to cause -- the 
latter type of action, in connection with which the child 
learns to look to his social environment for the means of 
realising his purposes, would be a main cause in the fostering 
of that attitude which gives rise to the type of imitative 
action discussed in the present paragraph. Hence when the 
child's imitativeness in this latter sense is pointed to(as 
it very commonly is) as a means which can be effectively used 
by the educator for the purpose of 'socialising' the child, 
it would seem that the argument implies a curious circle. The 
socialisation process must be well advanced before the child 
really becomes imitative in this sense, that is, before 'prestige' 
begins to work. 
(4) A child sees a clown at the circus perform an acrobatic 
feat, such as turning a somersault, walking on a tight rope, and 
so on; and he practices strenuously until he can himself reproduce 
the performance or until dissatisfying results lead him 
to desist. The interest here is in the successful exercise 
of his powers in order to produce a definite and difficult result. 
It is the interest in achievement as such or for its own sake, 
and the satisfaction accruing is probably a special case of - 
satisfaction of the constructive instinct. "The pleasure 
of feeling oneself a cause ", that is, the pleasure resulting 
from the satisfaction of the experimentation tendency, would 
(138) 
appear to be the main factor in this case. If we admit an 
independent instinct of self- assertion, the satisfaction of 
this instinct would also be an important part of the process. 
(5) There remains to be mentioned what is perhaps the 
most interesting and significant class of imitative acts. This 
is the kind of act which we can describe only by saying that 
the individual desires to reproduce an experience which has 
direct value for him. The value of the object in this case 
is not (as in the case discussed in par. 3) indirect or 
associative but direct or intrinsic. An individual may strive 
imitatively to reproduce, for example., a gait, manner, gesture 
or tone of voice which has had a directly pleasurable effect 
on him. This need or impulse to reproduce an object which has 
intrinsic value underlies a most important class of imitative 
activities. We refer to the kind of 'imitation' which is found 
in art. The horse, for example, is an object which interests or 
possesses direct value for the child, and therefore the child 
attempts to draw it. The landscape possesses al peculiar value for 
the artist - he therefore must heeds reproduce it) , and the 
success of the reproduction is measured by the degree in which the 
original ,value- experience is recovered. The dramatist similarly 
seeks to recover the peculiar value -experience of a certain human 
situation. Now imitation of this kind would appear to be 
simply a specially i-portant case of the basic psychological 
principle according to which we tend to continue or persist in a 
pleasurable activity. Some writers, indeed, such as Baldwin, 
would incline to regard this continuance of or persistence in a 
Pleasurable activity as itself a foot of imitation. But this 
seems improper and confusing; the term imitation can only be 
used to refer to that very special manifestation of this motive 
(139) 
which we have indicated. To explain fully the original conation 
in this case would mean an investigation of the ultimate psychological 
factors in aesthetic enjoyment. 
We have thus recognized in different tyres of imitative 
action conations or motives of different kinds. It is hardly 
necessary to add that in any particular case, more than one of 
these motives may be and, in fact, usually would be operative. 
Further, the analysis of these different types leads us to the 
conclusion that in deliberate imitation as such there is present 
no inherited factor in the sense of an innate tendency to imitate. 
What, then, is the special congenital factor implied in delib- 
erate imitation? In addition to the instinctive impulses which we 
recognize (see p. ) , there is implied the inheritance of 
a special capacity. This is the capacity to carry on a procese 
which represents an essential aspect of the activity of reason, 
namely, the process of active comparison of objects so as to 
discriminate identities and differences. This means fundamentally 
the capacity to carry on processes of abstraction and generalization. 
Hence one thing with which we must reckon in our attempt to trace to 
its sotce the activity of deliberate imitation is the inheritance of 
the capacity to carry on processes of this nature. Given the 
motivating factors, inherited and acquired, which have been 
already discussed, given also the fundamental fact of which 
we have already examined the significance, namely, the fact 
that for the human being the behaviour of members of his own 
species possesses a peculiar interest, and given, finally, the 
capacity to carry on the rational process considered in the 
prêsent paragraph, then no new problem is raised by the fact of 
deliberate imitation. From another point of view, it might be 
said that such imitation is merely a special case of the 
(140) 
essentially rational activity of consciously adopting and adapting 
means for the attainment of ends. An illustration will indicate the 
relation in which it stands to the higher processes of thinking. 
Gehen the engineer constructs a bridge in accordance with a 
model which has been put into his hands, his thinking is 
essentially of the type involved in deliberate imitation; and 
it might be described by that phrase to distinguish it from the 
case(which would be considered a grade higher in the scale of 
rational activity), in which he is called upon first of all to 
construct the model itself. 
In the sequel, we shall in the main be concerned with the 
specific causal factors underlying ethical growth. For this 
reason the word 'imitation', which covers such a variety of 
specific causal factors and which, indeed, properly belongs 
to the vocabulary of purely descriptive psychology, will 
by no means figure so largely as it usually does in discussions 
of this kind. 
Sympathy. We may now proceed to consider the concept 
of sympathy. In the present chapter we have already discovered 
especial and, it would seem, distinctively human capacity, 
the capacity to have "representative emotions," to use the 
phrase of Leslie Stephen. We would agree, also, with that 
writer that this capacity must be included within the total 
of capacities which go to constitute rationality. As Stephen 
says: "It is a description of reason itself, so far as it 
deals with other sentient beings. u(1) This capacity is the 
basic fact underlying the growth of what has been called 
'reflective' sympathy. Reflective sympathy, in the strict sense, 
implies the reconstruction or representation of another's affective 
state as a consequence of the representation of this other's 
(1) Science of Ethics, pp 220 -221 
('4') 
circumstances or, simply, of the observation of his overt 
behaviour. The latter phrase might suggest that we are confusing 
this form of sympathy with "primitive passive's sympathy, but, 
as will presently appear, we are not forgetting the distinction 
between these two different phenomena; on the contrary, we 
shall find it necessary to reassert the distinction with emphasis. 
In reflective sympathy, the intellectual or cognitive factor 
is more or less pronounced. Implicitly or explicitly, the process 
involves inference or judgment. There are two cases to be considered. 
In the one case we have a representative experience of the 
other's situation; in the other case, we may not be aware of this 
situation but we observe in the individual certain signs which have 
become for us significant of a certain emotion. In both cases 
we make the implicit or explicit judgment that the individual is 
experiencing this particular emotion and hence we 'understand' his 
emotional state. The question arises: What is involved in 'under- 
standings in this sense? Does it necessarily imply the 
representation to some degree of the emotion as such, the repro- 
duction of it, so to speak, in ourselves? The answer appears to be that 
originally such representation of the feeling itself would be 
fully carried out and that it is perhaps always present to some 
degree. But in the course of experience, the representative 
feeling as such becomes increasingly schematic in proportion 
as the term which denotes it more and more directly 
and immediately bound up with the appropriate reaction. This 
would seem to be in accordance with the general rule that 
imagery tends to play an increasingly unimportant role in 
the thinking of the trained mind, such imagery, however, being 
more or less recoverable when the need appears. 
( 142) 
Reflective sympathy implies a considerable degree of 
mental development. This fact is emphasised by gully, who also 
draws attention to the prominence of the representative or 
intellectual factor. Sully says: "Since sympathy with others 
is only possible when we imaginatively represent and realise 
their affective states by help of our own similar experiences, 
it can only reach a similar development after a certain 
accumulation of emotive experience through the gratifications 
and disappointments of the more instinctive emotions, and when 
the general representative power of the mind attains a certain 
strength. "(1) The same writer is careful to distinguish, however, 
between sympathy and mere intellectual apprehension: "While 
sympathy and intellectual apprehension are thus closely related 
they are not identical. In each case there is the representation 
of another's mind or feeling but the mode of representation 
differs. In sympathizing with a person we are occupied with 
his feelings as such and are ourselves in a state of resonant 
feeling; in the understanding him we are intellectually active, 
fixing our attention on the relations (causal etc..) of his 
mental states. "(2) 
Baldwin also suggests the relative lateness of the 
appearance of reflective sympathy by connecting its rise 
with the growth of the notion of self; and he suggests, too, 
the social origin of it.' It has already been pointed out 
that Adam Smith took account only of reflective sympathy. Even 
though he noted the fact of what we would now call primitive 
Passive sympathy, he attempted to explain it in terms 
applicable only to the reflective type.(4) Nevertheless, his 
f1) The Human Mind, vol 2 ch. 15, p 107. 
(2) Ibid vo1.2 p.111. 
(3) Social and Ethical Inteinretations,n.-33 
(4) See D.126. 
(143) 
discussion of the latter is beyond question a valuable 
contribution. We have already expressed our concurrence in the 
more liberal interpretation of this writer's position- the 
interpretation which sees in it an insistence on the ultimately 
social origin of our judgments of moral value. Here we would 
urge that his emphasis on the representative factor in reflective 
sympathy is sound. On the other hand, it must be granted that 
his account of this process of 'imagining', as he calls it, 
(an account which seems to picture it as at all tiles an 
elaborate and even tortuous process) produces indeed the 
impression of that artificiality to which his critics have 
taken exception. This defect is corrected, however, if we 
remember that, in the course of experience, the process of 
sympathetic apprehension of another's feeling comes to be 
short -circuited, so that actual representation may be extremely 
schematic, if not entirely absent. Let us repeat, the-4, the 
possibilities: (a) We may represent the object or situation 
which our fellow -man is experiencing; this may involve in 
addition the representation of its affective value for him. 
This latter representation means the "representative emotion" 
which Leslie Jtephen describes with profound truth as "reason 
itself so far as it deals with other sentient beings". (b) Certain 
phenomena of behaviour have come to function as expressive 
signs - expressive of a certain emotional state; on observation 
of such behaviour, we represent in a more or less direct or 
immediate way, according to our own level of development, the 
emotional condition which they express, -- again the representative 
eaotion the capacity for which is inherent in the capacity for 
reason itself. 
(144) 
With regard to sympathy in the sense of the 'contagion 
of feeling', or the 'sympathetic induction' of emotion as it 
has been called, we need only admit the fact of this kind 
of sympathy without attempting to add anything to the account 
usually given. If we are to talk of a sympathy instinct or 
instinctive tendency, the terms ought primarily to denote an 
experience of this kind. It seems clearly to satisfy one of 
McDougall's criteria of the prinariness of an instinct in that 
human beings share it with the higher animals. McDougall's 
description of it as "the experiencing of any feeling or 
emotion when and because we observe in other persons or 
creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion. "(1) is 
satisfactory so long as we are careful not to misinterpret 
the phrase "when and because we observe in other persons 
or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion." This 
sympathy experience must not be confused with the higher 
inferential process described above. What then is the general 
significance in human development of this primitive passive 
sympathy? 
' (e are not concerned here with any hypothesis as 
to its underlying mechanism though it may be remarked in 
passing(a) that JcDougall's suggestion of "a special 
perceptual inlet" associated with each of the primary instincts 
and adapted to receive and elaborate the sense impression 
caused by the expression of that same instinct in animals of 
the same species "(2), represento at least an interesting hypothesis; 
and (b) Sully's attempt to account for it as an indirect process 
due to the imitative reproduction of these expressive gestures 4 
has this in its favour that observation of children would seem to 
indicate that such contagion of feeling does not clearly antedate 
(1) Introd. to $oc. Psych. iß.`22. 
(2) Ibid. ).D3. 
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imitation of gesturesT At any rate, the imitative reproduction of 
expressive gestures must be regarded as partly at least accounting 
for the intensity of the transmitted feeling, for the thoroughness, 
so to speak with which the transmission is achieved. 
From our point of view, the fundamental role of this primitive 
passive sympathy is to add to the raw material of feeling out of 
which the higher form of sympathetic apprehension is subsequently 
built up. Just as the higher levels of cognitive life presuppose 
a wealth of cognitive material traceable ultimately to sense - 
experience, so the capacity for the higher process of feeling 
presupposes a broad foundation of affective experience of the 
more primitive type. This contagion of feeling, then, is a 
principal means whereby the affective life of the gregarious 
antmal is extended in range and its development hastened. 
It remains to consider briefly a phenomenon which does 
not appear to be exactly iñdentifiable with sympathy in either 
of the senses discussed above, though its development is 
closely bound up with these two forms of the feeling. 
This is the phenomenon which McDougall discusses under the 
.rubric of active sympathy. He describes it thus: "it involves 
a reciprocal relation between at least two persons; either 
party to the relation not only is apt to experience the 
emotions displayed by the other, but he desires also that 
tte other shall share his own emotions; he actively seeks 
the sympathy of the other, and, when he has communicated his 
emotion to the other, he attains a peculiar satisfaction 
4rhich greatly enhances his pleasure and his joy or, in the 
case of painful emotions diminishes his pain. "(2) Now we 
would submit that this familiar and important sense of the 
(1) The htuman Mind ,p. iC . 
(2) Introd.to Soc. Psych. p. 168. 
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term represents a less fundamental notion than that which 
we have found to be implied in the concept of reflective sympathy. 
The basic fact in reflective sympathy is that we 
are able to apprehend, to realise the nature of, another's 
affective experience. We are clearly taking a further step 
when we not only have this sympathetic apprehension of the 
other's emotional attitude to a certain object, but when we 
actually come to adopt the same attitude ourselves. Now this 
further step is a result which may or may not come to pass. 
Mitchell seems to distinguish between the two phenomena but 
apparently considers that the name'sympathy' is a misnomer 
except as applied to the fall -blown case of active sympathy, 
"We may thinkCanother'sJ though says that writer," without 
having his feeling; and we may also know and understand his 
feeling, but instead of imitating it we may be indifferent or 
laugh at it, or be repelled by it," (l) But this knowledge 
and understanding of the other's feeling, which has involved 
the representation of that feeling, if not now, then on former 
occasions, is, as we have seen, something more than a merely 
intellectual operation, and, on a broader view, would be the 
root fact to which the term sympathy in the higher sense ought 
primarily to refer. 
Perhaps no more telling illustration could be found of 
a tendency against which it has been part of the main object of the 
present essay to protest. We refer to the tendency on the 
part of the instinct psychologists so to present their admittedly 
strong case on behalf of the importance of instinct in all later 
development as to create a general impression or picture 
of this development which does much less than adequate justice 
(1) Structure and Growth of the Mind, p. 148. (italics outs) 
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to the role of the higher intellectual or rational processes. 
With the majority of the instincts, no doubt a plausible case 
can be made out for the contention that all the higher 
forms of their manifestation can be traced, by insensible 
gradations, to their cruder forms in animal life. But in the case 
of sympathy, the gap between primitive passive and reflective 
sympathy is more difficult to bridge; and it can hardly 
be denied that ethical import attaches only to the latter. 
The process discussed in an earlier chapter in virtue 
of which reason or intelli_-ence may with strict accuracy 
be said to determine the ends of the higher forms of human behaviour 
is well illus,ted here. The representative activity of the 
mind, stimulated, sustained and controlled, for example, by the 
spoken or written word, that is, directly through intercourse 
with our fellow -men, or indirectly through the suggestions of 
literature) yields its rare fruit in a deepening and 
expansion of the life of feeling itself, which is 
inevitably reflected in the objects or ends of human striving. 
The capccity to "put yourself in his place" which is the activity 
of reason itself with the sentieno+f our fellow -men for its 
object opens up new vistas of value to which the instincts as 
such and in themselves could not have piloted the will, and 
remoulds the objects of our striving so as to rest both their 
attractiveness and their obligatoriness on the sure foundations 
of our rational nature. 
Gregariousness. It is not necessary at this 
juncture to do anything more than indicate the restriction 
1 
of meaning which he put upon this concept. When it has been 
E 
said that gregariousness is the instinct that impels the animal 
to seek the proximity - the mere physical proximity - of its 
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kind, we seem to have said all that can safely be 
said in so far as the definite instinct is concerned. McDougall's 
account, which makes it clear that sociable qualities in the 
ordinary sense are by no means implied, its impulse being 
adequately satisfied by mere physical proximity, seems 
satisfactory. We have already commented on the violent straining 
of this concept by certain writers. Scientific psychology, 
which should aim to secure the fullest possible measure of 
precision in statement, can have nothing to say to such 
uncritical procedure. The instinctive impulse, as we shall see, 
is by no means unimportant, inasmuch as it is one of the 
'urges' that bring about and maintain human association. 
But we are verging on looseness when we attribute more to 
this instinct than this function of merely initiating or 
helping to initiate, the process which terminates in 
socialisation. It would seem that McDougall himself sets 
the example of what at least looks very like an illegitimate 
extension of the concept. In his treatment of active sympathy, 
he raises the question as to the explanation of the familiar 
fact that normally the individual feels the need of having 
his sentiment reciprocated by his fellows and that such 
reciprocation intensified the feeling. He is willing to 
find part of the explanation in the fundamental reaction 
of primitive passive sympathy, but argues that further explanation 
is necessary and suggests the notion of a specialisation of 
the gregarious instinct. supplement;, as it were, each of the special 
instincts, rendering complete satisfaction of their impulses 
impossible, until each animal is surrounded by others of the 
same species in a similar state of excitement." (1) Hence 
(1) Introd. to Soc. Psych. p.170. 
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'ewe may see in this instinct the principle that we need for 
the explanation of the development of active sympathy from 
the crude sympathetic reaction or mere sympathetic induction 
of emotion "(1) We would suggest, however, that this kind 
of speculative extension of the concept of gregariousness, 
tin extension which is apt to be looked upon not so much as 
a legitimate hypothesis, but as an explanation which tends to 
preclude further pursuit of the problem, is not in the best 
interests of scientific psychology. Instead of connecting the 
phenomenon in question with the gregarious instinct, is it not 
safer to regard it simply as a special case of the basic tendency 
of an organism as such to adjust itself to its environment? That 
is, we would begin by recognising the existence of the capacity 
for reflective sympathy in certain animals, i.e.human beings. 
How the capacity came into being, in what way it has grown, 
if it has grown at all, out of primitive passive sympathy, we 
are not yet in a position to say. But the fact of 
its existence means that, for the creatures that possess it, 
a new world of objects, so to speak, is opened up. By 
reflective sympathy he apprehends the emotional states of his 
fellows and these emotional states constitute new objects 
to which he feels the need to adjust himself. In seeking 
adjustment either by trying to realise in himself the states 
of his fellows or by trying to produce in them states 
similar to his own, it would seem a reasonable suggestion that 
his behaviour is to be accounted for mainly by habit; i. e., by 
the growth of that habitual attitude to his fellows which we 
mentioned in connection with our discussion of imitation. 
The result of this deeply rooted habitual attitude is, as we 
pointed out in the earlier passage, that he feels the need 
(i) Introd. to Soc. Psych. p 
(15m' 
to put himself into accord with the values or, in other 
words, with the feelings of his fellowmen. He has doubtless 
had abundant experience of the satisfying consequences bound 
up with this social attunement. This would mean that active 
sympathy is not really something innate, but essentially a 
result of the general process of socialisation. This point 
will be recalled when we come to treat in a later chapter the 
question of moral defectives, and we shall find that the above 
view enables us better to understand the real character of the 
defect in such cases. 
In so far as there is a further motive, it would be 
accounted for by primitive passive sympathy itself. In any case, 
it seems safer to limit the gregarious instinct to the function 
at the most of simply initiating the process by keeping him in 
contact with his fellows. In a similar way, it may be recalled, 
we attributed to the curiosity instinct the function of initiating 
activities to explain which, in their subsequent developments, 
we need to fall back on other tendencies than the 
curiosity tendency. 
The third innate tendency, suggestibility, may be briefly 
mentioned. We have already subscribed to the limitation of 
that term to cover only the special phenomenon of the 
tendency, under certain conditions, to accept with conviction 
ideas or beliefs in the absence of reasoned or logical ground 
for such acceptance; and we have here to propose a still further 
limitation of the meaning of this term. It is no part of the 
object of the present essay to discuss the psychology of 
suggestion as such; it is sufficient simply to state the sense 
in which the term will be used. This sense is adequately 
conveyed in the words which we have just used, except for 
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one ambiguity which it seems worth while to point out. 
This ambiguity lies in the interpretation of the phrase 
"in the absence of reasoned or logical groonds." +Vhen this 
logical background is absent in the nature of the case, as 
in the case of the very immature child, it would seem reasonable 
to argue that the acceptance of the 'suggested' idea is 
really a special psychological phenomenon; and, moreover, 
that this phenomenon is not on the same mental plane as that 
in which such acceptance is due strictly to 'dissociation', 
i.e. to the more or less temporary inaction of existing idea 
systems or, in other words,to the suspension of the critical 
attitude. It is usual to say that children are highly amenable 
to suggestion because of the paucity of their ideas 
and of the consequent rudimentariness of their critical 
faculties. But if this be the reason for the acceptance 
of the suggested idea, and if, as appears to be the case 
the fundamental phenomenon in suggestion appears to be 
dissociation, then there would seem to be little point 
in talking about 'suggestion' or 'dissociation' in the 
case of the young child. Dissociation of what? In 
the act of suggestion as ordinarily understood, there is 
usually implieu not merely the fact of the uncritical acceptance 
of an idea, but the fact that other ideas, which might 
possibly occasion conflict, exist but are for some reason 
inoperative, and that the critical faculties, although more 
or less developed, are for the time being in abeyance. 
It would appear that this process is sufficiently distinctive 
and important to call for a special term, and the term suggestion, 
both in popular thinking and in abnormal psychology, carries 
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already this twofold impli_cafiion; i. e. the :ore or less temporary 
inhibition of the critical attitude, of dissonant ideas, and the result - 
ing acceptance, with full conviction of the 'suggested' idea. If, 
however, we extend the connotation of this term, as is comionly done, 
to cover all cases of mere uncritical acceptance as such, then in 
the nature of the case the process of knowledge acquisition, as 
far as the child is concerned, is in the main to be described 
in terms of suggestion. The objections, however, which have 
already been urged against the over -extension of the meanings 
of terms would then be applicable to our use of the term 
'suggestion'. In the case of the child, we are dealing with 
an organism which is in process of rapid growth, which is 
reaching out for new experiences to feed its rapidly emerging 
capacities; and this 'elan vital' (if we may adapt that 
phrase to a purely psychological use) together with the paucity 
of existing idea, accounts for the avidity with which the 
actions of others are imitated and their ideas accepted. 
As far as concerns this tendency to an uncritical acceptance 
of ideas, some term such as 'primitive credulity' indicates 
the psychological situation more accurately than the term 
suggestibility'. Further, it is sometimes pointed out as 
a phenomenon of suggestibility that the ideas accepted by the 
child at this stage tend to maintain themselves even in 
the face of critical or contrariant ideas which are later 
presente& to him. But, as we saw in the exactly parallel case of 
imitation) this tendency is at bottom a habit phenomenon and is 
not to be ascribed, as it usually is, to some superior 
efficacy on the part of the suggested idea as such. 
In the present essay, therefore, while the importance of 
suggestion in ethical education will be fully recognized, 
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the term will be used to refer to the kind of process indicated 
above. 
We are now in a position to state specifically the essential 
facts of native endowment. This statement would recognise 1. reflexes 
and random movements, 2. appetites, 3. instincts, 4. capacities. 
As regards 2 and 3, Drever's tabulation seems the most useful. It 
is a psychological classification; and it provides also for the 
fundamental pleasure -pain reactions. To this we will append a statemez 




(Seeking for Pleasure (Hunger 







(Probably numerous though difficult to 
distinguish from reflexes and may perhaps 
be classed as: 
Reactions of adjustment and attention 




















The first modification which we would make is to include under 
general' tendencies the tendency to habit formation. 
*The second modification which we find it necessary to make 
concerns 'imitation'. Our discussion of this phenomenon (pp 130 -j)4 
suggests the following modification: Imitation will appear (a) among 
the specific instincts(p.132); (b) among the general innate tendencies, 
and here it will refer to the innate tendency to what is called 
(1) See, however, discussion on uo. 196 --203. 
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ideo -motor activity; and (c) among the 'capacities' where, in 
accordance with the results arrived at or p.'deliberate' imitation 
will be provided for. 
What appears to be one further source of dynamic may be 
mentioned here. This is emotion as such. It will be recalled 
that we accepted the view which regards emotion as incidental 
to the obstruction or thwarting of a conation. The objection might 
be raised that the apparent increase of dynamic under emotion 
is not really due to the emotion itself, but is simply the 
manifestation of the underlying conation which is obstructed. 
The objection is answered by pointing out that the obstruction of an 
obviously trivial conation may occasion an increase of effort 
out of all proportion to the importance of that original conation. 
wp have to add the statement of what appear to be fundamental 
inherited capacities. These we may state as follows: 
(1) The capacity for representation, including 
(a) representation of cognitive or ideational 
elements. 
(b) representation of affective or 
emotional elements.(Reflective Sympathy.) 
(2) The capacity for language. By this we mean,of course, 
more than the mere innate tendency to vocalisation. 
(3) The capacity to apprehend, to abstract and to be interested 
in space relations* as such; add also the capacity to be 
emotionally affected by certain spatial experiences (the 
so- called elementary aesthetic forms) 
(4) The capacity to apprehend, abstract and be interested in 
the number aspects of objects. 
(5) The capacity to apprehend, abstract and be interested in 
the 'sequence' aspect of objects.(the time sense) 
(6) The capacity to apprehend, abstract and be interested in 
the causal aspect of objects. 
(7) The capacity to be affected in a peculiar way or to a 
peculiar degree by the sensuous aspect of objects, 
especially by colour and sound experiences. 
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(8) The capacity for conscious comparison and contrast of objects, 
and the discrimination of identities and differences; better 
described, perhaps, in general terms, as the capacity for abstraction 
and generalisation. This capacity manifests itself throughout 
all mental life; but a special manifestation of it is to be 
found in the important activity which we have callei deliberate 
imitation. 
Now it must be clearly understood that this statement of 
inherited capacities makes no claim to be considered exact 
from the standpoint of technical psychology. It is immediately 
obvious that many of these capacities are not independent of 
one another. Some of them, also, such as the capacity for 
representation, are obviously more fundamental than some others. 
But the investigation of their ultimate nature and of their 
interrelations is a problem for the psychologist. It may be 
that some still more fundamental concept, such as the concept 
of rhythm, for example, will eventually explain several of them. 
In any case pending further investigations, a statement such as we 
have given is both legitimate and necessary in the interests of our 
special problem. In the discussion of that problem, we are 
largely concerned with these capacities as we find them integrated and 
developed in the higher human activities. 
We have now treated in some detail the problem of the 
psychological basis in the light of more recent tendencies and 
controversies in psychology, The discussion has foreshadowed 
our position with regard to certain aspects of the general 
problem of ethical growth. The following chapters will develop 
fully the principal ethical implications of that discussion. 
Now, as we have already urged, the unsatisfactoriness of even the 
best discussions of ethical growth is in the main traceable to 
a lack of thoroughness and precision in the examination and 
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statement of the psychological first principles, resulting in a 
faulty focussing of the ethical problem itself. It seems desirable, 
therefore, to summarise at this stage our conclusions so far 
and to re- formulate our problem with still further precision. 
Motivation or the springs of Action. The question as 
PL 
to1\dynamic of mental life, the sources of the urge or 
driving power which initiates and sustains mental activity, 
in short, the question as to the genesis of all conation, 
involves the recognition of (a) an original or inherited 
equipment of impulse or tendencies to action and (b) acquired 
impulses or tendencies, not satisfactorily accounted for as 
mere modifications or disguised forms of (a). The former group 
is represented by the native endowment of (a) instincts,(b) appetites, 
(o) reflexes and (d) random movements. It is permissible, perhaps, 
to assume that further psychological investigation will reveal 
the reflexes and the random movements to be at bottom 
identical phenomena. With regard to the statement in detail 
of these inherited tendencies, we found no reason why we 
should not accept McDougall's statement with the modifications 
and amplifications supplied by Dreyer. Considered simply as a 
statement of what these inherited tendencies are, irrespective 
of questions as to their significance or role in the general 
economy of the mental life, this statement would seem for 
our present purpose asound working hypothesis, Confinin 
ourselves to these more complex specific tendencies, the 
instincts,(which are the real casus belli among the psychologists) 
we found reason to disagree with McDougall's central thesis 
as to the basic and permanent role of these tendencies in 
furnishing the dynamic of mental life, Our general conclusion 
was to the effect that, when they appear to be basic, they are 
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really so only in a chronological sense by which we mean 
essentially that they represent the original or earliest sources of 
motivation. Experience, however, involves the gradual acquisition of 
new urges or drives. 
What then is the nature and source of this acquired 
dynamic for which we cannot account in terms of the specific 
instincts per se? We found that the answer to this question 
involves a recognition of the hasic nature of habit as a 
psychological category, of its penetrating influence at all 
levels of mental life, of the reality and, in a sense, the 
primariness of the dynamic which it engenders. We saw that 
the only 4c ient ific way of conceiving habit, the only way 
which holds out any hope of consistency, is to identify 
it with all the integrations of more elementary reactions which have 
been achieved during the individual's experience and which have 
acquired a relative stability. Such integrations originate in different 
ways : - (1) the extension and general modification in experience 
of the original objects of the instincts, and the extension, 
Complication and stabilising of emotional reactions -- a 
pianomenon finely discussed by McDougall but apparently not 
regarded by him as a habit pehnomenon; (2) the integration 
of the numerous reflexes and random movements into ordered 
activities; (3) the later integration of representative 
elements -images,'free ideas', concepts, -- into stable 
ideational trains. We then distinguished degrees of strength 
and permanence of the habit dynamic: (1) at the lowest level 
there is the tendency of any integration, merely as such, to 
express and maintain itself when an appropriate situation 
occurs; (2) at the highest level, where the integration 
involves capacities of a more comprehensive and deep- seated 
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kind, we have not only the experience of a deeper satisfaction 
but also the generation of new needs and impulsions. We are 
thus brought back to the notion of native capacities to which 
the habit -integrations give satisfying expression. A tentative 
statement of these fundamental and, in large measure, distinctively hume 
capacities has been given. Humanity, in its restless pursuit 
of the means whereby these capacities should be realised and 
given effective, satisfying expression, has groped its way to 
certain higher integrations, certain ordered pursuits or interests 
which we have designated the human values; and social heredity 
has transmitted these racial habits and perpetuated the 
conviction of their absolute, inalienable value. 
It was then pointed out that the integrative process - 
an essential feature of mind at all levels of development- comes, 
bathe case of the human mind, to be subject to a special kind 
of systematic control or direction made possible by the growth 
of representative activity. The most significant effects of this 
latter phenomenon are to render possible(a) the conscious , 
deliberate application of past experience to the determination 
of present choice; (b) the grasping of causal and temporal 
relations between different experiences, and hence the 
apprehension of consequences of behaviour; and (e) the 
reconstitution of the objects of choice, the ideal construction 
of permanent ends, -- ends which draw their dynamic from the 
sources described above but derive the possibility of their 
being constructed and protected at all from the operation of 
this intellectual factor. In this sense we found that the 
intellectual factor may be described as a determiner of ends. 
Further, we found reason to ascribe to it this determining role 
in a deeper sense. The ideal manipulation of the elements of 
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of cognitive experience (1), and the extension of representative 
activity to the facts of the emotional as well as of the 
intellectual life, (2) involve an expansion and deepening of the life 
of feeling itself, and hence a dynamic value of a more ultimate kind. 
We may now formulate our problem as follows: 
(i) We have to trace the growth of a kind of consciousness an 
essential element in which is the sense of authoritativeness or 
obligatoriness attaching to certain human interests, pursuits 
or values. These values, as t'r::ey present themselves to the 
ethically educated will, appear vested with an authority that 
has been in part directly inculcated, in part indirectly 
suggested throughout the process of education, so that it is 
now inwoven into the very texture of the mind as an awareness 
of certain objective conditions or situations which somehow 
limit the will, &mod furnishing the support for that judgment which 
condemns caprice or frivolity in the face of life's alternatives and 
in a sense prescribing the very content or substance of that 
life itself. 
(1) See remarks on art, p. 22 -25 cf. also . McDougall: Soc. 
Psych.p. 73." The similarity of various objects to the primary 
or natively given object, similarities which in many cases can 
only be operative for a highly developed mind, enables them to 
evoke tender emotion and its protective impulse directly etc." 
This statem?nt well illustrates the basic role of the intell- 
ectual factor; we have only to add that we would disagree, on g 
general psychological grounds, with the implication that the 
"tender emotion" thus later evolr :ed by the new object is at all 
identical, as an affective experience, with the primary "tender 
emotion" from which we are assured it is derived. 
(2) See discussion of reflective sympathy, p 1=6 
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(2) We have also to trace the process by which this 
external authority comes to be internalised. This is the 
process by which the individual comes to make these values 
his own; appreciation supervenes upon mere acceptance of 
authority as such. This appreciation, rooted in part in the 
individual's direct personal verification of 'worthwhileness' 
and in part in his sympathetic assimilation of the experience 
of his fellows, is not incompatible with the continued 
consciousness of obligation. On the contrary, it intensifies 
and deepens this consciousness inasmuch as it finds a 
rationale for it. Moreover, a certain externality always attaches 
to this consciousness, for isolated, unorganized impulses are 
at any time liable to assert themselves in even the most 
highly moralized individual. Nevertheless, the sense of the 
abiding worth and dignity of these objects has taken deep 
root in his consciousness. .Philosophers have at all times 
found something to conjure with in the vague phrase'love 
of Humanity' and have for different purposes identified it 
with various orders of conduct, ranging from the benevolent 
impulse of the good Samaritan to the professed devotion to 
a more or less nebulous ideal of ultimate human Perfection. 
Do we not attach to the phrase a significance which is at 
once comprehensive and concrete if we denote by it the 
practical allegiance of the human will to those cherished 
products of human striving? 
(3 ) But we have seen that these values are relatively 
independent of one another and hence so far we have only the 
consciousness, as it were, of a number of separate or disparate 
'obligations'. We have not touched the very core of our 
Problem until we approach the question of the synthesis of 
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these 'obligations' into a sinzle obligatory ideal of personal 
life. The structure of a personality -- a personality which 
will be at once the expression of true individuality and the 
embodiment of universal laws or principles of ethical growth 
must be fabricated out of these seemingly disparate values:. 
This really involves the study of certain fundamental aspects 
of the growth of the Self. We must concentrate perticularly 
on the study of 
(4) representative activity. Here we must take account 
of the process by which the representative elements come to 
be ordered or systematised on the basis of (a) temporal 
relations and (b) causal relations. The former phenomenon we 
may conveniently refer to as the growth of the time -senses; 
the latter represents the growth of reason, in so far as reason 
is concerned with the synthesis of the representative elements 
with one another and with the facts of perceptual experience. 
Hence with reference to each stage of the individual's 
development, we shall ask: 
(1) What are the principal agencies by means of which the 
'authority' consciousness described above is developed and 
how do these agencies operate? 
(2) To what values are these agencies especially directed, 
that is, on what values is the emphasis especially laid in the 
fostering of the consciousness of obligation, and how far ought 
the process of education to be modified in this regard? 
(3) How far, at each stye, is the internalisation of 
this authority possible? 
(4) What is the nature and extent of the general synthesis 
at each period? And by what educational influences can this 
synthesis be furthered? 
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(5) In what ways and for what reasons may the process 
of ethical education fail to achieve its desired results? 
Pith these general questions in mind, we may now proceed to 
the more detailed consideration of ethical growth. 
CHAPTER VII( (The Significancy' of tie Infancy Feriod. 
It is customary to distinguish at least four periods or 
stages in the individual's mental development. We may refer to 
these stages, in a semi- technical manner, as (a) Infancy, 
covering approximately the period from birth to the age of 
six or seven; (b) Childhood, from the age of six or seven to 
the age of twelve or thirteen; (e) Adolescence, lasting until 
'about the twenty -fifth year; and (d) Adulthood. Needless to say, 
these distinctions do not imply any real breach in the 
continuity of mental growth. Still less do they imply the 
notion of any rigorous uniformity in the mental development 
of individuals. On the other hand, the practice of distinguishing 
such stages in the individual's mental history means more 
than a mere methodological device. Its justification is to 
be found in phenomena of growth which seem to be specially 
associated with such stages. Furthermore, from the standpoint 
of general genetic psychology, that is, the detailed discussion 
of the growth of the mind as a whole, a more precise distinction 
of stages would be advisable. The period of infancy and 
that of adolescence would each reveal at least two stages 
or phases presenting special characteristics and often 
referred to respectively as early and late infancy, early and 
late ad olencence . From this point of view, the most 
scientifically useful demarcation of stages is perhaps that 
adopted by Kirkpatrick. Here we have a recognition of six stages: 
(163) 
three stages in infancy, the childhood stage, from six to about 
twelve, and two adolescent periods. i(1) It is noteworthy that 
there is general agreement as to the homogeneity of the 
period of childhood, from six to twelve. The variety appears 
on the whole in connection with the infancy and adolescent 
periods in which the phenomena of growth are such as to 
suggest that here, if anywhere, such distinctions of stages 
are essentially mere devices of method. In the present 
essay we shall adopt, for the purposes of presentation, 
the broad, fourfold distinction indicated above, but we shall 
try to do justice to the further distinctions in so far 
as they are based on phenomena relevant to our present 
enquiry.The period of early infancy, especially the period 
prior to the ac_uisition of language, is mainly and most 
directly interesting to the general psychologist as such. 
Modern psychology is only beginning to realize the enormous 
amount of acquisition or integration that takes place during 
this period. Recent controversies suggest, for example, that 
the settlement of such a problem as that of the nature and 
number of the human instincts and the more precisedefinition of 
the concept of instinct itself is bound up with the 
scientific, experimental investigation of these early adjustments. 
Although it may be granted that this period is of direct interest 
only to general psychology, it seems a mistaken corollary 
(1) The Individual in the Making, pp.59 -60; c.f.also 
Comenius, stages recognized in The Great Didactic: 1 -6 years; 
6 -12 years; 12 -18 years; and Claparede, Psychologie de l'Enfant, 
P. 65; and numerous other suggestions in the same direction in 
educational literature, all of which are in fairly close 
agreement with one another as regards the stages distinguished 
(164) 
that this stage is, as a whole, "of trifling ethical significance," 
as1IacCunn puts it0-) Indirectly, its significance is far -reaching. 
There is one adjustment or habit of permanent amid fundamental 
significance which would seem to have its roots in this 
period. Within the continuum of his external world, the 
child first discriminates persons, and his almost complete 
dependence on the human element in his environment for the 
carrying out of his adjustments forges the first strong links 
in that chain of processes by which the satisfaction of his 
needs or impulses becomes inseparably bound up with his 
consciousness of a social milieu. What becomes later the sense 
of the authoritativeness and the value of a social environment 
has its furthest roots in the totally unreflective attitude of 
dependence to which he is beginning to be habituated at this 
early stage. 
With this recognition of the significance of early 
infancy, we may proceed to the later phase when language has 
been acquired and when the operation of directly ethical 
influences can be discerned. In accordance with our general 
plan, we have to consider (a) The social agencies which are 
Operative, (b) the different values, and to enquire into the 
manner in which the notions of authority and worth come to 
be associated with them; and (c) the nature and extent of 
the general synthesis daring the period. 
The most important social agency at this stage is the 
fmily. Although the school or Kindergarten exercises a direct 
influence even at this stage, the contribution of the latter 
is not yet comparable in importance with that of the family, (2 ` 
As regards the social influences outside of the family and 
(1) The Making of Character, p. 159 
(2) cf. Hetherington and Muirhead: Social lurpose,pp 141 -142 
(165) 
the school, these have hardly begun to operate. Taking the first 
of our values, the knowledge value, we find that the family 
tends to generate the notion of authority or 'obligation' in two 
ways. By direct exhortation the notion is to some extent impressed 
upon the mind of the child. It is true that at this stage 
social exhortation or direct suggestiou)as it may be called, 
is directed in the main, and often indeed exclusively, to the 
inculcation of the social values. Perhaps the school is more 
important than the family in this connection in so far as 
the former is more or less identified in the child's mind 
with the pursuit of knowle_-.ge. But indirectly, the family 
may exert an abiding influence in this respect. In so far 
as the content of the childish world of fancy, the world 
of story, fairy -tale and legend, is regulated at all by external, 
adult influences, knowledge may well be idealized through 
those beings -- to the child the very real beings -- who people 
that world. Again, knowledge is associated in the child's 
mind with his elders and of course derives a value from that 
fact itself. It is true that the limitless knowledge which 
the child attributes to his elders is a main source of his 
attitude of submissive admiration, but the converse is also 
true. His elders, whose superior powers and prowess are 
everywhere and at all times manifest to the child, reflect 
a lustre on that knowledge which he peculiarly associates with 
them 
On the other hand, as far as this first period is concerned, 
there seems to be little or no need for this ab extra 
assertion of the claims of knowledge. All observers are agreed 
as to the potency of the curiosity impulse during this 
stage. The general rapidity of growth characteristic of the 
(166) 
period makes itself felt on the cognitive side in a 
tireless groping for new knowledge, in a seemingly insatiable 
need for mental adventure. Knowledge is now in the strict 
sense a value; it represents the object which furnishes the 
natural, appropriate satisfaction to an impulse or need of the 
organism. We have already seen how the so- called(and, as we 
argued, falsely so- called) suggestibility of the child is 
incidental to a condition in which the eager seeking for 
knowledge is combined with the absence of existing idea systems, 
with the result that new ideas, as such, are accepted at their 
face value. This interest in knowledge is of course to a 
considerable degree practical, or, at least, explicable by 
motives other than curiosity. But(with the important qualification 
which is explained in the next paragraph) it is very largely 
a genuine theoretical interest. As Sully puts it,TTYet from the 
earliest, a true speculative interest blends with this 
practical instinct. Children are in the completest sense 
little philosophers." 
(1) 
While a failure to accord full recognition to this aspect 
of the child's mind can hardly be laid to the charge of 
psychologists, nevertheless they seem to have been somewhat 
undiscriminating and uncritical, on the whole, in their recognition 
of it. We have not only to recognize the fact of the child's 
supreme versatility (relatively speaking) but also the fact of 
the disconnected, unorganized congeries which tends to result 
from these still largely aimless though vigorous movements of 
his mind. In other words, the phenomenon under consideration is 
the satisfaction of 'mere' or 'pure' curiosity. This kind 
of satisfaction is essentially an ad hoc satisfaction. 
(1) studies of Childhood, p.79 
(167) 
gplentiful and frequent supply of isolated scraps of knowledge 
furnishes satisfying mental pabulum. We are still far removed 
from that fruition of the curiosity impulse into a complexer 
need, of which curiosity is only one, and probably a minor 
element(1) Mere curiosity in itself holds out little 
hope of permanence in the knowledge interest, for the impulse, as 
the child experiences it at this stage is but an incident of 
a period of overwhelmingly rapid growth. To prepare, and to 
present to the child, the body of knowledge in such a way as 
to generate the higher need of which we spoke is a problem 
which has engaged the attention of great educational thinkers in 
the past and which still vexes educational science. In the 
degree to which, sooner or later, a measure of this attitude 
or need is engendered will that synthesis represented in 
knowledge acquisition carry its own dynamic and insure its 
on progressively deepening satisfaction. 
Art. This relative absence of any regulative or unifying 
principle is still more apparent in the child's whole- hearted, 
undisciplined enjoyment of those creations which may be taken 
as representing in the main his world of art. The creations of 
fancy in story, myth, fairy -tale and legend not only quicken and 
develop the emotional life, but also supply a congenial 
world in which this rapidly expanding life may regale itself 
without let or hindrance. The child's world of art, like that 
of the adult, is in its own way a supplementing of the 
deficiencies and an overcoming of the obstacles of real life. 
9s Sully points out, in discussing the child's make -believe 
(a special and more complete expression of the need we are 
iscussing) "the scenes he acts out, the semblances he shapes 
(l) See P. 105--108. 
with his hands, are not produced as having objective value, but 
rather as providing himself with a new environment 
pleasure of a child in what we call'dramatic' make- believe 
is wholly independent of any appreciating eye. "(1) We shall 
discuss later the limitations which further development must 
overcome before the value of this activity becomes directly 
ethical. We need only remark here that indirectly a far - 
reaching ethical import attúches to this free ranging of the 
mind and its self -identification with a larger, richer world 
of feeling and action. As one writer puts it: "As indirect 
experiences grow, or in other words, as he hears or reads 
mare stories, his ideal widens and his knowledge of the 
problems of life is enlarged. This is the raw material of 
morality, for out of his answers to these problems he 
builds up standards of conduct and of judgment. He projects 
himself into his own idea, and he projects himself into the 
experiences of other people: he lives in both; this is 
imagination of the highest kind, it is often called sympathy, 
but the term is too limited, it is rather inaginc,tive 
understanding. "(2) It may be remarked that the capacity here, 
which the writer quoted feels is inadequately described by the 
term sympathy, is evidently that higher capacity which we 
discussed under the head of 'reflective sympathy.' Furthermore, 
it would seem that any form of educational theory or practice, 
(theLiontessorri system appears to be a case in point) which 
would neglect and starve this side of the child's nature, is 
80wing the seeds of a stunted ethical growth. 
(1) Studies of Childhood,p.326 




With regard to the religious value it is desirable 
to indicate the actualities and possibilities in childish 
experience at this stage. The psychological facts would seem 
clearly to warrant only one conclusion: viz., that the religious 
need in the strict sense is not a fact of childish experience. 
It is tare that the literature of child psychology shews 
that ttc idea of God is normally a part of the young 
child's acquisitions, but the variety of forms it assumes and 
the odd uses to which it is so frequently put suggeSt t:-L 
essential externality of it. Sully points out hc-a the 7;n1ld 
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concept supplies a solution which is probably more convenient 
to his harassed elders than satisfying to the child himself. 
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Needless to say, this does not mean that the child remains 
unaffected by the religious factors of his environment. As 
long as the attitude and the behaviour of his elders testify 
to the value which religion possesses for them, the sense of 
authority -- albeit an external authority -- will be generated 
and kept alive in the child's mind in connection with the 
activities, ideas, and even the phrases and words of the 
religious life. 
(1) 
Religious ritual and ceremonial are doubtless 
peculiarly effective in this regard. This experience functions 
as more than a mere preparation for the stage when an inner 
significance will be apprehended in these things; it hastens 
the onset of that stage. On the other hand, the ethical 
value of the attempt to inculcate definite, explicit concepts 
is, to say the least, doubtful. The child's faith in his elders is, 
as we have seen, almost without bounds; but not altogether so, 
and it may well be undermined by unwisdom in this respect. 
Tracy, for example, says in reference to the idea of God; "No 
difficulty is experienced when he is told that God can 
see him though he cannot see God; and that God is very near 
to him all the while. Either he does not raise the question 
how God can be near him and yet not be seen; or, if the question 
is raised, he is very easily satisfied with the answer he gets. 
It may be glaringly illogical or obviously inadequate, to the 
adult mind but to the child it is quite satisfactory for 
the time being. "(2) Now if there is one thing more than another 
which modern psychology teaches us about the child, it is 
perhaps this: to suspect him most 'hen he appears "very easily 
` satisfied" with explanations which are "illogical or obviously 
inadequate " to our own minds. 
(l ) c. f. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, p.96. 
(2) Psych. of Adolescence, pp.187 -188 
(172) 
On the whole, the facts seem to justify the conclusion that 
religion remains essentially external at this stage; in 
this case, as distinct from the cases of knowledge and 
art, the need has not yet appeared which will give real inner 
significance to it. 
Social and Group Values. At this stae, however, as also 
at the nest, the real weight of social authority is thrown 
inthe scale on the side of the social values, Justice, 
Benevolence, Veracity., The sense which Justice is used 
here has been already explained. Baldwin seems to have 
traced this value to its true source far back in the child's 
mental history at the very dawn of his knowledge of self 
and of his distinction between self and other. In the 
'dialectic of personal growth', as he calls it,(2) the child's 
knowledge of the other grows by his projection into that 
other of his own affective, cognitive and conative experiences. 
and, conversely, his realization of their experiences is 
reflected back to illuminate and expand his consciousness of self. 
In this process of expansion, the three factors of imitation, 
suggestion and sympathy are operative. With regard to sympathy, 
we have to recognize (a) the expansion of the emotional life 
by the operation of primitive passive sympathy or feeling 
contagion, and (b) emotional expansion by the way of 
reflective sympathy. It is clear that the continuance of 
the dialectic of personal growth presupposes the existence 
of this latter capacity the kinship of which with the capacity 
! of reason has been already explained. Hence, though the 
(1) Bee p 34. 
(2) Soc. and Eth.Interpretations, par. 2; 
also, Mental Development,pp,119 -120 
instinctive 
factor (which must be identified with primitive sympathy 
if we are to have regard to consistency in the use of the term'instinct' 
adds to the child's raw material of feeling, it is clearly of 
only minor importance in ethical growth. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of Justice, 
we would point out what appears to be the fundamental 
significance of Baldwin's account of the dialectic of personal J 
growth and of the 'socius' which is the outcome of this 
(1) 
process. The process, in fact, makes it inevitable that 
all the child's standards and values should henceforth have 
a social reference. Attributing to others what he finds in 
himself and finding in himself what he has apprehended in 
others describes the twofold movement of mind by which his 
knowledge of self and other grows. But this mental movement 
becomes a fixed, ineradicable habit. Hence it would seem that 
wefind here the real psychological origin and meaning of the 
fact that later, to put it in very general terms, what he wills 
for himself he ipso facto wills for others and vice versa. 
4Yedo not intend to raise here any abstract ethical questions 
Centring around the problem of the nature and validity of ethical 
Judgments. The point which is emphasized is the fact, already 
commented on that ethical judgments always possess this 
implicit or explicit social reference. The martyr, for 
instance, in electing the stake, does not will the stake for 
hie fellows. What he does regard as binding on them as well 
non himself is the uncompromising devotion to the ideal; and we 
are merely offering a suggestion as to when and how this 
attitude originates in the individual's mental history 
(1) See especially Soc. and Eth. Interpretations, p. 30; 
also c.f. Thought and Things, Vol III pp.102 -106. 
Prtay we not find here the origin and explan. tion, at least in so 
far as they concern the psychologist, of certain later deliverances 
of the ethical consciousness which are sometimes pointed to as 
direct intuitions and sometimes as pronouncements of pure 
reason? When I will a good for myself I ipso facto concede to 
my fellowman the right to will it too, when I prescribe a 
rule for my fellowman, I ipso facto prescribe it for myself,- - 
have these statements, for instance, their real basis or support 
impure reason? The question may occasion some awkward 
difficulties as to what precisely we mean by 'reason': but do we 
not save ourselves from what is perhaps a somewhat sterile 
discussion by recognizing the psychological origin and 
hence the inevitableness, under normal conditions, of the 
mental movement in question? 
In this way the so- called dialectic of personal growth 
might be connected with the discussion of broad questions 
of abstract ethics. But to return to the problem of the 
genesis and development of the idea of justice, we are still 
very far from the emergence of anything in the nature of a 
conscious standard. The nature of the demand which Justice 
makes has yet to define itself for the child's consciousness. 
In point of fact, the period is, on the whole unfavourable 
for this development on a large scale. The second half of 
the period, from three to six years, is markedly 
individualistic. As this individualizing stage, as Kirkpatrick 
Calls it, 
(1) 
the child is largely engrossed in the 
exercise and expansion of his numerous acquisitions, 
especially his sensori -motor acquisitions. The recognition 
and utilization of this phase of his development is the 
(1) The Individual in the Making, p. 60. 
(174e) 
special merit of the Montessorri system. There is hardly 
yet the need, even if there were the opportunity, for the 
larger social experience which comes from the association 
with children of his oLvn age. It would seem indeed to be 
at this period in his history that the family, with its very 
limited but peculiarly intimate kind of social experience, 
plays its most important role. We can distinguish several ways 
in which the family functions to bring this value into 
consciousness. 
In the first place, the family familiarizes the child 
with the fact of authoritative control in connection with 
social situations. He has already learned the lesson of the 
inhibition of impulse in connection with his exploration 
of the material world, His social environment presents a 
class of objects, the behaviour of which often appears 
peculiarly incalculable, but to which he must needs adjust 
himself. The direct assertion of the family authority, most 
commonly taking the form of definite prohibitions intended 
to safeguard the claims of other members of the family, gives 
to the child his earliest, vague realization of the fact 
that there are certain uniformities or principles governing 
the behaviour of the family group;(1) and he feels the impulse 
to discover these principles for the same reasons that he 
feels the need to understand and to master his physical 
environment. 
(1) c.f. Mumford: "The Dawn of Character in the Child," 
pp. 94 -98. One of this writer's statements, however, 
(emphasized by italics) implies . what would seem to be 
a serious misinterpretation. The statement is: "Some 
l l "/ (5 ) 
things, he learns, are right or wrong independently of 
external authority, others right or wrong merely because 
they are ordered by someone in authority. Some actions 
constitute mere good behaviour, others are part of good 
conduct. The ultimate sanction for right or wrong con- 
duct he finds within himself." (p.p6) The incidents which 
are thus interpreted are these: (a) the child remembers one 
night that he has left his toy soldiers on the floor, 
in contravention of the nurse's instructions to put them 
away. The only disturbance, however, which this occasions 
him is a certain amount of anxiety lest the nurse should 
discover them and inflict the recognized penalty of 
depriving him of his toys for the following day: (b) the 
child remembers one night that at tea -time he told the nurse 
a lie. This occasions a lively discomfort described 
as "a horrid pain inside ", and he cannot rest until 
he has confessed and has been forgiven. The writer's 
conclusion is, as stated above, that the child finds 
within himself a sanction for truth -telling; and this 
would seem to be rather a serious misreading of the situation. 
As a matter of fact, the sanction in both cases comes from 
the same quarter. But, as we pointed out on p. ,181, 
social authority, including the authority of others 
besides the nurse, has been especially directed against 
lying. In his experience, too, the child has doubtless 
found all the signs of specially grave disapproval 
evoked by lying. Hence the difference of attitude. 
This inner sanction appears indeed with later development, 
but at the stage of which Miss Mumford is speaking, the 
child is still far removed from any such sanction. 
(177) 
It is not difficult to understand the exact sense in 
which an idea such as that of the claims of others must, to 
begin with, be actually taught to the child. supposing that 
his desires encountered no obstacle in the shape of other 
people like himself who also have desires to gratify, we can 
hardly imagine that an idea of 'justice' would take root in 
his mind. The first step towards the apprehension of 
the idea is taken when the presence of these others 
obstructs his activities. Reflection upon his own claims arises 
when he is confronted by the claims of his brother or 
sister -- claims which are sustained against his own by 
parental approval and support. 
When we say that reflection arises ander these cir- 
cumstances, the suggestion is not intended that such 
reflection is at all very explicit or deliberate. The 
child for the present is living predominantly on the 
perceptual level. At the same time, reflection tends to 
appear to some extent; and the important thing is that, as 
has just been suggested, this reflection is fostered and 
quickened by the fact that his elders continue to direct 
his attention to the existence and the claims of his brother 
or sister. It is also true, without doubt, that at 
the outset his dawning sense of justice is keenest when 
it is a question of contending for his own rights. Nevertheless, 
in spite of this rather unmeritorious level of justice, his 
Powers of representation have been directed, through the 
influence of his educators, to the apprehension and appreciation 
of the desires and feelings of others, and thus the essential 
step has been taken. 
(178; 
Again,the social situations in connection with which the 
family authority is exercised are relatively simple and easy 
to grasp. Hence it is easier for the child to detect the 
Identical element in seemingly different situations, in 
other words, to carry out a process of abstraction and 
generalization in reference to them. Finally, the narrow and 
intimate character of the family group facilitates the 
appreciation of the teleological significance of the value 
in question. The disharmonies resulting from a disregard of 
it are manifest and acutely felt. In other words, there is 
even now some progress in the direction of the internalization 
of the authority attaching to this value. 
Evidence of the child's need and persistent effort to - 
discover the r&tionale of the controls or standards which he 
finds around him is forthcoming in a characteristic which appears 
at this stage and which, though noted by several writers, seems 
in every case to be not altogether correctly interpreted. This 
is the child's rigorous insistence on the strict observance 
of routime or custom in the matters of everyday life; and 
his manifest discomfort when he finds any departure from 
such routine, however trivial such departure may seem 
to the adult. Sully, in discussing the phenomenon of what 
he calls the "binding influence of a repeated, regular manner 
of proceeding," says: "Yet I believe the facts point to 
something more [than "a reflexion,by imitation, of others' 
orderly ways "!, to an innate disposition. to follow precedent 
and rule, which precedes education and is one of the forces 
towhich education can appeal. This disposition has its roots 
inhabit, which is apparently a law of all life: but it 
¡Elmore than the blind impulse of habit, since it is 
reflective a(d) rational and implies a recognition of the 
universal." It is usual and natural to consider this 
tendency as representing the inauguration of the imperious 
sway of custom or habit; nor does Sully's more careful 
and discriminating statement appear to differentiate 
it sufficiently from habit. That the habit interpretation is 
mistaken seems clear if we remember the two relevant facts, 
(a) that the peculiarity is often extraordinarily marked 
and associated with great intensity of feeling, and (b) that 
it occurs during a period which is par excellence the 
period of rapid growth and of mental flexibility and which 
is therefore unlikely to manifest a habit phenomenon of 
this kind. 
The true explanation is probably to be found in the 
fact mentioned above that a dominant need or interest of 
the child at this period is that of understanding his 
social environment, of finding that 'method' which he feels 
exists underneath its seeming aberrations. His mind eagerly 
seizes upon the uniformities of the ordinary daily routine, 
for they hold out the promise of that mastery for which 
he is striving. Hence it is not surprising that he is 
the implacable enemy of "the exception "; for the exception 
profoundly disturbs that hard -won and still growing 
sense of his personal bearings. 
The same motive appears in the child's so- called 'keen 
sense of justice', -- his quickness to detect any departure 
from the canons of justice which his elders have imparted 
to him and which, because of his very rudimentary powers 
of abstraction and generalization, he is apt to interpret 
(1) Studies of Childhood,p.281. 
(16C) 
ina disconcertingly literal manner. So also when he feels 
that he has been unjustly treated, his tendency is to 
brood over the circumstance to a degree which may appear 
altogether unreasoning and perverse. To attribute to him a 
keener sense of justice than is possessed by the adult 
is to use that phrase either equivocally or incorrectly. 
The explanation is to be found in something more 
general. His efforts to understand and to enter into 
the ideas and purposes of his social environment have been 
rudely baffled and thwarted, and he suffers under a keen, 
rankling sense of disharmony, of personal impotence, in 
the presence of an environment which has suddenly shown 
itself so uncongenial to his spirit. 
Benevolence. With regard to this value, little need 
be said at this stage in the child's career. The fundamental 
capacity which is implied is that which we found presupposed 
7 
in the understanding of justice, na --ely, reflective sympathy; 
and the agencies operating to vest the value with authority 
are the same. By force of precept and example, the consciousness 
of a duty or obligation to consult and promote the happiness 
of others is beginning to make its appearance. Moreover, the 
child finds this quality of benevolence glorified in the 
ideal creatures of his legendary and fairy lore. as 
in the case of justice, the relatively small family group 
offers special facilities for the appreciation of this 
quality as something conducive to a more perfect social 
harmony. 
Veracity. The study of the child's attitude to this 
value has received special attention from the psychologists, 
and a considerable amount of evidence has been accumulated 
1 181 ) 
on the topic of 'children's lies'. Directly or indirectly, 
the psychological facts brought to light are of ethical 
interest. Statements to the effect that the child's natural, 
original impulse is to tell the truth and that lying is 
one of the unhappy results of his social experience are 
of course not to be taken seriously by the psychologist. They 
probably echo the philosophic or semi -religious preconception 
of child nature as essentially and primarily 'good'. From 
the psychologists's viewpoint, this notion is no less devoid 
of justification or, indeed, of meaning, than the opposing 
theory of the child's original 'badness'. The simple 
psychological fact which might be thus falsely interpreted is 
the fact that prevarication involves an intellectual process, 
a conscious manipulation of the facts, which can find its 
motive only in social relationships and which of course will 
not occur apart from such motivation. On the other hand, when 
such a motive is present, there can be no conceivable reason 
in the child's own consciousness(social training apart) why he 
should not distort the facts to effect his adjustment. Again, 
the so- called 'unconscious falsehood' of children is not exactly 
in point here. For this represents, on the one hand, a special 
case of the child's impulse to a free , untrammeled exercise 
of his capacity for imaginative construction -- and this we have 
already discussed -- and, on the other hand, an example of a 
highly imperfect synthesis, manifesting itself in a failure to 
distinguish consciously between his ideal and his real world. 
'Day- dreaming' again, is a special kind of falsification, 




The exercise of social authority is especially directed 
against the manipulation of the facts with the conscious intention 
to mislead others; and the child therefore early learns to 
identify lying with action of this kind. Such technical lying , 
occurs either by way of averting punishment or of securing some 
personal advantage. Such personal advantage may involve nothing 
more than the attraction of others' admiring attention to 
himself, -- a source of satisfaction which is more readily accounted 
for if we admit an instinct of self- assertion. But this 
conscious manipulation may well proceed from other and less 
discreditable motives. As Miss Drummond points out, the desire 
to preserve social harmony may prompt him to falsehood, 
(1) 
The 
interest of this motive lies in the growing appreciation, which 
it implies, of smooth -working, harmonious social relationships. 
In other words, his social development has proceeded to a point 
at which the internalization of the authority attrching to veracity 
can to some degree be achieved. The child is beginning to realize 
in some measure that the disregard of this standard entails 
friction and disharmony in his social environment. While we 
my admit, therefore, ácertain measure of appreciation of this 
value, it must nevertheless be pointed out that at this stage 
its authority is essentially external. As in the case of the 
other social values, a fairly protracted social experience 
is necessary before there can be much real appreciation of 
how the continuance of those manifold and satisfying activities 
of his social life is bound up with a regard for veracity 
on the part of himself and others. Tor must we confuse this 
true appreciation (rooted in well- established, satisfying habits 
(1) Five Years Old or Thereabouts,p. 141. 
(183) 
of social action) with a seeming appreciation that is really a 
matter of direct sympathetic reproduction of the feelings of 
others. The young child may very well assume a markedly 
emotional attitude to lying, but such feeling at this stage 
is doubtless to be ascribed to the operation of primitive, 
passive sympathy, in virtue of which the feelings of others 
tend to be directly induced in the child. (1) 
(1) Note. A full discussion of lying in all its important 
aspects will be found in an essay by M. Duprat,'Le Mensonge' 
These aspects are numerous enough fully to justify our inclusion 
of 'veracity' as a separate value along with justice and 
benevolence which themselves, theoretically speaking, imply 
veracity. In a special section on children's lies, M. Duprat 
refers to the investigation of 250 cases of children's 
lies which are classified as follows: 
42 négatifs 
( 26 de d6n4gation 
) 6 de dissimulation 
( 10 d' attenuation 
( 70 d' invention mensongre 
( 21 de faux en ócriture 
141 positifs ( 4 de simulation 
( 18 de déformation 
( 18 d' exagg4ration 
et environ 75 mensonges mixtes. 
Such investigations are numerous and their interest consists 
in the fact that they bring out the variety of the forms 
Which the lying of children ssume. r. Duprat rightly remarks 
that the actual figures have not much scientific value because 
"parai tous les mensonges connus de lui, un instituteur ou un 
Pire de famille relate celui ou ceux qui lui paraissent les 
Plus interessants pour une raison ou pour une autre, ceux que 
l'expérience antérieure, les préjugés, les tendances predominantes 
(184) 
contribuent pour beacoup a faire ¿lire." (p.56) At the same time, 
making all allowance for this very real source of error, 
the preponderance of the positive type of falsehood is 
significant. M. Duprat sums up the general situation in these 
words: "Il semble qu'en gene "ral, chez les enfants, les 
imaginatifs, inventeurs de mensonges ou fourberies, soient 
plus nombreux que les négateurs et les dissimules, mais ce 
qui est surtout digne de remarque, c'est qu'on trouve chez 
les enfants comme chez les adultes anormaux une quantité 
déjá notable de menteurs sans imagination vive, sans pouvoir 
créateur, plutOt denegateurs systematiques, la opposer une 
quantité tres notable de menteurs par imagination, par jeu plus 
ou moins malin, par rupture d' équilibre mentale au profit de 
l'invention illusoire." (pp. 56 -57) The latter type of falsehood 
is unquestionably the childish type; the former (négateurs) 
I, t. Duprat correctly accounts for as "héréditairement craintifs, 
débiles ou victimes de la brutalité de leur proches." (p.59) 
We may pass over what we have called the group values, in 
so far as the present stage is concerned. On the whole, it 
may be safely said that the child, during this period, hardly 
becomes conscious of these values. It is true that the 
school or kindergarten, with its wider social circle, may, 
under certain conditions, foster this consciousness even here; 
but it is not until the next period that these values become 
really important. Group games, which are pre -eminently the 
educative agencies in this regard, are not characteristic of the 
present individualistic period -- a fact which is recognized and 
perhaps overemphasized in the Montessorri system. 
We come now to the question of the integration or general 
synthesis during the period. Hitherto we have considered the 
'value-stuff', so to speak, with which the child is called 
upon to weave the texture of an ethical self -hood. The 
development of such a self -hood is essentially a question of 
the integration of these diverse values into some kind of 
unity; and from that point of view the period presents 
characteristics of peculiar interest. 
Fundamentally, it is a period of almost complete intellectual 
and emotional in- coordination. We have already seen how 
the mental life at this stage is a life of "many -sided interest" 
¡none sense -- the superficial sense -- of that famous phrase; 
and it remains to point out how far the period falls short 
ofthat intellectual and emotional unity or coordination which, 
whatever else it intended, the Herbartian ideal certainly implied. 
In his world of knowledge, of creative imagination or of 
social relationships, the child is still eagerly groping for 
new experiences and revelling in the exercise of his new- 
capacities. The boundary lines between the real and 
the ideal world are uncertain, indistinct, -- in fact they 
have still to be drawn. 
The non -coordinating, non- systematising, 
in fundamental sense, the non -critical character of his activity 
is well revealed in his attitude to what we have called his 
world of art. The satisfactions which he derives from this 
source are in one way not dissimilar to the/nature satisfactions 
of later years. But they are totally uncritical of their own 
nature and worth. His facile imagination is exercised, in a 
veritable "all -or- none" manner, to supplement or compensate for 
the deficiencies ofd his real world. The more basic need for new 
and satisfying experiences is thus for the time being abundantly 
satisfied. As his development proceeds, his attitude to these 
satisfactions reveals an increasing discrimination in proportion 
as they are harmonized with the needs and demands of life. 
It seems a point worth emphasizing that this stage of 
intellectual and emotional incoordination, of versatility, of 
breadth without depth, of shallow many -sidedness of interest, 
of 'scrappiness', as it has been variously described, is to 
be regarded asjnormal incident of the child's mental growth. 
To make no provision for it is to impoverish the soil from 
which the ethical self -hood must spring. The Mother School 
curriculum of Comenius, therefore, (in spite of what may appear 
to us now as that writer's somewhat preposterous pansophic 
ideal) seems to reveal a truer educational instinct than the 
Montessorri curriculum. It does not seem unfair to suggest that 
the latter realizes a premature unification or integration 
only by too early a pruning of the rich overgrowths of the 
child -mind. Montessorri's exclusive attention to only one 
side of the child's constructive activities seems to justify 
this - criticism though it would be fully conceded that she has 
(1k37 ) 
practically solved the problem of the particular aspect of 
mental growth with which she deals. 
This lack of coordination of his multiple interests is 
but the outward expression, the symptom, of an inner integration 
which is only in its most incipient stages. The process of 
selection and synthesis of experiences, finally resulting in 
the organization which we call the 'self', is in its very 
beginnings. This development is bound up with the growth of 
representative activity. In connection with the growth of 
representation, there are two processes to be considered. First, 
we have to consider the integration of representative elements 
into an orderly temporal series; i.e. , a series based on the 
fact of mere sequence in time; second, we must consider the 
integration of representative elements on the basis of the 
apprehension of causal and logical relations. 
The former process is represented in the growth of the so- 
called memory series or train, and we may consider it first. The 
selection and integration of past experience which is given in the 
memory series is the basis of the child's apprehension of temporal 
relations or, to use the common phrase, of his time sense. 
Hence the development of the timesense may be taken as a 
direct indication of the growth of representative activity. 
The question of the child's level of development in this respect 
is baaio to the problem of ethical growth; for in the absence 
of such a representative train, which preserves and makes available 
for the present direction of conduct special experiences from 
the past, we cannot strictly regard the present act as 
consciously expressive of the individual in the sense in which 
an ethical act is considered as expressive of the whole individual. 
Of course, it is true that any act, psychologically 
(188) 
considered, is simply an expressionof the sum -total of 
the individual's adjustments; past experience, in the form of 
representative or organic memory makes the act what it is. 
But from thethical viewpoint an act, if it is to be regarded 
as thus expressive of the self and hence to become the object 
of ethical judgment, presupposes the preservation of the past 
to some degree in representative form. 
The development of the time sense in the child, which 
may be taken as indicative of the degree of representative 
growth, has received some attention from the psycholoFzists. 
They are unanimous as to the relatively late appearance of 
anything in the nature of that precise apprehension of temporal 
relations of which the adult is capable. Meumann(l) and others 
have pointed out that the child's apprehension of temporal 
concepts is limited to very short periods, such as a day, 
while concepts such as a week, a month, a year, fifty years and 
soon tend to be vaguely referred to the past without any 
real discrimination between them. The "long, long ago ", which 
officially opens the childish tale is thus fully justified 
ofpsychology. So also with his understanding of future 
references. Excellent indirect evidence of the practical non- 
existence for the young child of that kind of integration 
implied by the possession of a time -perspective is supplied 
from a study of the story preferences of children. 
limy factors, of course, affect such preferences. But an analysis 
of these factors seems to confirm in an interesting way con- 
clusions about the time sense of the child which have been 
arrived at by other means. In the matter of story preferences, 
&significant feature of this stage is the child's practical disregard 
(1) c.f. Rusk: Experimental Education,pp. 64 -67. 
of the time factor. 
In the subsequent periods also, as we shall see, 
the growing appreciation of temporal relations is reflected in 
(1) 
story preferences. 
It may be concluded, then, that the child has not yet 
achieved the integration of representative elements into a 
stable memory series. he is capable, however, of r- calling 
isolated experiences and, further, his representation of these 
is frequently characterized by such a vividness and fidelity 
of detail as to conceal the essential rudimentariness and 
inadequacy of his representative processes. Such vivid representation 
is accompanied by a correspondingly vague location in time. 
As Kirkpatrick suggests, the child in such cases is possibly not 
at all "thinking of the past as past, but merely living it 
over again by the help of words and images without recognizing 
that it is a reproduced rather than a real experience. 
IV) 
Still more defective is the child's apprehension of 
causal and logical relations and his cap city to integrate 
experiences on the basis of such relations. This kind of 
integration is obviously a higher and later achievement 
that the temporal series, for it implies both a wider 
experience and a certain development of `free' ideas. 
(3) 
The general outcome of this intellectual limitation of 
childhood -- undeveloped capacity for representation -- may be 
sunned up by saying that the child's reactions tend to be predom- 
inantly of the perceptual type. Generalization and abstraction 
(l) See ,r -kel This is an extensive investigation 
of the question as to the stories that are preferred at the 
different stages. A consideration of the results seems fully to 
justify the statement in the text. 
(2) The Individual in the Making, pp. 104 -105. 
(3) see p. 86. 
have , of course, been operative throughout in 
the sense that he has been learning to react to the general 
features of situations. But these general features have only 
to a very limited extent been consciously isolated and 
apprehended. In other ,words, his development hitherto 
might be described rather as a process of tfaining, in the sense 
in which that term might be applied to one of the higher 
animals, than as a process of education. It has been shewn, 
of course, that in certain essential respects he is already 
far ahead of the animals but he is still far from having 
freed himself completely from the limitations of this 
perceptual level. 
It is in connection with the social values that this 
intellectual limitation is most apparent. We have already 
seen why these values should long remain essentially 
external to the child; it remains to point out that not merely 
the appreciation but even the apprehension of them must be a 
difficult process. He must learn to isolate and attend to 
situations so as to grasp the general or universal element 
in them; he must learn to detect identities that are overlaid 
by very obtrusive differences. This necessitates powers 
of abstraction and generalization on a somewhat higher plane 
than are needed for the apprehension of the general 
features,and hence for the classification, of the objects 
of perceptual experience. It is important to remember, however, 
that in both cases, language performs the same essential function, _ 
As already pointed out(l) , this function is twofold; viz., that 
of expressing or summing up the generalizations already achieved 
and that of stimulating the mind to further exploration. This 
second function of language is apt to be overlooked; the new 
(1) See p.70. 
word offers the active mind of the child the stimulus of a 
new problem. Hence one justification of direct authoritative 
exhortation, at least in an occasional way, in connection with 
moral terms of which the meanings are but dimly apprehended. 
Froebel had probably this important psychological fact, among 
other things, in his mind in his discussion of the inter -relations 
(1) 
of religion, nature and language. The terms of morality, 
meagre without doubt in point of intellectual content , but rich 
with the authority and prestige of their social source, initiate 
those higher processes of mind which will eventually uncover the 
bed-rock principles on which all true human association is 
founded. 
Definite limits,too, will obviously be set to the develop - 
ment of his emotional life. As we have seen, this is a period of 
rapid emotional expansion, but its characteristic limitation 
appears when we consider the question of emotional organization. 
Sentiment formation or the organization of the emotions around 
definite objects is of course only in its incipient stages.(2) 
Moreover, the kind of object which can become the centre of 
such an emotional organization is limited to the class of 
concrete objects which are presented in sense experience. The 
;..sentiments formed with reference to abstract objects clearly 
ci,onot t pertain to this period. 
The position as a whole may therefore be summed up 
as follows There is little or no integration of experiences 
into a stable representative series on the basis of temporal 
and causal bonds. That synthesis which gives to life its 
Perspective, which gives to experience its meaning and its value 
and which controls the individual in the choice of his ends and 
(1) cf. Education of Mian(Hatlmann's trans.) es7e4E61 
(2) But see ch XI 
guides him to his true satisfaction, is only in its sporadic, 
fragmentary beginnings. In discussing the primary fundamental 
meaning of 'good' in our first chapter, we distinguished between 
two senses in which the notion might be said to be primary; a 
psychological sense, in which there was yet no direct ethical 
implication and in which 'good' was identified simply with the 
satisfaction of impulse; and a primary ethical sense, according 
to which this satisfaction was found to be determined with 
conscious reference to past experience: i.e., the available 
whole of experience is appealed to. Only to a very limited 
extent can we regard the actions of the young child as being 
of this nature. At this stage, therefore, he cannot on the whole 
be considered as a proper object of ethical judgment, despite the 
fact that his experience is, as we have shewn, replete with 
ethical significance. For the same reason, those special 
organizations of impulse implied in the possession of the 
'virtues' are only in the embryo stage. For the growth of these 
character traits which are considered 'virtuous' or 'good' 
likewise imply representation and organization inasmuch as they 
imply the capacity to eitaluate immediate in the light of remote 
satisfactions and to act for remote ends. In our last chapter 
we discussed the kind of deficiencies of endowment which may 
1 
preclude altogether the attainment of the truly ethical stage. It 
will suffice to indicate here the general reason why the 
Child is not yet a proper object of ethical judgment. From 
first to last, ethical shortcoming or failure is associated with 
obedience to the dictates of the isolated impulse. But in 
their very nature the impulses of childhood are isolated, 
Ì isolated in the sense that there is yet no hierarchy or 
I, 
system which furnishes a principle of control or inhibition. 
lg 3 
Here at least is a fundamental sense in which we would agree 
to the sharp Freudian contrast between the child's absorption in 
the 'Pleasure' principle and the adult's subjection to the 
!Reality' principle. George iot, that excellent student of 
childhood, touches the core of its psychology when she talks 
of "the dim guesses, the strangely perspectiveless conception 
of life that gave the bitterness (of childish grief) its 
(1) 
intensity". 
(1) The Mill on the Floss, chap. 7. 
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Chapter 8 
Ethical Development in Childhood 
our discussion of the ethical growth during the second period. 
- --the period of childhood proper -- -will be governed by what appear 
to be the two dominant facts concerning the period. viz, 
(a) there is comparatively little growth in the sense of expansion, 
of assimilation of new experiences, and (b) development in the sense 
of the integration or synthesis of experience occurs on a very large 
scale. Hence the discussion may be conveniently divided into these 
main topics: (a) a consideration of the direction in which actual 
expansion occurs; (b) the study of the integrative process during 
the period, the process which in the :!arlier period we found only 
in its most rudimentary beginnings; and (c) the further study of the 
process by which the individual's consciousness of the authority 
attaching to the values is deepened and of the extent to which the 
authority is still further internalised. Real expansion appears to 
take place only in one direction, but tre kind and degree of develop- 
ment achieved in this direction is supremely important from our 
point of view. Associated with this stage is participation, for the 
first time, in the kind of activities from which emerges the 
consciousness of what we called the group values. Our first task', 
therefore, is to study the rise of this consciousness. 
Emphasis must be laid on the point that the development of this 
group s. consciousness is a gradual process. Statements to the effect 
that at this stage the child is essentially individualistic and that 
a truly social consciousness does not appear until early adolescence, 
are beyond. question mistaken if they are intended to mean that 
there 
is a sudden emergence of social consciousness at the later stage. 
We 
may grant that the observation of children's play during 
the second 
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half of the childhood period clearly confirms the view (quoted by 
Stanley Hall) according to which, "from sever to twelve, games are 
almost exclusively individualistic and competitive but in early 
adolescence,....the plays are predominantly team games, in which the 
individual is more-or less sacrificed for the whole." 
(1) 
Kirkpatrick 
too, emphasises the importance of the competitive or rivalry motive in 
the play of the child and, indeed, in his activities as a whole at 
this stage. "The most prominent new tendency," he says, "that appears 
during the period is the tendency to compete with others in all 
lines." (2) But while we may admit that it is only about the beginning 
of adolescence that we find evidence of a keen group consciousness, 
this does not mean that such a group consciousness supervenes 
suddenly on an earlier period of individualism. Such a notion really 
belongs to that type of psychology which finds the all - important 
principle of mental growth in the appearance of definite instincts 
at certain stages and pays scant heed to processes of habituation 
that have been steadily going on in the meantime. 
The "social" consciousness of early adolescence is discussed 
more carefully later. Here we may remark that this consciousness is 
essentially the fruit of the early social experience and training 
which we consider in the present chapter. The group consciousness, 
as it appears in the adolescent, is in no sense to be identified 
with a mere gregarious instinct, although probably an instinctive 
factor of this kind enters into and colours it. A process of 
training has developed this consciousness out of the individualism 
of the earlier period. By calling the infancy period truly 
individualistic, we mean to say that social, in the sense of 
corporate activities have not formed part of the infant's experience 
(1) Youth; Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene; pp 83 -84. 
(2) The Individual in the Making; p. 166. 
at all. Hence one important aspect of the childhood period. It 
represents the more or less gradual transition from a stage of 
c/ 
practically non -existent group consciousness to a stage of group 
consciousness which is well- marked.(1) The process of socialisation 
goes on apace throughout the whole period. An essential aspect of 
this process is the gradual development in the child. of an attitude 
in the growth of which there are really two stages; (a) the tendency 
to discontinue activities which bring him into conflict with his 
fellows; and (b) the tendency to attach value to ends or activities 
which do not involve conflict with his fellows but which, on the 
cóntrary, may he, and often must be, pursued in co- operation with them. 
Value will not normally be attached to ends to which his fellows are 
clearly indifferent. But among the ends which they value, he finds 
that there are some which are 'non-competitive'; the pursuit of them 
does not bring him directly into conflict with others, and such 
pursuit may admit of co- operation with others. This attitude, as we 
shall see later, , an essential aspect of the ethical attitude and 
is, of course, the outcome of the entire process of ethical training. 
But the foundations are laid in the period at present under consider- 
ation. 
Now the above paragraph really states all that we fundamentally 
mean when we say, for instance, that during this period, the 
'possessive' or 'acquisitive' instinct is disciplined or repressed. 
In point of fact, we may best deal at this juncture with a tendency 
which, as commonly treated by the economists and ,osychologists) is apt 
to occasion a serious confusion of thought. We refer to the 
so- called acquisitive or possessive instinct. An examination of this 
so-called instinct at this point in our argument will, we hope, 
achieve two results: (a.) the indication of the real nature 
of the 
(1) e.f,Welton; Moral Training, P.121. 
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development at the present stage of childhood, --a development usually 
associated in psychological literature with a loose and vague dis- 
cussion of an instinct of acquisition, possession or ownership as it 
le variously called; and (b) an explication of the real origin and 
significance --- especially ethical significance --of the kind of behaviour 
which the advocates of this instinct have in view. 
Our examination of this 'instinct' will lead us to the following 
conclusions: (a) It is possible that there is what we may call a 
'collecting' or 'hoarding' instinct. 
(b) If there is such an instinct, the significance of it, except for 
special pedagogical purposes, seems to be trivial. 
(c) Such a mere 'collecting' instinct must be clearly distinguished 
at the outset from the acquisitive or possessive 'instinct' in the 
sense in which the latter refers to a fundamentally important fact of 
psychology which possesses basic significance for social science. 
(d) A rigorously scientific psychology would incline to deny the 
existence of an instinct in the latter sense and would hold that 
what we have here is a powerful 'tendency' which is the product of 
experience. The innate basis of it.would be traced to certain elemen- 
tary ways of reacting to objects, --- -ways already provided for in the 
statement of native endowment. 
(e) The connection between this important tendency and the 'collecting' 
instinct (if there is one) seems at the most incidental and superficial. 
Let us consider the difficulty as it appears in connection with 
the fully developed forms of this acquisitive or possessive tendency. 
The individual who devotes the bulk of his energies to the amassing 
of wealth, to the extension of his property in land, to the securing 
of rare art specimens and so on, would be said to be actuated by a 
Powerful possessive instinct. Other motives might of course be 
admitted, but the acquisitive instinct would be regarded as the 
198 
dominant motive. On the other hand, when Darwin devotes his life 
to the acquisition of knowledge of a certain kind, no one thinks of 
accusing him of being actuated by a strong acquisitive instinct. 
Nor is the charge forthcoming in the case of the man who travels 
round the world in order to 'acquirer interesting experiences. There 
is TaccuisitionT in some sense in both cases and, in the former case, 
the acquisition is said to be the manifestation of an acquisitive 
instinct, while at the same time the conduct of the individual 
concerned would be held ethically reprehensible. Neither judgment 
would be made with regard to the latter. What is the real difference 
between the two cases? 
f 
4 
arm being acquired. In the former case, what is being acquired is 
certain means to possible interesting experiences. Moreover, the 
possessions acquired are physical or material possessi)iis in some 
form. We do not, for instance, talk of a man as having a strong 
acquisitive tendency because he is fond of power and strives for 
positions of authority. Now, just because these possessions, which the 
acquisitive man seeks to secure, are material possessions, they 
represent 'competitive' objects. 'That is, the supply of them is 
usually limited and one man's possession essentially means other men's 
deprivation. At the level of acquisition of which we are now speaking, 
that will normally be the case, for at this level men will, broadly 
speaking, strive for the possession of the same kind of material 
objects. That is, they will strive, in the main, to secure the 
'valuable' material objects. Hence, when we describe conduct like 
this as the manifestation of a possessive instinct (at the same time 
regarding it as more or less reprehensible, ethically considered), 
we seem to have three things in our minds. (a) The objects are material 
objects and hence the supply is limited. (b) The acquisition of them 
Clearly the first difference concerns the kind of thing," that 
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brings the individual into competition or conflict with his fellows. 
(c) The objects are means to possible satisfying experiences in the 
:future, that is, they are means which will 'keep'. We submit 
therefore, that there may be abundant reason for ethical condemnation 
of the pursuit of such objects; but where, exactly, is the justifi- 
cation for calling the pursuit of them the manifestation of a special 
instinct of acquisition? In the mere fact that the objects are 
material objects? If so, then we show below good reason for holding 
that, in the main, this pursuit of material objects can be explained 
without the assumption of a special instinct. The only instance 
where this explanation is perhaps unconvincing is to be found in the 
phenomena indicated by the 'collecting' or 'hoarding' instinct; and 
these phenomena. we shall discuss separately. 
Let us try to get back to the psychological beginnings of this 
acquisitive tendency. The_question which we must try to answer is: 
is there an innate or instinctive sense of the 'meum', an unlearnt or 
directly innate tendency to distinguish between 'meum' and'tuum'? 
That is the form in which the question is usually put and, as a rule, 
answered with a careless affirmative. But how, in actual fact, does 
this 'meum' and 'tuum' situation arise? 
Thorndyke describes the earliest manifestation of acquisitiveness 
thus: "To any not too large object which attracts attention and does 
not possess repelling or frightening features the original response 
is approach or, if the child is within reaching distance, 
reaching, 
touching and grasping. An object having been grasped, 
its possession 
may provoke the resroonse of putting it in the mouth or 
of general 
manipula.tibn or both." 
(1) 
So far we have only a satisfying 
experience 
resulting from response to an object by means of 
ordinary reflexes 
and the curiosity impulse. But Thorndyke's next 
sentence requires 
careful scrutiny. "The sight of another human 
being going for the 
(1) Educational Psychology, vol. 1. p.51. 
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object or busied with it Ftrengthens the tendencies towards possession. 
(1) That iE meant by "strengthens the tendencies towards poeeession "v 
We presume that this means that the child, if he happens to be holding 
the object, grasps it more firmly. But is this not a direct habit 
reaction due to his experiences in the past with human beings, 
experiences involving the drawing of objects away from him, putting the 
out of his reach and so on? A crucial test would be whether the child 
would thus react to the presence of another human being before he had 
experiences of that kind to any extent. This is an obvious t?st, 
though somewhat difficult to arrange, and we are not aware that there 
is any information on the point. Hence not only would the presumption 
be to the effect that this reaction is based on past experiences but 
this ought certainly to be the attitude of the scientific psychologist. 
We would thus trace the acquisitive tendency back to its origin in 
certain elementary tendencies already provided for. The ultimate 
origin of it would be found in the simple grasping and manipulative 
movements described above in the quotation from Thorndyke. But we 
can hardly say that these early movements represent the beginnings of 
a special acquisitive 'instinct'. They are simply the expressions 
in certain satisfying ways of tendencies already recognised. The 
situation) then is simple enough. The child receives satisfying 
experiences from grasping and handling an object. A possible 
obstruction to this pleasureable activity appears in the shape of 
another human being. The conation is therefore intensified or 
strengthened just as any conation whatsoever tends to be reinforced 
when it meets with an obstacle. Thorndyke's next sentence makes 
this clear: "To resistance the response is pulling and twisting 
the 
Object and pushing away 
(1) 
whoever or whatever is in touch with it." 
Now have we not here all the psychological ingredients,so 
to 
speak, of the cmeumLand (tuum Ositua.tion? They would be, 
in effect: an 
(1) opp. cit. 
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object from which interest, satisfying experiences are being either 
experienced 3r anticipated; another human being, reacted to (owing to 
habit) as an actual or possible obstacle; hence the object more tightly 
grasped or more vigorously striven for. This kind of situation is 
multiplied. endlessly in the child's experience. The situation acquires 
a peculiar emotional tone or value and this, in effect, is the feeling 
of'mineness' as against 'thineness'. The entire psychosis is the 
product of experience .and calls for no new instinct to explain it. 
The more elaborate acquisitive activities which we considered above 
are in the direct line of its growth. Furthermore, the tendency is 
in its essence anti -social, but it is so in the sense, exactly, that 
other human beings are essentially regarded as obstacles. Hence when 
Bertrand Russell distinguishes between the creative and the possessive 
impulses and asserts that "The best life is that in which creative 
impulses play the largest part and possessive impulses the smallest," 
the statement might almost, in the light of the above discussion, be 
described as a truism. For the possessive impulse, by definition, 
is a powerful tendency, generated and developed in experience, to 
pursue objects of a certain kind in opposition to or in competition 
with our fellowman. Nothing that is here said is incompatible with 
the notion that the later expressions of this tendency may give 
occasion for the development of character traits (e.g.perseverance) 
which are in themselves admirable. (2) 
The possessive or ownership 'instinct' is commonly said to be 
very marked during the period of childhood with which we are occupied 
in the present chapter. What does this statement mean on our view? 
In the first place, we would point out that the satisfaction of an 
instinct of possession is commonly confused with the satisfaction of 
(1) Principles of Social Reconstruction. p. 234. 
(2) d.f. Dreyer, Instinct in Lan, p. 189 
(1) 
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a very different impulse, namely, the constructive or experimentation 
impulse. The latter, as will presently be seen, is important at this 
stage. For example, when the boy builds a hut or constructs arraft, 
the essential satisfaction lies, not in the fact of ownership, but 
in the fact of creation or authorship. It is not the "it belongs to 
me" but the "I made it" that occasions the thrill. In the second 
place, the dominance of the tendency at this stage is to be closely 
connected with another characteristic which we discuss in the present 
chapter, namely, the boy's preoccupation with the physical or material 
world.(1) After what has been said above, it is unnecessary to point 
out the connection between the two tendencies. 
One aspect of acquisitiveness has not yet been mentioned. This. 
is the fact that the acquisitive tendency may be directed to an 
extraordinary variety of objects, including objects of the most useless 
description.(2) The question really raised by this fact is the 
question as to whether there is not a 'collecting' instinct which 
would account for irrational acquisitions of this sort. Such a 
'hoarding' instinct appears to exist in the case of a large number 
of animals and there would be thus some ground for presuming that it 
exists in man. assuming such an instinct, what relation are we to 
suppose to hold between it and the acquisitive tendency discussed 
above? A fertile source of confusion is the fact that they are as a. 
rule tacitly identified with each other; and even when they appear to 
be distinguished, they are again confused in the course of diecussion.(3) 
As a matter of fact it does not seem at all clear that we ought to 
identify them. For the collecting instinct appears considerably 
later 
than the possessive tendency and., moreover, it seems to follow a 
(1) see pp 211-213. 
(2) Some idea of this variety is given in "Child Life and 
Education ". (Stanley Hall) pp. 210 -211. 
(3) ibid. Compare the essay on 'The Collecting Instinct' 
with 
that on 'The Psychology of Ownership'. 
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relatively independent course, reaching its maximum intensity at about 
the age of ten and then declining.(1) At any rate, if we do identify 
these tendencies, the natural thing would be to regard 'collecting' as 
a special and later offshoot of possession, and hence, if our original 
argument is sound, not really instinctive. In point of fact. the 
possibility of accounting for the collection of seemingly useless 
objects without the supposition of an instinct to collect has not been 
sufficiently explored. The degree to which the manifest 'uselessness' 
of the objects collected furnishes evidence for the existence of an 
instinct has been much overestimated by the psychologists. prever 
points out that the evidence suggests that any object whatsoever may 
be collected, and this observation. seems sounci` As regards the 
'uselessness' of the kind of object which the child may be found 
collecting, this 'uselessness' looks dangerously like an adult 
projection into child life. There may be excellent reasons in the 
child's own mental histroy, for the 'value' which these things have 
acquired. In other words, this value maybe purely an 'individual' 
affair, and not the racial value of mere collecting; that is,it would 
be explained in terms of experience and not instinct. It would be 
doubtless difficult to disebver, in any particular case, just what 
the reason is for this emotional 'fixation' on that 'useless'.object. 
But we must recognise that the psychologist's task is often a 
difficult one, unless indeed. he makes a practice of resolving his 
difficulties by means of a 'deus ex machina' of special ínstincte.(3) 
While, however, we are willing to admit the possibility of a 
collecting instinct, we are not really called upon to investigate 
the 
(1) c.f. Aspects of Child Life and Education: compare p. 208 and 
p.256. 
(2) Instinct in Man. p. 188. 
(3) c.f. the manner in which the Freudian psychology would account 
for these fixation:. 
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matter. Our concern is essentially with the tendency which is of 
prime importance in ethical growth, namely, the tendency which we have 
discussed under the head of the possessive or acquisitive tendency. 
The question might be asked: in view of the fact that this tendency 
becomes very powerful in later life, whet do you gain by showing that 
the tendency is a product of experience and not the manifestation of 
a specific instinct? This c.uestior_, which brings us to the justification 
of the entire discussion, may be answered briefly. 
(a) The most important outcome is a correct interpretation of the 
ethical situation itself. We can now realise that, when we find an 
individual predominantly interested in acquisitive activities, we are 
not at all .; r the presence of en original instinct which is in- 
ordinately strong and against which the individual himself has perhaps 
been fighting a losing battle. We have, rather, a case in which real 
ethical education has been lacking. This tendency, which originated 
in and was fostered by experience, ought to have been and could have 
been disciplined and controlled by a sounder ethical training. The 
difference in point of view here is obviously of the first importance. 
(b) We get a scientifically correct view of the tendency in 
question and'this is the first duty of the psychologist. We may add, 
too, that in the case of this tendency a rigorously exact statement of 
its real nature makes a vast difference to the way in which we interpret 
many important phenomena in which economic science is intereeted.(1)The 
meaning of these behaviour- phenomena is now seen to be that the other 
tendencies, self- display, constructive instinct, etc. which we have 
(1) The reader will perhaps be more convinced of the truth of this 
statement if, with the logical implications of the above discussion in 
mind, he reads, let us say, McDougall, Introd. to Soc. psych. ch.14; 
Bertrand Fussell, Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp.234 -236; 
Parker, the Casual Laborer and other Essays, pp. 145 -146. c.f. 
especially in the light of the foregoing discussion, Veblen's account 
in "The Theóry of the Leisure Class: Ch.2 "; and in "The Instinct of 
9Vorkmanship, p. 217 "(the misdirection of the Workmanship instinct). 
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already recognised, have been directed to a particular class of objects. 
We may now proceed to consider the specific socialising influences 
brought to bear on the individual during the period of childhood. It 
will be remembered that the fundamental values of the political or 
group life were described as justice, equality, liberty, loyalty.(2) 
The implications of these terms were also considered. While certain 
demands of the group life are reflected in the terms 'justice' and 
'equality', nevertheless the deeper implications of them are to be 
found, as we saw, in an appreciation of the essential content of the 
notion of political liberty. Our examination of the attitudes and con- 
ceptions which are fostered in the individual by active participation in 
group life will serve as an explication or illustration in detail of the 
idea of political liberty as applied to the group unit. 
In passing from infancy to childhood, the individual passes from 
an intimate but restricted, into a much wider sphere of social re- 
lations. Incidental to this transition, certain special maladjustments 
may occur, the nature and significance of which will be considered in 
a later chapter.(1) In the meantime, we confine ourselves to a con- 
sideration of the manner in which the consciousness of the group values 
is developed as a result of this larger social experience. Two 
agencies are of outstanding importance in this connection and we shall 
consider their respective modi operandi. The first is organised or 
group play, the second is the school itself. 
The importance of play for mental development in general has been 
very properly stressed by the psychologists. It is not, however, the 
innate play tendency, as such, that is under consideration here. Our 
concern is with these organised group activities into which the play 
instinct has been elaborated and which realise developmental purposes 
far in excess of those subserved by the instinct in itself. This 
(1) See ch. XI. 
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aspect of play has not perhaps received the attention it deeerves. If 
the Groove theory be true, the general form of such play will be largely 
determined by instinct, but from our point of view, the interest centres 
on those features of the game which are of directly social origin and 
Which are transmitted, often with an interesting conservatism, from one 
generation of childhood to another. From the moment he begins to play 
the game or games proper to his age, the child finds himself heir to a 
fairly elaborate system of rules, and standards. These "rules of the 
game ", which are his social play inheritance, ere of peculiar importance 
for several reasons. To begin with, they are generally definite and 
detailed, and in this respect they are to be 'contrasted with the at 
least seemingly vaguer and more variable prescriptions which have hither- 
to claimed to control his activities. In another respect aleo these 
rules of the game are peculiar. They are enforced with a fine stringency 
that refuses even to contemplate exception. As a participant in the 
game, the chid finds himself a member of a group, the watchword of 
which is justice and equality; in the incidence of these rules, all 
distinctions vanish, everybody counts for one and nobody for more than 
one. To ask the psychological explanation of children's extreme 
punctilio in this regard is to propound an interesting question. The 
more immediate explanation is to be found in the fact teat this unre- 
lenting stringency in the enforcement of rules is itself Fn integral 
part --- prominently emphasised--of his social inheritance with regard to 
the game. But while it is true that he by no means evolves this con- 
ception of :tern justice out of his own consciousness, but simply 
accepts it as unreflectively as he accepts te rules themselves, never- 
theless nothing is clearer than the fact that he finds this rigid 
application of the rules congenial and satisfying. Why? The sections 
which follow will, we believe, furnish the fundamental answer to this 
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question which is not so simple as it --nc,y perhaps appear. 
Attitudes and habits are therefore developed in strict accordance 
with' the meaning of political justice and equality, and the child' is 
familiarised with the notion of lave and standards which are impartially 
enforced within a given group. But the training in group life goes 
deeper than this. Just as the meaning of political justice and equality 
is directly apprehended by the child in connection with games, so also 
in the same connection he comes to realise in a practical way another. 
fundamental fact of group life, namely, the fact of the essential 
inequality necessarily implied in the healthy functioning of the group. 
In the game, he is speedily made to realise his personal level, to 
apprehend his personal capacities and limitations and thus to discover 
his proper niche in the group. He realises that, if he is not to forego 
the many satisfactions of the game, he must limit and. control himself 
in certain ways. He must follow, obey, imitate here, while he can 
dictate and initiate there.(1) It is. no mere exaggeration to say 
thct nowhere is political liberty, in its essential implications, better 
exemplified than in this kind of activity. The essence of liberty, in 
so far as group life is concerned, is the unimpeded exercise of 
capacities, subject to limitations which are accepted as necessary and 
beneficial in the light of the larger satisfactions arising out of 
concerted action for the sake of a common purpose. The .discipline of 
the playground thus early engenders habits of social action and 
standards of judgment which are the starting point for the articulate 
political ideals and standards of later life. In a similar manner, the 
appreciation of the value which we described as 'loyalty' or 'fraternity' 
has its origin here. Play offers the earliest opportunity for conscious, 
deliberate cooperation with others for the realisation of a common 
(1) c.f. Baldwin; Soc. & Ethic. Interpretations.pp. -52- -153. 
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purpose and gradually habituates the child to that willing negation of 
purely individual impulse, which such cooperation involves. In fine, 
the organised play group may be said., in one essential respect at least, 
to represent an ideal form of association; for of the play group it is 
true, par excellence, that the individual is and feels himself to be 
at once means and end. The presence of individuals who are mere means 
is completely alien to the spirit of this group. To be in it is to be 
of it; such is the first principle of this form of association. 
The educational limitations of play, however, must be recognised. 
These limitations are inherent in its very nature. The nature of play 
seems adequately characterised by sayiìlg that the satisfaction resides 
in the activity itself, while the end to which the activity is 
consciously directed has only a make- believe value. This is an obvious 
inversion of the order of things as the child will find them in real 
life, where he will be called upon to prosecute activities not directly 
or in themselves satisfying for the sake of an end of value. With 
regard to the education in the group values,, to which we are for the 
present confining ourselves, the trairing afforded by the school itself 
approximates more closely to the conditions of real life. At the same 
time, the degree to which the school will furnish a training which is 
systematic and intelligent, instead of haphazard and blind, will vary 
enormously according to the principles underlying its organisation and 
inspiring its activities. Some modern educational thinkers, among whom 
Dewey deserves pioneer credit,(l) have rendered signal service to 
education by the impressive emphasis they have laid on the function 
of 
the school as a training ground for the cooperative activities 
of later 
life. Preparation for group life by means of participation 
in group 
(1) c. f. Democracy tend Education, p.416 et al. 
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activities at the school stage is the watchword of these thinkers. 
They would replace the individualism of school work by activities of a 
consciously cooperative kind. In other words, the school would, as 
far as possible, create situations or problems resembling those 
situations in real life which are not to be met by the individual in 
his own strength, but which demand cooperative effort. This would 
seem an eminently sound plea, for the direct inculcation of the group 
values at a stage at which, as we have seen, the numerous benefits and 
satisfactions of group activity are already. beginning to be appreciated, 
but appreciated, however, in connection with a kind of activity which 
is psychologically remote from the situations of real life. yet there 
is one respect in which the group training, which these educationalists 
desiderate from the school, falls short, even at its best, of realising 
the conditions of later group life. We have seen that in the play 
situation we have a make -believe end and a valuable or satisfying pro- 
cess and, also, that in real life we have an end of value while the 
means to its attainment may be intrinsically unattractive. The school 
situation is not exactly identical with either of these situations, but 
seems indeed to involve the defects of both as far as the child's sense 
of value is concerned. The difficulty is that the ends to which the 
cooperative activities of the school would probably in the main be 
directed could only within limits be appreciated as 'real'; but at the 
same time they would not exactly be in the class of 'make- believe' ends. 
To use an apt phrase, they would be largely 'fictitious',(1) and this 
very fact of their fictitious character --a fact which s often more 
apparent than it need be-- undoubtedly detracts from the general efficacy 
of school training. One habit of mind, of fundamental importance in 
later life, can only to a limited extent be fostered in connection with 
(1) Darroch: Psychology & the Teacher (quoted by Adams: Evol. of 
Educational Theory, P426. 
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the problems and. tasks of the school. This is the habit of mind in 
virtue of which the individual tends to trace and appreciate the con- 
nection between the end of felt worth and the uninteresting, unsatisfy- 
ing, perhaps even repugnant process involved in its realisation. One 
difficulty in making the ends of school activities appear 'real' to 
the child is that, when he has arrived at the stage -of development 
which we have under consideration, he has already grown highly sensitive 
to the attitudes and opinion of his elders, and his sense of the 
'reality' of an end is influenced in a marked degree by the attitude 
of his elders to it; -and this attitude, as he sums it up fpr himself, 
may be considerably at variance with the assertions they may make with 
respect to the value in question. 
Recognising this difficulty, however, we must at the same time 
point out that there are ends, which, though not exactly play ends nor 
yet 'real' ends in the above sense, nevertheless represent real ends 
for the child. Such are especially the ends which - furnish satisfaction 
to his constructive or creative instinct.(1) The constructive impulse 
of the child may be made the basis of the corporate activities which we 
have discussed; for this impulse may receive an even greater satisfaction 
(1) C.f. this statement of Thorndyke which rightly warns against the 
possible error of making too much of this fictitiousness of school 
values: "The reasons for the good showing that Arithmetic makes are 
probably the strength of its appeal to the interest indefinite 
achievement, success, doing what one attempts to do; and of its appeal, 
in grades 5 to 8, to the practical interest of getting on in the world, 
acquiring abilities that the world pays for. Of these the former is 
in my opinion much the more potent interest. (The Psychology of 
Arithmetic, p. 212.) 
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from corporate than from mere individual activities. This becomes 
clear when we consider the special kind of integration wrier the child 
is rapidly achieving at this period of his development. 
The question a: to the nature and extent of the_ integration at 
this stage is most conveniently approached from two points of view, 
The unification of interests or values is one aspect of the problem, 
the other aspect ie found in that inner synthesis which represents the 
content of the idea of self. 
With regard to the former Question, let as consider the trans- 
formation which the vnowledge value undergoes during the period. This 
transformation may be described by saying that, during the period from 
about six to about twelve year:, the re.tless, undiscriminating 
curiosity of infancy is more or less rapidly superseded by a much more 
limited interest in knowledge. This restricted interest is sometimes 
described as essentially a practical interest; knowledge is said to be 
interesting in so far as it is seen to contribute towards the attainment 
of practical results or objects. There is an important ambiguity, 
however, in the term 'practical' in this connection. One meaning of 
the term 'practical' we may pass over as irrelevant here. This is the 
familiar sense of practical in which we apply the term to the individual 
who is skilled and interested in mere technique as opposed to the 
individual who is interested in underlying principles. From our point 
of view, 'practical' activities may mean activities that are intended 
to minister to material needs,- -needs of the kind that we have already 
considered. (1) To say that the child's interest in knowledge is 
Practical in the sense that he ie interested in it as a means to certain 
ulterior rewards involves a superficial and false reading of the 
Psychology of childhood. It is to mistake an occasional motive, 
largely 




permanent motive. But 'practical' as applied to children, may mean the 
tendency to find satisfaction predominantly in the manipulation of 
material objects, that is, objects of perceptual experience. The need 
which motivates such 'practical' activity may itself be far removed from 
the 'practical' in the former sense of the term. The motive, in fact, 
turns out to be wrongly described as practical, though the activity 
itself may conveniently be so characterised. The truth appears to be 
that one of the noteworthy facts of development at the present stage is 
the, growth of what has been called the 'experimentation impulse', the 
impulse which finds its satisfaction in achievement as such, in having 
created something, in "feeling oneself a cause ". This is the impulse to 
which reference has been made several times in the foregoing pages and 
which we have designated by the commoner term; 'creative or constructive 
instinct'. We have already seen that this creative impulse may function 
in an important way in connection with the manipulation of other than 
physical objects.(1) Why is it particularly directed during this 
period, as it appears to be, to the physical world? The answer is to 
be found in another fundamental need of the pre: ent period, the need 
for physcial activity, for the free exercise of the physcial capacities 
of the organs. The creative impulse is determined, as regards the kind 
of objects with which it will occupy itself by this need for physical 
activity. Or, conversely, the need for physcial activity is determined 
as regards its expression by the creative impulse. In point of fact, 
this preference for the objects of sense experience does not seem fully 
accounted for by the fact that these objects afford scope for physical 
activity. The preference is doubtless influenced by other organic 
needs; the investigation of the precise nature of these needs is a pro- 
blem for the psychologist. It may be remarked in passing that we have 1 
here another illustration of the complicated character of the factors 
(1) see p. 106. 
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involved in motivation and of the danger of over -stressing any one 
factor. 
Whatever be the ultimate explanation of it, this feature of the 
present stage seems clearly pronounced. The experimentation impulse is 
powerfully operative but limited in a characteristic way to the manipu- 
lation of the physcial environment and to the production of physical 
resulte. Hence, while we may agree with Kirkpatrick that "during no 
period before this are there so few changes in the instinctive tenden- 
cies of the child, "(l)we must not forget this important phase of his 
growth, Moreover, among the arguments which have been adduced in 
support of the Culture -Epoch theory, perhaps there is none more 
plausible than that which points to the child's manifest delight in 
out -of- doors pursuits, in climbing trees, wading streams, making caves 
and so on. Satisfaction in such activities is doubtless it the main 
to be traced to the needs mentioned above. 
When it is asserted, then, that the child's interest in knowledge 
tends to be an essentially practical interest, what is meant or ought to 
be meant is that he is mainly interested in knowledge in so far as it 
furthers this dominant interest. As compared with the earlier period, 
there is thus a considerable narrowing of the knowledge interest. The 
curtailment of this interest is one aspect of the integration or unifi- 
cation which occurs during the period. The final result, as will be 
seen, is a kind of life which is at once relatively narrow and self - 
sufficing. 
The same process is again revealed in connection with the growth 
of the art interest. Here, too, we find the versatility, the many- 
sided-responsiveness of the earlier stage replaced by a more restricted 
interest. The artistic value becomes integrated with other values to 
form an element in a unity which is being rapidly fabricated out of the 
distinction between the ideal and the real worlds. In healthy develop - 
(1) The Individual in the Making, P. 169. 
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ment(i)this line of demarcation is truly and clearly drawn, and is hence- 
forth never to be erased, although the limitations which it prescribes 
may often, and with beneficient results, be deliberately ignored or 
overcome. The child's attitude to the ideal world, as that attitude 
is revealed in his reactions to stories, shows a transformation the 
stages of wlJob are clearly marked. The first symptom of this 
dawning realisation is the question: "is it true ?" With which, sooner 
or later, the child comes to respond to thèse stories, hitlerto 
merely accepted and enjoyed. "Is it true ?" is symptomatic at once 
of this growing realisation of the fact of two worlds. and of his 
need to come to terms with the distinction between them. The kind 
of integration which finally occurs here is similar to that described 
in connection with the knowledge intere'st. The interest in the ideal 
world becomes likewise restricted within fairly well- defined limits. 
Examination of story- preferences at this stage reveals the fact that 
the preferred stories possess certain well- mnrkei. characters which 
reflect in ai interesting way the mentni reeds of the period. These 
stories present nn abundance of incident, idealising physical prowess 
and achievement on the one hand, and, on the other, certain definite 
qualities of character. The significance of this latter - feature will 
be shown presently. A further noteworthy feature is the fact that 
the growing time -sense. is making itself felt in the same direction. 
Interest in stories which disregard this factor tends to ëisappear. 
The apparent preference for the biographical form of story is, of 
course, partly tö be explained by the relative simplicity which makes 
the situations in this form of story easier to grasp. But un- 
questionably there is another factor at work, namely, the effect of 
the growth of the time -sense on the notion of the self. As explained 
below, one aspect of the integrative process is the construction and 1 
l'l) see VI. X) 
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stabilisine of the ideational train which gives meaning to the 
concepts of past and future. This process has proceeded far enough to 
render biography intelligible and satisfying while at the same time 
biography, with its picture of completed lives, stimulates and furthers 
the integrative process itself. 
A:: far as religious development is concerned, the present stage 
appears to present no hew characteristic. Although this value still 
remains essentially external, there is v. continued deepening of the 
sense of its authoritativeness in so far as the child continues to be 
subjected to certain social influences. The external forms, the 
ritual, the words and phrases of religion continue to amass these 
associations which may leave they for all time profoundly charged with 
their peoiliear suggestions of mystery, solemnity and value. Thus, the 
mere fact of bowing the head and clasping the hands may to the last 
occasion a wave feelings which have their origin in early experience 
These feelings will in due course colour the object of the developed 
religious consciousness, but for the present the intellectual attitude 
accompanying them is probably at the most but an attitude of vague 
interrogation. 
But perhaps the most interesting aspect of this synthesising pro -,.- 
cess is to be found in connection with the moral values, the values of 
the social and group life. The child's persistent efforts during the 
earlier period to find some order in the apparent chaos of his social 
relations have been already discussed. By the end of the present period, 
these efforts have resulted in the growth of what is to all intents and 
purposes a definite moral code. The term 'moral code' seems best to 
describe the kind of integration which the child achieves in respect 
of the numerous prohibitions, standards and regulations to which he 
has been subjected in his social relationships. It cannot be called a 
r 
216 
systematisation of these controls, for it may possess but little inner 
coherence. Reflection is seldom brought to bear upon it, its 
inconsistencies and deficiences for the present pass unobserved. The 
earlier tendency to ruminate over the social standars and values, 
%. 
occasionally revealing their incoherencies in a flash of unwelcome 
L childish logic, has given way before the dominant practical interest. 
The interest in moral standards, like the interest in knowledge and 
art, has been trimmed to much narrower proportions. The code of morals, 
while thus restricted., is nevertheless definite and well -calculated to 
meet the demands of the familiar, regularly recurring problems and 
situations of the practical life.(1) 
To appreciate the significance of the moral development, we must 
answer three questions concerning it. 
(1) Why is such a code elaborated er constructed at all? What 
fundamental need or needs lead to this empirical and seemingly final 
solution of the moral problem ?. This question has already been answered. 
1) 
The contents of this code are not difficult to describe. 
On the side of VIE social and group values, we find disapprobation 
of very definite and obvious departures from the fundamental 
standard of conduct. For example, cheating, lying, stealing, 
cruelty, clearly marked selfishness, disloyalty and so on, are 
condenu ed. Again, there is some development of what ivicLougall 
calls' sentiment for self -control: This approbation of self - 
control occurs in connection with the child's activities 
generally, but more especially, perhats, in connection with 
the duties and tasks of the school. 'Diligence' is a quality 
of which the importance has been steadily inculcated by his 
elders. This code of morals, moreover, becomes modified in 
certain ways to suit different parts or sides of the social 
environment. Thus, special modifications occur in connection 
with the family relation, the playground relation, the 'chum' 
or friendship relation. As regards school life, for example, 
an interesting appreciation of the boy's moral code is given 
by Rev. William Temple (The Modern Teacher, p. 264) This 
statement has in view a somewhat.later age than is contemplated 
in the present chapter, but it illustrates well the general 
nature of the moral code of boyhood. 
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The child's code of moral; is the fruit of long effort to come to 
terms with the intractable social environment, with its numerous baffling 
restrictions and prohibitions, standards and values. The fundamental 
need is best described simply, as the need for adjustment, for adaptation 
to environment, social and physcial. Assimilation or mastery of certain 
elements in this environment (coupled with a temporary waning and loss 
of interest in other elements of it) and the integration of interests 
in the manner described, have resulted in an adjustment which is 
relatively complete and satisfying. Mental as well as physical growth 
often appears to have come to a standstill. This fact of the seeming 
completeness or self- sufficingness of the life of later childhood has 
been commonly remarked. Some writers -- Stanley Hall, for example,- - 
explain this fact by the hypothesis that the stage recapitulates a 
stage in race history when maturity was reached at this earlier age. 
(2) What is the significance of this moral code for later 
development? Or, what is the permanently valuable result secured by 
it? The answer to this question is to be found in the far -reaching 
results of the habits which become firmly established. Habits of 
action in accordance with certain well- defined standards or principles 
have become deeply ingrained. Certain definite forms of response come 
to be directly bound up with the varied situations which the social 
environment presents. Nor is the process of habituation confined to 
action as such. Habits of judging social situations and problems 
in 
the light of these moral standards develop is the same unreflective, 
uncritical manner. Now enough has been said in the earlier 
part of 
this essay concerning the dynamic or drive generated by habit 
to make 
it unnecessary here to labour the importance of this solid 
groundwork 
of social or moral habits. As we shall see, these 
very principles and 
standar,s, which have controlled the formation of the 
habits of social 
tehaviórr, are likely themselves to be called upon to justify their 
218 
i existence and their claims before the impatient tribunal of dis- 
satisfied youth. Nor will youth. suspect, when it endeavours to re- 
vitalise them anal. to elevate them to the level of its own ideal, 
instead of rejecting them ae impostures., that their suggestive value, 
their power to attract the will, is largely founded cn the routine 
of these early habits.(1) 
(3) Our third question is: What is the sanction of this code? 
The sanlone mainly effective at this stage can be distinguished 
as (a) fear of punishment and hope of reward.; and (b) fear of 
disapproval and desire for approval, i.e. the sanctions of social 
censure and social praise. We may pass over the first, partly because 
it plays only a minor roletowards the close of the period, and partly 
because it raises no spe cial difficulty. The problem of the ethics 
of punishment, that is, the question as to its true aims, - retribution, 
deterrence, or reformation - can hardly be said toy rise in regard to 
the punishment of children. The sole justification for punishment 
here is obviously reformation. Punishment is valuable in so far as 
it leads the child to take the first steps towards the inhibition of 
impulse and in so for as it serves early to instil the vivid 
consciousness of an external authority. So also reward. This has 
its value in furnishing an effective motive for the postponement of 
present gratification for the sake of a more remote satisfaction. 
But the fact that this satisfaction is something external to the 
activity, something arbitrarily imposed from without, limits the value 
and points the danger of this kind of motive. The patent danger, of 
course, ie that of fostering a habit of looking outside the activity 
to purely ulterior objects and of withdrawing attention from those 
activities which do not manifestly offer such definite personal gains. 
(1) c.f. Boyd; The Modern Teacher p.244; also Kirkpatrick; Fundamentals 
of Child Study; "The formation of habits is the most important thing in 
the preparatory stage of Moral development, since they will ultimately 
determine motives to moral ideals ". p.186 
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But the dominant sanction toward: the end of the period at any 
rate is susceptibility to social approval and disapproval. Two 
forms of this sanction must be distinguished; the child is not only 
sensitive to the judgment of his elders but also to the judgment of 
his equals. This stage, indeed, appears to be characterised by 
special susceptibility to the judgment of equals.(1) McDougall 
investigates in an interesting way the question ae to the psychological 
explanation of this susceptibility to public opinion which we now 
find for the first time operative as a. normal, regular motive. 
According to McDougall's analysis, the basic factors in the develop- 
ment of this attitude are the instincts of self- assertion and self- - 
abaseraent.(2) We have already accepted, provisionally at least, the 
hypothesis of these instincts. But we are probably exaggerating the 
role of these instincts when we make them the essential factors under- 
lying our susceptibility to social praise and censure. McDougall 
apparently assumes the identity of the self -assertive instinct in man 
with the display tendency which Darwin and others attribute to 
certain of the higher animals. Granting such a display tendency, 
we would naturally expect to find a similar instinct in man. But 
such an instinct would assert itself rather in an occasional way and 
more particularly in connection with the sex impulse. In point of 
fact, it appears to be at the stage at which this latter impulse is 
maturing that we find the most marked manifestation of the display 
impulse in the human being. The tendency to self- display, especially 
in the presence of members of the opposite sex, it very striking, for 
instance, in the young adolescent. Such occasional experiences, again, 
as the glow of exhilaration which many people experience when they 
suddenly find themselves in the limelight, or the painful shrinking 
and confusion of others under similar conditions, are neatly explained 
(1) c.f. Kirkpatrick; The Individual in the Making, pp.166 -168. 
(2) Introd. to Soc.Psych. p.193 and p. 196 (note). 
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as due to the existence of the two instincts of self- assertion and 
self - abasement in different degrees of strength in different individuals. 
But these two instincts do not seem to furnish convincing explanation 
of the value which the individual comes to attach to public approval. 
For here we are dealing with an attitude which appears relatively early 
and, instead of weakening with age, becomes increasingly marked. The 
logical outcome of an explanation in terms of a display instinct would 
really be something of the nature of the Freudian hypothesis of the 
radical and permanent role of the sex interest at all stages of growth. 
As a matter of fact, the phenomenon under discussion offers an 
excellent illustration of the general position taken up in the present 
essay, and exemplified in our treatment of tendencies such as imitation 
(1) 
and sympathy. There seems no good ground for denying that an instinctive 
factor is operative. But on our view the role of this factor would be 
relatively minor. To magnify its importance by finding in it the 
'explanation' of the all - important tendency we are discussing is to 
distort the picture of mental development. Is it not more convincing 
to regard as the accumulated result of social training and experience 
this value which the individual comes to attach, largely without 
reflection or question, to public opinion. In other words, it would 
represent essentially a habitual attitude. Certain instincts may 
function to facilitate its formation but it does not seem right to 
describe it as based on these instincts. For it is clear, when we 
consider the mental history of the individual, that the development Jf 
an attitude of this kind is inevitable, apart altogether from the 
existence or non -existence of special instincts of the kind discussed. 
From earliest infancy, the individual has been subjected, without 
inter- 




mission, to experiences calculated to foster a 'social' consciousness 
of this kind. A basic feature of this process of socialisation is the 
growth of what is a mental habit, the habit of conscious social 
reference with respect to all his valuations. By a very natural process 
there grows out of this the habit of attaching value, or attempting to 
attach value, to those objects which are valued by the social environ- 
ment. Among the judgments of society to which he comes to attach value 
or significance is society's judgments concerning his own conduct. 
That such a habit of mind should become ineradicably fixed is not 
surprising when one remembers how absolute, from infancy onwards, has 
been the individual's dependence on society for the satisfaction of his 
manifold needs. Dr. Jones, in discussing the child's dependence on 
society, denies that the effect of it would be to develope a. habitual 
attitude of submission. He says: "The infant's needs are so automatically 
satisfied and the distinction he draws between self and the outer world 
is so rudimentary that he is much more likely to have a sense of 
power than of helplessness, "(1) "_; and again Dr. Jones tells us that "the 
fact that he has to rely on parents for his material welfare, food, 
clothes and so on, he takes very much for granted and it does not 
produce much psychological reverberation ". 
(1) 
This appears, however, to 
misjudge the situation and to imply a mistaken conception of the kind 
of process involved in the growth of this habit. The formation of this 
habit by no means implies that the fact of his complete dependence is 
normally present to the child's consciousness. On the contrary, in so 
far as his elders continue to supply his wants as fast as he makes them 
known, he may certainly develop an illusory sense of his power. 
(1) British Journal of Psychology: July 1922, p.44. Dr. Jones does not 
deny, of course, the child's keen sense of dependence, but would explain 
the fact in terms of the psycho -analytic concept of the Oedipus complex. 
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Nevertheless, this incessant and necessary dependence on others for 
the satisfaction of his needs and for assistance in the prosecution of 
his purposes does its work. The accumulated result of these oft - 
repeated acts of dependence is a habitual attitude of mind of which 
the principal ingredient is a submissiveness to society's judgments 
and a tendency to expéri.ence a lively sense of value in connection with 
them. That this interpretation, rather than that of Dr. Jones, is the 
true one seems to be shewn, for example, by the extreme distress which 
so often overcomes the young child when he finds himself temporarily 
left alone in a strange place. In his general bearing at such a time 
there is little suggestion of personal power or self- sufficiency. It 
may be recalled that the principle under discussion was used in the 
explanation of one type of imitative activity.(l) The objection might 
be raised that the kind of public opinion to which the child is most 
sensitive at the stage which we are considering in the present chapter 
is the opinion, not of his elders, but of his equals. Put the fact that 
the susceptibility to the opinion of his equals is relatively the more 
marked at this period is due to special circumstances of growth which 
we have discussed in connection with group life. We have shown that 
for the first time he is experiencing and exploring the many satis- 
factions and pleasures of group life, and the habit of mind implied in 
his sensitivity to the opinion of the group is very rapidly and 
noticeably developed out of experience of the satisfactions and dis- 
satisfactions bound up with behaviour approved and disapproved 
by the 
group. As far as the approval -- disapproval of his elders s r4 
concerned, the importance of it continues to be taken 
for granted. But 
their approval and disapproval are limited to the observance 
of certain 
well- defined standards or rules of behaviour. In the nature 
of the 
(1) See p.136. 
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case, therefore, the opinions of his elders do not concern him so 
intimately as the more minutely exacting and ever -present criticism of 
his peers. 
So much for the general problem of the integration of values. It 
remains to consider the inner or subjective aspect of this integration, 
namely, the synthesis of the ideational or representative processes. In 
this respect, also, great advances are made. As in the case of the 
earlier period we may consider two important aspects of this ideational 
synthesis; (2) the ordering of the representative elements into a stable 
series on the basis of temporal or causal relations; and (b) the growth 
of the powers of'abstraction and generalisation. With regard to the 
former, the degree of development is indicated by the rapid growth of 
the time- sense. Representative memory in the complete sense, involving 
not merely representation of past experiences, but their more or less 
definite locution in the past, has undergone considerable development. 
The kind_ of representation .needed for a more adequate apprehension of 
the distinctions of past, present and future is now possible. One 
important result of this development is t'e'Xt it renders possible the 
projection of a practical ideal of self. We say practical ideal by 
way of contrasting it with the mere fantasies of the previous stage. 
The growth of the time -sense at the present stage means the projection 
of ideals which are felt to have some connection with present realities, 
however slim that connection may be. The value of certain kinds of 
literature, and especially of biographical literature, in this direction 
has been already suggested. Such literature not only in large measure 
furnishes the content of childish ideals but also stimulates and 
quickens the growth of the time -sense itself. For it furnishes concrete 
examples of the large *integrations which the child. is beginning vaguely 
and dimly to apprehend. 
It would be a mistake to suppose, however, that the time -sense 
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reaches its full development here. On the contrary, it is still found 
to be highly imperfect. The concepts of past and future are still far 
from the precision which they will presently attain. Eepreeentative 
activity is still too undeveloped and the content of experience too 
meagre to admit of the formulation and projection of a completely 
practical, that i;, a strictly and fully ethical ideal. The ideals of 
the child of twelve may well reveal a considerable uniformity and 
consistency with respect to their general nature, for they represent 
the projection on the grand scale of those activities and qualities 
which have become the central, unifying factors in his life. The 
ideals, too, may be vividly conceived. But they are still largely 
divorced from the actualities of his existence, for there is yet but 
little of that backward movement of the mind, as Dewey describes it, 
(1) 
from the contemplation of the end to the serious consideration. of the 
means for its attainment. In other words, these ideals have only 
to a very limited extent become the real principles of volitional control 
In the development of a relatively stable ideational train, there 
is implied, of course, C. corresponding growth in the capacity for 
abstraction and generalisation. The degree to which abstract moral 
standardee have been already appreciated is proof of rapid development in 
this direction. No better illustration could be given of the child's 
progress here ti -an the fact that he has now normally achieved a very 
considerable feat of abstraction and generalisation: he has grasped the 
'ought' concept. The 'ought' notion has been disentangled in particular 
from two other notions with both of which it possesses affinity of 
meaning, without being identifiable with either. The "I ought" has 
been distinguished from the "I must" and from the "I desire to" or "I 
am inclined to ". Where our concern is purely with the psychology 
of 
the process, we must keep in mind that the child acquires the 
'ought' 
(1) see p. 91. 
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concept precisely as he acquires the meaning of any other word. He 
finds it applied to certain kinds of situation and, given that he is 
capable of the necessary processes of abstraction and generalisation, 
he can learn to identify these situations. Moreover, these 'ought' 
situations involve consequences of a special kind, --- different conse- 
quences, for example, from those involved in the "I must" or in the 
"I am inclined to" situations. It is clear that the "I ought" is con- 
cerned with the most elusive and complex of these three situations. As 
we have pointed out, it has a certain affinity with the other two, and 
the child fi it in his experience now clearly affiliated with the 
one, now with the other. In the bewildering variety of situations, 
he is called upon to apprehend the universal of the 'ought'; and this 
obviously demands high powers of abstraction and generalisation. 
Taking this period as a whole, it might fairly be said to represent 
the completion of the first phase or movement of the ethical life. 
Plithout suggesting any complete break in the essential continuity of 
that life, we must nevertheless recognise the relatively complete 
integration that has been achieved. One characteristic which is commonly 
noted is symptomatic. This is the tendency, most apparent towards the 
close of the period, to the temporary withdrawal of interest from the 
activities of the adult social environment. At no time in the child's 
growth is his interest in his elders less than during the two or three V 
years which precede the commencement of adolescence. This does not 
necessarily mean any diminution of the importance or value which he 
attaches to the judgments of adults in so far as these judgments are 
directly brought to bear on his own conduct. On the contrary, 
there is 
no period in his development during which he entertains 
such an implicit, 
unquestioning respect for his adult environment as 
now. But this 
environment is essentially represented for him in well- 
defined conduct 
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)ntrols; these he has mastered end cherishes with a conservatism which 
prophetic of the last stage when growth will have finally come to an 
2d. Except for this narrowly practical interest in his elders, his 
tention is predominantly directed to his equals. The fundamental 
3ason for this is to be found in the completeness with which he has 
ltegrated the impulses and nee, of his nature and has found satisfying 
Kpression for them. Only with the disturbing, disintegrating effects 
f those farther needs and impulses which a new phase of development - 
ill presently bring into being will his attention turn again, with 
istful enquiry, to the larger world of his elder:. 
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CHAPT. H IX 
Nowhere does the practice of distinguishing special 
periods of growth appear to be better justified than in the 
case of-tte adolescence. Adolescence presents what is 
probably the most interesting, if not the most important, 
' period of ethical development. To call it the most 
important period would perhaps be rash, for the ethical 
significance of the two earlier periods is far -reaching 
and profound. For this reason, it would be a serious 
mistake to suppose anything resembling a complete break in 
the individuals development. The notion of continuity 
in development is no mere hypothesis; as will be fully shewn 
in the following chapters, there is abundant evidence of an 
underlying continuity linking together stages apparently so 
diverse as adolescence and childhood. At the same time, the 
numerous and profoundly significant changes which occur 
during the period of adolescence must be recognized. These 
changes may well be striking enough .effectually to conceal 
the essential continuity of personal growth; and, in any case, 
they are such as to lend a peculiar interest to this period 
from the point of view of ethical development. Mental growth 
is rapid as in the infancy period; but in adolescence the 
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different phases of growth can be better observed and more 
accurately interpreted. 
The descriptive literature of adolescence is still far 
from voluminous. A study of this liter &ture reveals a very 
encouraging measure of agreement on the part of the different 
writers as to the phenomena specially associated with the period. 
This is doubtless traceable in large degree to the influence of 
the great pioneer in adolescent psychology, Stanley Hall. No 
writer could afford to undertake a descriptive psychological 
account of adolescence without first reckoning with Stanley Hall's 
monumental contribution in this field. This common fountainJead 
of information partly explains, then'the uniformity to be found 
in the different accounts. The real explanation, however, is to be 
found in the fact that the characteristics of the period are 
peculiarly marked, easily described and, in fact, already largely 
familiar from the treatment of them in general literature. 
It would seem, however, that much remains still to be done 
with regard to the interpretation of this considerable body of 
valuable descriptive material that has been accumulated. In the 
present essay we shall be mainly occupied with this question of 
interpretation. An attempt will be made to appreciate the more 
basic psychological principles underlying adolescent phenomena and 
to offer an explanatory account of certain mental movements which 
characterize the period as a whole. The material now available in 
the descriptive literature appears on the whole adequate for this 
Purpose. Our special problem, however, is to trace the further 
development of the ethical consciousness. In one sense, this does 
not involve any narrowing of the range of our enquiry; for ethical 
growth is a function of the growth of the mind as a whole. In 
another sense, however, our enquiry is restricted. While it is 
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concerned with all aspects of mental development, it is interested 
only in the elucidation of their bearing on ethical development. 
This development, it will be remembered, involves the fabrication 
of a personal ideal, the content or stuff of which is to be found 
in those fundamental values which we discussed in an earlier 
chapter. Certain of those values which we passed over as relatively 
of little or no importance during the two previous stages, may 
now come to play a profoundly significant role in the individual's 
development. We have nav to reckon with all the values and a 
broader synthesis is demanded. Part of our task will be to apply 
the ethical criterion to the kind of synthesis which the individual 
finally achieves. The mental conflict incidental to adolescence 
may find its solution in various ways. By applying the ethical 
criterion to the final outcome of this conflict, we mean that we 
must ask whether the integration is in the spirit of the demands 
of the ethical ideal as we have conceived it. In this 
connection, we shall consider some typical outcomes of the 
conflict which ice, different ways fail to satisfy the ethical 
!ought'. 
Within the period of adolescence, again, special stages of 
¡growth have been distinguished. There is general agreement, for 
instance, as to the existence of three stares or phases which are 
te,cribed as early, middle and late adolescence. While there is 
good evidence that such a division has a basis in the facts of 
development, the boundary lines are uncertain, and individual 
variations are too great to admit of any rigid interpretation of 
these further distinctions. For the purposes of our present 
Problem, it is more important to remember that the upper limits 
Of adolescence cannot be rigidly fixed. It is usual to regard 
the period as terminating, broadly speaking, about the ages of 
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twenty -four or twenty -five. The close of the period cannot, however, 
be externally fixed in this way, for the real meaning of adolescence 
Is to be sought in certain phenomena of the intellectual, 
emotional and conative life which may occur earlier or later 
according to circumstances. The essential point is that the mental 
movements which we have now to consider are movements in the 
direction of a more comprehensive, a more complete and, it 
may well be, a final synthesis. Adolescence is rightly considered 
as terminatin;í with the achievement of an integration of this 
kind. To say that the synthesis achieved at the close of this 
period is necessarily final would be incorrect. A more or less 
thorough reconstruction of the ethical life someti.ies occurs 
bring adulthood. The influences which bring about these later 
changes are usually of an exceptional kind and, in any case, 
lie outside the purview of the present essay. Normally, the 
ethical life of the adult is foreshadowed in that synthesis 
which marks the close of adolescence. 
In Adolescence as a whole, two great mental movements are 
¡clearly discernible. The first is a movement towards disintegration 
and dissolution of existing adjustments, the second a movement 
in the direction of re- integration of the elements of the immensely 
enhanced life of thought, feeling and will. Certain needs and 
impulses begin to assert themselves now with peculiar force and 
certain intellectual capacities undergo a very raçid development. 
The adjustments of childhood prove unequal to the strain of mental 
growth. A period of maladjustment ensues, which may be of short 
orprotracted duration. This is the 'storm and stress' phase which 
lasts, broadly speaking, from the onset of adolescenee,to about 
the sixteenth year, with variations incidental to special 
circumstances and especially, of course, variations dependent on 
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,c. The second phase of adolescent development, which may also 
short or protracted according to special conditions of 
adowment and circumstances, involves the more or less successful 
ijustment of the individual to his new environment with its larger 
pportunitiee and more exacting demands. Our discussion, then, will 
e directed specifically to a consideration of: (1) The factors 
hat make for disintegration. In this connection we shall consider 
a) special impulses and intellectual capacities which either 
ppear for the first time or acquire peculiar importance at this 
tage, and (b) the modus operandi of certain social factors in the 
causation of this maladjustment. 
(2) The factors that make for integration. Under this head 
all be considered (a) psychological factors. Here we shall 
3onsider the psychological development which renders possible the 
Puller appreciation of the essential human values; and attention 
íi11 also be given to the further growth of the self concept. 
(b) Special social influences. This will involve, in particular, 
a consideration of the integrating influence which may be 
exerted by participation in certain kinds of associations, such 
ae, religious, cultural, philanthropic and economic associations. 
(3) Types of ethical failure. We can distinguish typical 
says in which the final outcome of the process of synthesis may be 
ethically defective. In particular, three types of ethical 
failure will be considered: (a) false integration, that is, a 
unification achieved by the undue curtailment or narrowing of 
interests; (b) failure to integrate: in this case, no real 
unification nothing approaching consistency or singleness of 
purpose has been achieved; (c) partial and relatively independent 
integrations. 
We refer here to the kind of life which 
Presents several syntheses which subsist together, although 
more or less incompatible with one another. Whether mutually 
compatible or not, they are in any case not taken up into the 
larger synthesis of a unitary ideal. 
Special causes which contribute to bring about the more 
serious defects of synthesis will be considered and an attempt will 
be made to appreciate the significance of such failure for the 
ethical life as a whole. 
1. The sex impulse. The development of the sex impulse and 
the emotional expansion associated with that development have 
been sufficiently emphasized in the literature of adolescence. 
The emphasis has perhaps been exaggerated with the result of 
conveying the false impression that the sex impulse appears 
now for the first time. There is a sense in which this is true, 
and also a sense in which such an idea is at variance with 
the facts. According to the authoritative view of Moll, certain 
processes which are, so to speak, in the dir -ct line of the 
sex instinct, begin to make their appearance before the eighth 
year and continue to occur periodically during the ensuing 
years until adolescence. The real nature of these processes can 
be understood only by recognizing the equivocal implications of 
the term 'sex impulse' itself. Two kinds of process are indicated 
by this term and these may occur independently of one another. 
In the first place, we have the appearance of processes of a 
Purely physical or physiological kind which are technically 
referred to by the term ' detnrnescence : The term ' contrectation. 
again, is used to designate processes of a psychical kind , such 
as love,shame, modesty; and so on. While phenomena of Loth rin_s 
NI occur long before adolescence, what appears to take place 
et the earlier stae i3 that these physical and psychical 
processes tend to occur independently of one another. They 
need not be at 811 coordinated or associated. At the adolescent stage 
these processes tend to become coordinated and synchronized. 
Furthermore, the impulses associated with both groups of processes 
begin, at this stage, to be more specifically directed to 
individuals of about the same age belonging to the opposite sex. 
Inthis last -mentioned tendency, of course, there is much that is 
not really instinctive but is the result of social influences. 
What concerns us for the present, however, is the justification 
for the common view that there is an important development 
of the sex instinct peculiarly associated with adolescence. 
The psychological basis of it is to be found in this fact of 
the tendency towards coordination, synchronization. and 
specific direction of the various impulses arising from sex. 
Admitting, then, the fact of an important new development 
inthis sense, the transformation which occurs may be more or less 
sudden and complete. One of the most significant features of 
that integration which is achieved towards the end of childhood 
is the apparent absence of the sex interest. The child's 
interest in the opposite sex probably reaches its lowest ebb 
at this stage. The sudden recrudescence of á interest at 
this stage, with the consequent appearance of new impulses and 
needs, the meaning of which is but little understood, is beyond 
question one of the most potent factors in the breakdown of 
1 
Childish adjustments and values. With regard to the growth of 
this impulse, however, two errors of interpretation are possible, 
In the first place, while there is little danger of over emphasizing 
the imperiousness of this new impulseÇ there is often a mistaken 
tendency to regard it as the only factor involved in the 
present maladjustment. Thus the influence of other psychological 
factors 
is underestimated or ignored. The above discussion 
of the early occurrence of sex impulses and of the real 
meaning of sex development in adolescence strongly suggests 
that the importance of the sex factor in the explanation of 
special adolescent characteristics has been overestimated. 
Asecond type of error is to be traced to the influence of the 
Freudian psychology. In this case, it is denied that the 
sex interest on the part of the adolescent is a new phenomenon, 
and it is said that what occurs is simply a redirection 
and localization of an impulse which has been powerfully 
operative even from infancy itself. This point of view, 
needless to say, implies much more than the mere recognition 
of continuity of growth. The latter idea would in general be 
admitted in some sense. It is not the early occurrence of 
something in the direct line of the sex impulse that is 
difficult to accept. The Freudian idea not only implies 
continuity but also finds the basis of that continuity in the 
(1) 
all- pervading influence of the sex impulse; and that impulse 
itself is held to be powerfully operative even in early infancy. 
A careful examination of this hypothesis as a whole is too 
large a task to be adequately undertaken here. In chapter 11. 
we consider the Freudian psychology with a view to indicating 
certain conceptions which seem permanently valuable to general 
as well as to abnormal psychology. But the concept of the 
'libido' can hardly yet be regarded as one of these. For the 
present, we need only remark that this concept seems much in 
(1) It is difficult to be quite sure as to whether Freud 
really does mean to minimize the importance of other 
instincts in the interests of the sex instinct; or whether 
the prominence accorded to the latter is not due to the fact 
that the novelty of his viewpoint made a special emphasis 
necessary, while hostile criticism, being mainly directed 
against his 'sexf hypothesis, has still further contributed 
to give prominence to this instinct. 
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the same position as certain other concepts which have been 
already examined and which involve such an extended use of 
familiar terms as to deprive them of all serviceable precision 
of meaning. No denial is here intended of the reality of 
many of those experiences to describe which the term 'libido' 
is used by the Freudians. But the whole sex hypothesis of this 
school is at present too purely speculative and has been 
subjected to too little scientific scrutiny to be practically 
helpful to the general psychologist. According to the general 
acceptation of the term, the instinct of stx is identified with 
that particular kind of interest in the opposite sex which is 
first normally manifested at the beginning of adolescence. All 
that is meant by saying that the sex interest is a new phenomenon 
now can be well seen by observing the difference in the behaviour 
of a party consisting of children of both sexes and of a party 
of adolescents of both sexes. In the former case, a somewhat 
unsociable atmosphere of indifference presently gives place to 
an outburst of romping and horse -play. In the latter case, 
however, the youth is from the first obviously interested in 
the members of the opposite sex and just as patently aware 
that he is an object of interest to them. By the development of 
the sex instinct in early adolescence, we mean the facts of 
mental and physical growth which account for this change of 
attitude. 
Special Capacities. -- Representation. Certain special 
capacities undergo rapid development during this period and 
generate a more or less vaguely felt need for a fuller , more 
satisfying measure of self- activity than the adjustments of 
childhood can offer. Let us consider first the growth of the 
representative powers. We have seen that there are two forms 
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of this representative activity which are intimately bound up 
with the individual's ethical growth. In the one form, representative 
activity is occupied with cognitive content, in the other it 
is concerned with the affective or sentient life. The latter form 
of representative activity was designated by the term "reflective 
sympathy." Needless to say, this distinction does not mean that 
either can occur without the other. But they must be distinguished. 
There are two capacities involved, one of which may attain to 
amuch higher level of development than the other. The individual 
who has reached a high standard of precision and comprehensiveness 
in the representation of ideational content but whose powers 
of apprehending and entering into the emotional life of others 
are sadly limited is not so uncommon as some simplifying 
psychologies would have us believe. 
Both capacities normally undergo rapid development during 
adolescence. The nature of the ideational development will 
be more fully considered later in connection with the growth of 
the Self concept. ' As for the growth of reflective sympathy, this 
expresses itself in 'a new and vastly more adequate response 
to the world of art. The adolescent begins now to apprehend 
and identify himself with a world of feeling and emotion of 
which he has hitherto known nothing or at most but vaguely 
suspected the existence. This broadening of the affective life 
proceeds, of course, from the adolescent's direct personal 
experience of a larger range of feeling. But the widening of the 
field of direct personal experience does not of itself imply the 
sympathetic development which we are considering, although it makes 
that 
development possible. The narrow confines of direct individual 
experience 
are broken through under the stimulus of growing 
representative 
powers which crave satisfying exercise; and thus 
) 
the rich world of indirect emotional experience, the world of art, 
begins to beckon the mind with a new and more urgent appeal. The 
final outcome of this new d'lan will normally be the development 
of a permanent and truer appreciation of the values of art. But 
for the present, the appearance of these new needs and impulses 
serve only to intensify further the growing consciousness of 
maladjustment. 
Space and Time Concepts. Connected with the growth of 
the representative powers but deserving of separate mention as a 
specially important phenomenon, is the development of the capacity 
to apprehend the larger conceptions of space and time. Space and 
Aims ideas, which were either meaningless or altogether inadequately 
grasped in childhood, acquire now an interest and attractiveness 
of their own. This, however, is only the most striking aspect 
of an intellectual development which appears to be general. 
Tracy summarizes the situation well in the following statement 
the items of which are based on experimental evidence: 'Many forms 
of mental activity appear to reach a sort of culminating point 
in their development(apart from what may be accomplished by 
special training) about the age of fifteen or sixteen years . 
The curve of accuracy in judgments of quantity does not rise 
so rapidly, if at all, after this age has been passed. Estimates 
of the number, size and distance of objects, are greatly increased 
inexactness through the entire teen age, but especially about 
the middle of the period. Moreover, not only is the mind better 
able to judge the quantitative relations of objects and events 
within the more limited spatial and temporal dimensions, but a 
lively interest is awakened also in the vaster areas of space 
and the greater periods of time. The imagination revels in 
the 
tremendous 
distances of the heavenly bodies, their vast proportions 
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are 
tremendous orbits; and quantitative comparisons 
end 
(1)   
indulged in with much zest." This expansion of intellectual 
capacity is the basis of a new and more adequate appreciation 
otthe knowledge value. New fields of profoundly humanizing 
knowledge are thrown open. At this stage ought to begin the 
education which will finally lead the mind to discover a 
profounder significance and deeper satisfaction in History, 
Astronomy, Geography, and kindred branches of knowledge. But 
this result will come later. For the preaent, the effect of 
these dawning intellectual interests and needs is in the 
direction of disrupting still further the relatively n arrow 
intellectual adjustments of the child. 
Development of the critical powers. One of the most 
potent forces that operate to undermine the authority of childish 
values is a marked development of the reasoning powers. This shews 
itself in an increased capacity for comparison and contrast and may be 
described roughly as a growth of the critical processes. 
The root psychological fact here is the further development of 
the capacity for abstraction and generalization. The mind begins 
now to move more easily in the realm of abstract and general 
ideas; and the generalizations of morality are among the first 
objects to attract the critical attention. The moral code to 
which the child has hitherto not only adapted his conduct 
but bowed his mind may now be subjected to a kind of scrutiny 
which it is ill- fitted to bear, and which may temporarily 
deprire it of much of its sanctity. It will be recalled 
that the main sanction of that code lay in the child's habitual 
subjection 
to social opinion, But for reasons which we shall 
(1) Psychology of Adolescence,pp.96 -97. 
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consider none carefully in the next section, there is a tendency 
towards a considerable diminution of this respect for his elders 
(the actively critical attitude now assumed to accepted moral 
standards, with its outcome in a more or less clear apprehension 
of their deficiencies and shortcomings is partly effect and 
partly cause of this diminished respect.) Stanley Hall is emphatic 
onthis point. For he tells us that children "respect all we 
smile at or even notice, and grow to like it like the plant 
toward the light. Their early lies are often what they think will 
please. At bottom the : :post restless child admires and loves 
those who save him fror too great fluctuations by coercion, 
provided the means be rightly chosen and the ascendancy extend 
over heart and mind. But the time comes when parents are often 
shocked at lack of respect suddenly shewn by the child. They have 
ceased to be the highest ideals. The period of habituating 
morality and making it habitual is ceasing, and the passion to 
realize freedom, to act on personal experience, and to keep a 
private conscience is in order. "(1) We shall consider in due 
Nurse the question of the "private conscience" and the mode of its 
acquisition. Our interest for the present, however, is in the 
core destructive and negative phase of this development, and 
it will be instructive to examine this more closely. 
One of the most important results, from the viewpoint of 
ethioal development, of this increase in the power to generalize 
hand abstract, to discriminate identity in difference, is observable 
curing the first half of adolescence. This is the ability to 
liscriminate easily between the external act and the motive or 
intention and the tendency to view the act as a whole which 
(1) Youth: Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene,p. 207. 
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possesses an inner or subjective as well as an outer or 
objective side. There arises an appreciation of the act in its 
real psychological nature in place of the earlier interest in 
the merely external, observable part of it. still more important, 
perhaps is the fact that, where there is manifest discrepancy 
between the external act and the intention, the tendency is to 
judge the intention rather than the act itself. Stanley Hall 
quotes the results of an interesting practical investigation 
which proves the appearance of this trait.(1) Only the children 
of adolescent age considered the praiseworthy intention rather 
than the harmful result in meting out punishment. This is 
in marked contrast with the attitude of childhood. To the non - 
introspective and uncritical child, nothing appears more 'natural' 
than that punishment or blame should be determined by what 
the individual actually does. Equally natural, too, does it seem 
to his unreflective mind that the sole and sufficient reason for 
not doing certain things is to avoid punishment or censure and 
for doing other things is to win reward or approval. For this 
reason the child is not normally disturbed by discrepancies and 
oontradictions underlying many of the ordinary moral standards 
and judgments of his elders. To the adolescent, however, who is 
becoming increasingly capable of a larger and more critical view 
of conduct, the many illogicalities and shortcomings of current 
morality begin to reveal themselves. He finds that there are 
apparent limits to the application of the canons of justice 
or (airplay; for he finds many things in his environment 
incompatible with a thorough -going application of these 
standards. 
Dishonesty is sternly condemned in certain relations 
while in other relations it is condoned, or even approved 
(1) Opp. cit. pp . 220 -221. 
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has smart business. He finds kindliness and benevolence preached, 
but much callousness and selfishness practised. Moreover, the wider 
knowledge of the world at large which he is acquiring through 
literature may still further undermine the foundations of his 
belief in the recognized code. For he encounters much that 
might suggest that morals are after all something fluid and 
variable, -- a matter merely of race, country or social caste. 
We do not of course, mean that the average adolescent 
perpetrates a masterly feat of destructive moral criticism, But 
his intellectual impulses are for the moment in that direction, 
and, what is more important, he derives a considerable satisfaction 
from the exercise of his new -found critical powers in this 
way. This latter fact is only one of several adolescent 
characteristics which have been frequently observed and which 
have a common psychological origin. We may mention here the most 
important of these adolescent phenomena end thereafter attempt a 
psychological interpretation of them. They are; (a) the 'ganging' 
tendency; (b) a new and actively critical interest in adults 
with the growth of a new kind of sensitiveness to their opinions 
(e) the tendency to an exaggerated, impracticable idealism; 
(d) adolescent altruism; (e) introspectiveness; 
Let us consider first the general psychological principle which 
we shall use in our discussion of these characteristics. 
The underlying fact is that of a maladjustment, the 
consciousness of which is becoming increasingly acute. Beinning 
with this fact, we would account for what happens by recalling 
certain points concerning the general psychology of Desire. Desire 
has its source in some failure of adjustment which shews itself 
first in a condition of restlessness and in a tendency towards 
seemingly 
aimless and incoordinated activity. The individual may 
..00" 
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or may not be aware of the meaning of this restlessness. That 
will depend on the extent of his experience and on the nature 
of the unsatisfied need. In any case, his first step will 
be to represent some sort of object or end from the attainment 
of which satisfaction is anticipated. This object becomes forthwith 
the conscious object of desire. It is more likely than not 
that this object, when attained, will fail to allay the unrest. 
That depends, as has been said, on whether the individual knows 
the real meaning of his dissatisfaction and, (even supposing 
that he knows this) on whether he is in a position to project 
and realize an end adequate to the needs of the case. At any 
rate, the object has become the real, conscious terminus of the 
desire and for this reason alone its attainment will mean a 
certain measure of satisfaction. Let us suppose, however, that 
the object falls far short of representing the real object which 
would satisfy the desire. In this case, the restlessness will continue; 
new objects will be projected, and a kind of activity, which is 
aimless and incoordinated on the whole,will be the result.(1) 
Obviously, we have here an illustration of that double implication 
of the term'motive' which was discussed in an earlier chapter(2) 
There we distinguished between motive in the sense of the 'terminus 
ad quern' and the 'vis- a- tergo' of action. Toioreover, the phrase 
'conscious' object of desire has been used. This suggests the 
use of the phrase'unconscious' desire to indicate the vis -a -tergo 
Side of the process. But the distinction between 'conscious' and 
'unconscious' (a distinction as dangerous as it is convenient) 
is applicable to the desire only in the cage, which is common 
enough, in which the individual fails to realize or makes a 
mistake concerning the kind of object to which the impulse is 
(1) The role of the sex impulse in this connection is of course 
very important. c.f. King, The High School Age. pp.1,00 -102 
(2) see p.81. 
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prompting him In reference to such a case, we may conveniently 
talk of conscious and unconscious desires. This use of the 
term 'unconscious' as least avoids the undesirable suggestion 
that in some mysterious way the impulse exists while the 
individual is not conscious of it. The individual, on the 
contrary, is very intensely conscious of this 'unconscious' 
impulse. Finally, the above statement admits the value and 
importance of the distinction, which Bertrand Russell discusses 
and illustrates, between 'primary' and 'secondary' desires » ) 
But we would make two remarks with regard to Bertrand Russell's 
discussion. (a) It treats of the case where the real object of 
the desire is not present to consciousness because it has 
been 'repressed'. As that writer is careful to point out, this 
does not exactly mean that it has previously been in consciousness 
and has been deliberately rejected. In the illustration he has 
taken, the real object of the desire, owing to its repugnant 
nature, has simply not been contemplated at all. The 'unawareness' 
that we are considering, however, is not due to repression of 
this kind. But the general effect is similar in both cases; 
and that effect is at once to stimulate activity and to render 
it rather incoordinated and aimless when viewed as a whole. 
(b) In so far as primary desire is understood as desire proceeding 
directly from inherited tendencies, from instincts or inherited 
appetites, the distinction between primary and secondary desires 
does not exactly illustrate our whole point of view. For 
according to our view, the persistent baulking of a system of habit 
tendencies could generate the same restlessness and occasion the 
(2) 
same kind of mental process as we have described above. 
(1) Analysis of Mind. pp.73 -74 
(2) As an illustration of the point,cf. quotation on p.114 
(Russell) 
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of unconscious motives in the sense explained. He is at a stage 
of transition, the transition from childhood to maturity. Owing 
to his expanding capacities, childish values have largely 
shed their attractiveness. But the adult world is still 
spiritually remote from him and does not yet receive him on 
an equal footing. The result is a restlessness of spirit, an 
eager groping for satisfaction, and a ceaseless projecting of 
new ends and purposes. Several characteristics find their 
explanation in this general mental condition. 
Consider first the co- called 'ganging' tendency. This means 
the tendency, among certain classes of youth, to the formation of 
(,organized hooligan gangs. The general character of such gangs 
is described by Stanley Hall. We are concerned here only 
with certain special features of them which appear to illustrate 
well some of the general principles of ethical growth discussed 
in the present essay. In the first place, the descriptive 
accounts of these gangs show that they often present many 
of the characteristics of a fairly well- developed social or 
communal. life. As Slaughter says: a'Studies made of boys' gans 
in the great cities show that provision is made for all the 
requirements of a social group, such as a place of meeting 
equipped with congenial literature, a primitive kind of leadership, 
secret call signals and hostile encounters with other groups 
another important fact which gives evidence of the self- sufficiency 
of these organizations, is that they are not amenable to the usual 
penal methods The saving fact about boys' gangs is that they 
are highly amenable to guidance and their energy can 
(1) Youth: Its Education, Regimen and Hygiene,pp.l31 -134. 
A valuable descriptive account(which however is negligible 
as an attempt at psychological explanation) is given in 
Puffer's "The Boye and His Gang." 
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be directed into useful channels. (1) easily This statement summarizes 
certain features which are. important for the psychological 
interpretation of the tendency. Concerning the amenability to 
adult guidance, we shall say more presently. The relative 
complexity and self-sufficiency of these groups, the capacity and 
need for a fuller kind of social life which they imply, are 
to be interpreted in the light of a development which we have 
already considered in connection with the earlier period. 
This is the developing consciousness and appreciation of what 
we described as the group values. Although the first manifestations 
of this development are to be found in childhood, it is only 
towards the close of that period that we find this consciousness well 
developed and beginning to assert itself in spontaneous and 
definite forms of group activity. About the age of twelve years, 
this tendency has begun to express itself in ways that are 
fully characteristic of the general integration which we associated 
with that period. The group consciousness, however, reaches 
its culminating expression in the more compact and highly 
controlled group activities of adolescence. The ganging tendency. 
then, is but symptomatic of the first peak -point of a development 
which, as we shall find, becomes in its later manifestations a 
factor of prime importance in determining the final outcome of 
ethical growth. 
While this is doubtless the explanation of the social 
forms which the activities of the youth are apt to take, it 
still remains to consider the actual nature of these activities. 
(1) The Adolescent pp. 76 -77. Fuffer remarks(opp.eít.p.9) that 
in the classic liten,t?ire of boyhood'ganrying' plays an 
inconspicuous part. Among other stories, he instances "Tom 
Brown. This story, however, ought rather to be considered as 
illustrating the point that where provision is otherwise Cade 
for the social impulses of the period, such a phenomenon as 
'ganging' would not appear. 
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.In the majority of cases, the various forms of free adolescent 
associations, that is, associations not instituted and directed 
by adults, but spontaneously formed by the adolescents themselves, 
are directed to special kinds of activities, This is true both 
of the organized gang and of the more loosely knit and more 
cssual associations. Broadly speaking, these activities are directed 
to the outraging, in more or less flagrant ways, of the restraints 
and standards of the adult environment. This defiance may assume 
trivial or serious forms, ranging from noisy and harmless pranks 
to predatory or destructive attacks on property and even to 
serious forms of personal assault.(1) The general explanation of 
such conduct is, as Tracy puts it," the love of excitement and 
(2) 
need of vigorous action and strong emotion." Underlying this 
need is the fact of rapid intellectual and emotional growth. This 
fact also accounts for a further characteristic of ganging activities: 
they are in large measure dramatizations of interesting situations 
and incidents. The gang plays many parts, (marauding Indians, 
pirates, etc.) which are in the main suggested by the congenial 
literature already referred to. This fondness for dramatization has 
already been mentioned in connection with the infancy period. 
The interesting point with regard to its manifestation now i3 that 
we have the same fundamental need availing itself of the resources 
of social or corporate action to secure a fuller, more adequate 
expression. 
A more significant feature, perhaps, of these activities 
le the fact that they are largely directed against the peace of 
the adult community. The impulses of the gangs composed of younger 
children tend to find adequate outlet in hostile encounters 
with 
(1) c.f. Puffer: The Boy and His Gang , chs.4 & 5. 
(2) Psych. of Adolese. p. 168. C.F. Healy,4T he individual 
Delinquent,ch.26. 
other gangs. But the older adolescents are likely to engage in 
activities of a more directly and more deliberately anti- social 
character. This is only a special and regrettable manifestation of 
an adolescent characteristic already mentioned, viz., the redirection 
of the attention to the adult world with new interest and enquiry. 
The underlying cause of this new mental movement is the general 
maladjustment which the adolescent is trying to overcome. These / 
anti -social activities are thus to be interpreted positively as 
indicating a renewal of interest in the adult world rather 
than negatively as suggesting a mere indifference to adult 
pursuits and values. The best evidence of this is the readiness 
with which these ganging propensities yield to adult direction 
and control. One way in which the renewed interest in the 
adult world manifests itself has been already considered. We 
refer to the actively critical attitude which tends to be adopted 
to accepted moral standards and values. But there is another 
and less negative aspect of this interest. The adolescent 
develo s a new sensitiveness to the opinions of his elders, 
a fact which is not so incompatible with the critical attitude 
e it might at first appear. To the child, the opinions of 
his elders are as a matter of course valuable and important; 
hence the approval and disapproval of his elders enter always 
into his reckonings. With him this is a deeply rooted habit 
of mind the origin of which we tried to explain. The adolescent, 
however, is acutely conscious of two things; of his own 
inexperience, awkwardness or inadequacy and, at the same time, 
of his capacity to enter more fully into the life of the adult 
world, of his need to be taken seriously by it, to be taken 
into its confidence. It is the period at which the craving for 
aÌmDathy is strongest. Hence there may develop an almost morbid 
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sensitiveness to criticism, to petty personal slights, to coldness 
and neglect. Hall and Tracy both comment on the new interest 
inand need for adult companionships(1) 
The next characteristic which we would interpret as 
arising directly out of the general maladjustment is what we 
mey call, for lack of a better word, the 'idealizing impulse' of 
youth. The tendency of the adolescent towards a thorough -going 
and, it may be, recklessly impracticable kind of moral idealism 
is highly interesting from a psychological viewpoint. The tendency 
may assert itself in various ways. It may take, for example, the 
form of an almost morbidly strict and literal interpretation of 
ordinary moral values, such as veracity, or, again, it may express 
itself in the projection and serious contemplation of a 
personal ideal which is depressingly lofty and remote. We have 
described it as the 'idealizing' impulse because, whatever form 
Amy take, it always involves the application, with a rigour 
altogether ideal, of the ordinary moral standards to which his 
previous social training has been gradually habituating him. 
Herein lies its interest for the psychologist. To get the clue 
to the mechanism of this process, we would recall the main point 
of the above statement with regard to the psychology of desire. 
It was there shown that the original condition of restlessness 
or dissatisfaction prompts the individual to project the idea 
ofcertain ends, objects, or activities from the attainment 
ofwhich he anticipates satisfaction. These becomefthereforef 
the conscious objects of desire, and, in so far as they are 
successfully pursued, some measure of satisfaction will result 
in accordance with the general psychological principle that 
stCCessful mental activity as such is satisfying. But the degree 
(1) Youth: p. 209, and Fsych. of ddolesc. p. 65. 
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to which the original impulse is satisfied depends, as we 
pointed out, on the adequacy of this conscious object, considered 
in the light of the real origin or source of the original 
dissatisfaction. In the case of the adolescent, two things are 
important here. In the first place, the restlessness has its 
origin in a maladjustment of a general kind, due to subtle 
processe$ of mental and physical development. In the second 
place, his limited experience has not yet discovered the 
direction in which permanent satisfaction is to be found. This 
discovery, if, indeed, he ever makes it at all, will mark the 
culminating point in his ethical development. 
We would expect, then, a trial- and -error kind of activity, 
taking the form of a spasmodic pursuit of various ill -coordinated 
ends; and to some extent this is what we find. In point of fact, 
however, the adolescent's activitis at this juncture are controlled, 
the directions in which he will look for satisfaction are 
determined, in a manner that merits attention. The determining 
factor here is his existing consciousness of values. We have seen 
that, by the end of the childhood period, certain values have 
been firmly impressed on his mind. To a considerable degree, these 
values;, are still essentially external, that is, they have been 
implicitly accepted, through direct and indirect suggestion, from 
social sources, but only in a partial way have they been 
understood and appreciated. We have seen further that they may 
be Subjected to a somewhat annihilating criticism which might 
conceivably mean the final undermining of his faith in their 
worth. But this faith is preserved by one all- important fact, 
namely, the fact that these values already largely rest on the 
sure foundations of habit. He cannot now escape the controlling 
influence of those habits of acting and of judging which have 
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Deers unreflectively built up during the earlier stages; and the 
effect of these habits has been to generate a strong disposition 
to conduct in accordance with certain moral standards. 
These habit tendencies more than counteract the destructive attack 
ofthe intellect on the moral standards themselves. These standards 
Mother words, however much the intellect is tempted to repudiate 
them as arbitrary or illogical, still retain an attractiveness for 
the will. But this value is not ultimately based on the apprehension 
of their true significance or meaning. In the technical sense 
ofthe phrase, their value is 'suggestive' and the source 
of this suggestive value is habitl) Thus the dissatisfied mind 
ofthe youth, ever alert to project objects which promise 
satisfaction, turns its attention to these standards. But now 
it is not to criticize, it is to idealize them. Life is unsatisfying, 
he feels. What of that? Satisfaction is to be found in the 
whole -hearted, single- minded devotion to certain supreme principles 
of conduct. The value of 'benevolence' may be interpretated to 
moan nothing less than the complete abnegation of self in the 
devotion to the service of others. Altruistic ideals, the 
impracticability of which is compensated for by their intense 
sincerity, are peculiarly associated with this period. The virtue 
of 'self -control' may be glorified into an uncompromising resolve 
"to scorn delights and live laborious days ". Truth -telling may 
be similarly transformed and may reappear as an almost morbid 
insistence on literal exactness of statement, or as a somewhat 
unhealthy propensity to analysis and criticism of his own motives. 
The valuable aspect of this latter process has already been mentioned 
The moral standard is applied to the inner as well as to the 
outer aspect of the act, as it must always be in truly ethical 
(1) c.f. Dreyer : Instinct in Man, p. 244. 
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ehaviour. In adolescence, however, the tendency to look inward 
gay develop to an unhealthy degree. This introspectiveness of 
7outh has been commonly pointed out and the appearance of such a 
tendency seems natural in the light of the many mental 
oonflicts to which the adolescent is subject. But the intro- 
spectiveness also proceeds from the tendency towards 'idealization' 
to which we have referred and which makes for a rigorous 'purism' in 
the application of moral standards. 
One further characteristic must be mentioned the psychology 
ofwhich may be interpretated in a way similar to that suggested 
above. This is the tendency - beyond question peculiarly marked during i 
early and middle adolescence -- to form friendships of a very 
devoted and intimate character. We are not referring, of course, 
to love between the sexes, not to l'amour, but to l'amitié, to the 
close friendships formed between members of the same sex. Compayré, 
in his little book on adolescence,(in the main a resume of salient 
points in Stanley Hall's work) is right in pointing out that 
this is the only characteristic of adolescence which Hall's 
contribution leaves without adequate treatmenf1) Compayre¡ himself] 
however, except for a few rather vague generalities and some 
references to illustrious friendships, makes no attempt to fill 
the lacuna. The psychological interpretation of this tendency, 
which is primarily our present concern, seems clear in the light 
of our preceding discussion. Friendship provides a definite, concrete 
form of expression for the idealizing impulses of youth and in 
this manner an incomplete or faulty adjustment to the social 
environment as a whole is compensated for by the narrower but more 
( ) L'Ailolescenc, ch. 8. Compayré saysL "Une lacune grave qu'on 
est étonne d'avoir a constater dans le livre de l'Adolescence, oh 
l'auteur a pourtant entassé tant de choses, c'est de n'y pas trouver 
un chap,tre spécial sur l'amitié. Quelques lignes h peine 
consacrees a un sentiment dont le développement est assur6ment une 
des charactéristiques les plus frappantes de le jeunesse,c'est 
vraiment trop peu." 
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intimate adjustments of friendships. In this relationship, too, 
the youth may learn to bring his ideals down to the solid earth of 
everyday practice and prove their value and their limitations. 
Such friendships furnish the basis for his first adequate 
appreciation of what we described in an earlier chapter 
as the social value, and out of them may arise the vision of 
larger and more perfect adjustments to his fellow men which point 
him far beyond the social routine to which he is already habituated 
It would seem then, that many of the most commonly remarked 
characteristics of youth are best interpreted in the light 
of these three principles; an original condition of faulty 
adjustment giving rise to a state of dissatisfaction, hence the 
conscious fabrication and projection of ends from which satisfaction 
is anticipated, and the general determination of the character of 
these promising ends by the existing consciousness of value. Some 
general implications of this viewpoint may be noted. In the first 
place it allows for the fact of continuity and interprets this 
continuity in a profoundly significant sense. For it finds the 
main thread of continuity in the habits of action and 
judgment which the earlier training has fostered. It is to these 
habitual tendencies that we ought to look for the really 
effective links that connect childhood with youth and youth 
with adulthood. This continuity is usually taken to refer 
to the unfolding of the instincts and the fundamental inherited 
capacities, and we are told that no period of growth involves 
the sudden appearances of impulses and needs that are really 
new. Now, while it must always be remembered that we are 
dealing with a continuum throughout, nevertheless the notion of 
continuity in this latter sense may be easily overemphasized. 
As far as the manifestation of inherited impulses and capacities 
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goes, there may be conspicuous differences between one period 
and another. Regarded from this standpoint, adolescence, for 
example, seems very remote from childhood. The important bond 
of connection is to be found in the acquired adjustments and 
dispositions ems, in other words, in the habits. Nor can we 
exactly say that this kind of continuity implies an underlying 
continuity in the growth of capacities. Habitual modes of action 
are carried over from the earlier to the later period, but these 
modes of action, in virtue of the new intellectual and emotional 
growth, come now to acquire a richer and deeper significance. 
This brings us to our next point. 
The mere habits of social and corporate action have 
developed a propensity or dynamic which prompts to such action% 
and gives it value. In an earlier chapter, we found it necessary to 
examine at some length the psychological justification of that 
statement. The conclusions arrived at in that chapter have a 
highly significant application here. Under the stimulus of mental / 
development and conflict, these habit propensities tend to develop 
into fully conscious ideals. In this man -er, the earlier, 
unreflecting obedience to rule and precept may blossom into 
devotion to an ideal, and the routine of conduct which, qua routine, 
is proving inadequate to the growing needs of the self, is 
enlarged and revivified. This is the essential sense in which 
ethical growth is a continuous process. Behind this growth of the 
self- conscious ideal there lies a very considerable development of 
impulses and capacities, but the fabric of this ideal itself, in which 
the new powers of the self seek to express themselves, is of the 
stuff of these early values. 
There is one further point of interest in this connection. 
It is not only the moral habits, that is, the habits of acting and 
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judging in social relations, which acquire especial significance 
now. The youth's attention is now turned with a keener scrutiny 
and a warr^er interest to many of the ideas of the earlier period 
which have hitherto failed to sectre his appreciation. Certain 
values, as we have seen, have remained largely external to him. 
Religion is a case in point of a value around which vivid suggestions 
of authority and worth have gathered even though the value itself 
has remained external to his consciousness in the sense that 
it has not yet fulfilled a need of his nature. The process by 
which this and other values come to be fully internalized will 
be considered in the next chapter. In the meantime, it is worth 
remarking that the knowledge interest or value does not as a 
rule loom so large in his consciousness at this stage as it 
ought to, considering the general level of his mental develop- 
ment. The reason is not far to seek. In the case of the 
religious value, for instance, the individual has been subjected 
throughout the entire period of childhood to powerful suggestions of 
a direct and indirect kind with the result that the authority -- 
albeit the essentialrgexternal authority -- of this value has 
impressed itself on his consciousness. With regard to the knowledge 
value, however, such suggestions have been brought to bear to a much 
more limited degree and in a manner less systematic and effective. 
One inevitable result of the child's docile acceptance of social 
judgments is this: the things that his elders take seriously, 
he will take seriously himself; and though he may not yet apprehend 
the seriousness of them, this initial set of his mina is the 
important thing. If there is point to a criticism suggested in 
chapter 3 and referred to again in our next chapter, the youth's 
failure to take the knowledge interest seriously need not 
occasion surprise. Butthis is a matter to which we shall recur. 
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New avenues of valuable experience have been thrown open 
to the mind of the youth and, in its own restless, spasmodic way, 
it has sought to explore them. In the assimilation of new 
experiences and the pursuit of wider ends, the narrower life 
of childhood has been left far behind. But the life is still 
essentially fragmentary, disjointed, unorganized. The evidence 
is all too frequently forthcoming of an underlying fragmentariness 
of aim, of the absence of any lasting synthesis. Our next 
task is to study the process by which the many diverse capacities 
and interests are integrated into the unity of a permanent ideal. 
The outcome of this ethical synthesis is an attitude of the 
will such as we have tried to describe in our introductory 
chapters. Here we approach the study of the final movement in 
ethical development and, when we h:ve completed this study, it 
will remain to consider some of the sources from which 
serious discord may be introduced into the life to the permanent 
marring of its harmony. 
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Chapter 10. 
A study of the process by which the elements of the adolescent life 
are integrated to form the substance of the ethical ideal will be best 
undertaken along two main lines. We shall consider first the develop- 
ment that occurs in the individual's attitude to the human values and 
shall endeavour to show how they come now to acquire a deeper signi- 
ficance and to play a larger role in his life. The manner in which 
-these values are finally internalised and become the basis of firmly 
fixed and satisfying habits, will be studied as the first part of our 
'problem. We shall therefore examine these values in detail and try to 
appreciate in an eyact way just the kind of appeal which. they individ- 
ually make at this stage. This examination of each individual value, 
in order to appreciate the fuller significance which it now acquires, 
is an important part of the study of the integrative process itself. 
second problem, however, iE to study the process of integration 
more directly. Here we shall be directly concerned with the ethical 
question as to the way in which the individual adjusts himself to 
these valuer as a whole. They are not equally significant for him, 
and therefore cannot enter equally into his life. His integration of 
them means that he must discover the best adjustment for him. Our 
second problem, then, is to examine the various influences which may 
operate to determine the character of this integration. 
The Knowledge Value. In the preceding chapter we commented on one 
result of the rapid growth of the representative powers, namely, the 
vastly more adequate apprehension of space and time relations. Con- 
ceptual space and time now become real to the individual, this develop- 
ment throws open new fields of knowledge. Consequently, we find that 
the normal youth is now capable of a far more adequate and absorbing in- 
terest in such branches,of knowledge as treat of the past history of 
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peoples /of civilisations, of the human race and so on. So also with 
spatial conceptions. A science such as Astronomy, which has little to 
offer that the mind of the child can assimilate, may present a fascin- 
ating field to the mind of the youth. Formal education has always been 
primarily directed to the furtherance of the knowledge value. The pity 
of it is that, in the vast majority of cases, formal education is 
dropped just on the threshold of that stage of mental development when 
knowledge is only beginning to reveal its real treasures to the mind. At 
the same time, there are other reasons than this, as we shall see, why 
the knowledge value frequently fails to find the appreciation it de- 
serves. In any case, these large excursions into the world of knowledge 
not only lay the foundations of a permanently valuable interest but have 
a further effect of a more directly ethical kind. They tend to deepen 
the consciousness of the worth and the dignity of human life as a whole. 
Perhaps the most important consideration, however, is that this 
is the stage at which normally appears the knowledge interest in the 
deeper sense of a conscious, permanent urge towards the pursuit of 
knowledge. In an earlier chapter "(1)we pointed out the complexity of 
the motivating factors underlying the knowledge interest in its fully 
developed form. We considered there an example of the highly special- 
ised kind of curiosity which gives rise to the systematic and absorbing 
pursuit of knowledge in scientific enquiry. Now it is frequently pointed 
out that adolescence is the period during which deep- seated inherited 
traits and aptitudes definitely reveal themselves. With regard to the 
pursuit of knowledge, peculiarities of native endowment may assert 
themselves now in a tendency towards what is at once a narrowing and an 
intensifying or deepening of the knowledge interest. In so far as this 
narrowing of the range of the individual's interest in knowledge is 
simply the result or expression of specialised capacities, it is 
"(1) see pp. 104 -107. 
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entirely in the direction of true development. From the standpoint 
of the ultimate ethical resulte, it is not that this or that branch 
of knowledge is in iteelf valuable; the only ultimately valuable 
result is the development and free exercise of human capacities. 
Knowledge is intrinsically valuable when it contributes to this build- 
ing ùp of "neur.ographiee ", l ) if we may borrow the phrase of Garnett. 
Tt will cicperd altogether on the peculiarities of the individual's 
native endowment -whether this building up process is to involve 
concentration or restriction of interest, which might superficially 
be mistaken to mean narrowness, while in reality it makes for depth. 
Mitchell's statement would apply to specialisation of this kind: 
"A life devoted to one pursuit may not only feel a deeper interest, 
but find a greater variety of interest within its pale, than many a 
life that looks many -sided It is only depth that commands variety 
in the long run. "(2) 
Such concentration, of course, is most apparent in cases of highly 
specialised native endowment. But in principle the above remarks are 
equally relevant to so- called average cases; and the point of our whole 
argument is that knowledge represents one highly important avenue of 
expression moi for the individual': human capacities. The discovery of 
the true place which this value ought to occupy in his life is a duty 
which concerns not only the individual himself, but also the society 
responsible for his education. The exact measure in which society 
incurs responsibility for the individual's failure in this regard. can 
only be determined, of course, by a full consideration of each 
particular case on its merits. 
(1) see p. Education & World Citizenship: ch. 13 et al. 
(2) Structure and Growth of the Lind. p. 406. 
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The Art Value. The mental development in adolescence involves, 
as we have seen, the possibility of a great expansion in the range of 
artistic feelings. There are several manifestations of this growth 
of artistic sensibilities. One important change that is clearly marked 
is a change in the attitude to Nature. The attitude which now makes 
its appearance for the first time is characteristically the attitude 
of the artist. Slaughter neatly expresses it as "a change from the 
projection of images to the projection of moods ".(1) Tracy summarises 
the special facts of development which affect the appreciation of 
art: "So by the medium of the ear, as by that of the eye, the world of 
nature and art makes a more powerful appeal, and elicits a more 
complete and comprehensive response. Finer distinctions are made in 
tone, accent and inflection; and there is a much better appreciation of 
totals and aggregates, in which the relations of a number of sounds to 
one another, either simultaneous or successive, constitute the chief 
feature.(2) Finally, Stanley Hall describes an important aspect of 
this development as follows: "Adolescence is the golden age of this 
kind of dreamery and reverie which supplements reality and totalizes our 
faculties, and often gives a special charm to dramatic activities and 
in morbid cases to simulation and dissimulation. It is a state from 
which some of the bad, but far more of the good qualities of life and 
mind arise. "(3) The real sight á..e of this artistic development from 
our point of `view will become clear if we examine more carefully the 
process at which Stanley Hall hints in this passage. We have to de- 
scribe, in effect, the fundamental change of attitude which occurs with 
respect to this value. The period of early childhood:, as we saw, is 
t 
characterised by a failure to differentiate clearly between the ideal 
and the real worlds. The demarcation of the one sphere from the other 
(1) The adolescent; p. 31. 
(2) Psych. of Adolesc. p. 87. 
(3) Youth; Its Education, Regimen and. Hygiene, p. 128. 
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which precedes their effective synthesis, can hardly be said to take 
place at that stage. Hence the absorption of the child in the world of 
imagination tends to be absolute while it lasts. The attitude of the 
young child to the imaginative creations of art presents what looks 
like a clear case of the principle of dissociation;(1) and from this 
point of view we might say that in the young child's enjoyment of 
these creations, his dissociation from the real world, though temporary, 
is practically complete. In his case, artistic illusion would perhaps 
be more accurately described as delusion. These two worlds are at 
length distinguished and, as was pointed out, more or less integrated 
in later childhood. The synthesis, however, is narrow and reflects 
the limited range of the child's emotional life. 
With the onset of adolescence, the attitude again undergoes change. 
In our discussion of the psychological meaning or origin of certain 
adolescent traits, it was suggested that the world of imaginative 
creation would naturally present itself as one way of escape from the 
strain of internal conflict. In so far as the adolescent begins to 
find the world of reality difficult or inadequately responsive to his 
needs, he tends to be thrown back on his own inner resources and to 
seek compensation and satisfaction in a world of creative fancy which 
he fashions to meet the larger needs of his mental life. His developing 
representative powers enable him to construct his ideal world on a more 
generous scale and to identify his mind more completely with its:satis- 
fying situations. This tendency towards a condition of relatively com- 
plete mental dissociation is sometimes described as a reversal to an 
infantile level of mind; and, indeed, the general resemblances between 
the present period and the period of early childhood need not be denied. 
But it is easy to overlook a furidamental psychological difference 
between the two cases. In infancy the complete absorption in the ideal 
(1) But see p. 252. 
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world rests on a failure to discriminate between the two worlds, and 
hence to describe the young child's attitude as a case of 'dissociation' 
seems to imply a loose, inexact use of the term. Moreoevcr, with the 
normal child, the attitude is only occesional, for the real world is 
still new and engrossingly interesting. Hence in the case of the normal 
child, this 'dissociation' occurs as a perfectly natural and healthy 
experience. With the young adolescent, however, the underlying 
psychological fact is of a different order and may well be fraught 
with more serious consequences. For the two worlds must now be 
dissociated by a definite mental act or process carried out in a more 
or less conscious and deliberate way. In other words, we have here an 
act of dissociation in the technical sense. The motive is essentially 
the same as that which actuates the child. It ie a motive that lies at 
the root of all artistic enjoyment at all stages of growth,viz.,the 
impulse or need to supplement reality with a synthesis of experience 
which is richer in emotional value and more satisfying. Even. at the 
maturest levels of artistic enjoyment, dissociation seems to be the 
basic phenomenon. Rut the degree of this dissociation and the manner in 
which it is brought about make a vast difference to the way in which 
this attitude affects the personality as a whole, a vast difference, in 
other words, to its ethical value. As has been pointed out, an import- 
ant phase of adolescent development is an impatience with the world of 
hard facts and a more or less acute consciousness of maladjustment to it. 
This may well lead to a mental withdrawal from reality in favour of the 
more facile satisfactions of his ideal world. Professor Valentine would 
seem to be right when he interprets t 'repression' which 
causes dissociation, as a fixed mental habit of diverting the attention 
from unpleasant facts or experiences.(1) It is possible then, that the 
(l) Dreams and thb Unconsclous,pp.32 --33. 
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youth may developQan insidious mental habit of this kind. 
'.mile this possibility must be recognised, it would seem a 
serious mistake to make too much of it. Notwithstanding the formidable 
evidence adduced by the psycho -pathologists, it must be urged that 
in the vast majority of cases, nothing of this kind has been proved 
to take place to a serious extent. On the contrary, the facts of 
mental development at this stage on the Aaole militate against an 
unhealthy excess in the direction of these inner satisfactions. That 
development is many -sided and, moreover, as we shall presently see, 
the real environment offers many new interests and attractions which 
compel the youth's attention. That happens, then, in normal develop- 
ment is that during adolescence, the art value becomes increasingly 
integrated with the other values or interests of life. This means 
a further change -- a subtle and profoundly significant change - in 
his attitude to art. Artistic enjoyment still implies an act of 
dissociation; but this now means the deliberate, self- conscious 
detachment or withdrawa3r of which the real 'motif' is a return to 
the world of actualities, to the serious business of life, with a 
mind reinvigorated and charged with a deeper sense of the worth and 
the dignity of life. Art really becomes what Matthew Arnold called 
it, "a criticism of life ", but not now in the sense that it throws 
into relief only the drabness and the inadequacy of that life. 
Rather does it invite the mind to dwell on life's limitless possibilities, 
its mystery and its greatness. The synthesis of art has become a 
permanent need with its own role in the general economy of life. In 
other words, it is become integral to the complete expression of 
ethical self -hood. 
Religion. All authorities are in agreement as to the large 
role that religion plays in the life of the adolescent. Pratt has 
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well pointed out, however, that much of the mental distress and 
conflict of a religious character which commonly appears at this 
stage is not really a necessary, inevitable incident of mental 
(1) 
development. The conflict is largely traceable to the disturbing / 
influence of certain specific theological ideas which were inculcated, 
without being adequately understood, during the previous stage. The 
following statement of Ames sums up the essential facts of the situ- 
ation with regard to the religious development during adolescence: 
"Statistical enquiries, which are likely to be extended in a much 
more comprehensive way by future observations are already sufficient 
to show in broad outlines that for the individual religion originates 
in youth. There are foregleams of it in late childhood and marked 
developments of it in mature years, but the period of original, 
spontaneous and vital awakening is the teens. This religious 
experience, however, is not an inevitable and uniform occurrence in 
all individuals. It is conditioned by training, environment, physical 
(2) 
development and social influences." Our task here is simply to 
point out the principal facts of general adolescent development to 
which we would trace the growing interest in religion. Reference 
must again be made to the growth of the representative powersand 
especially to the more adequate ideas of space and time which are 
bound up with that growth. To begin with, the youth is now for the 
first time in a position to cope with the purely intellectual or 
cognitive side of religion. Many ideas, closely associated with the 
religious life, (ideas such as teternalX ,'omnipotentt,somniscientt, 
' infinites, and so on) can now meet with some measure of apprehension. 
Rousseau had doubtless this fact in mind when he denied the possi- 
bility of real religious experience or education prior to the age of 
eighteen. If the specific object of the religious consciousness was 
(1) The Religious Consciousness, p.113. 
(2) The Psychology of Religious Experience, p.214. 
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truly described in our earlier chapter, one would naturally infer 
that religious experience is a phenomenon of comparatively late 
appearance in mental development. 
Closely bound up with the growth of the reaigious interest is 
the development of the larger social interests, including the sex 
interest. The social aspect of religion will be considered more 
fully later. For our purpose, the important problem is to appreciate 
the way in which religion comes to fulfill a real need in the life 
of the adolescent. Apart altogether from the facts of mental develop- 
ment which render religious ideas intelligible, there is the question 
as to the function which such ideas perform in the scheme of life, 
the question as to how they come to acquire permanent ethical 
significance. This question would be answered in a general way by 
saying that the individual comes to adopt an attitude of mind which 
is in its essence religious. He looks to the ideal order of religion 1, 
for the permanent justification or ground of his developing ideals. 
As we have seen, his values are habit -rooted, either directly in 
the sense that he has tested or proved them in his experiences or 
indirectly in the sense that they have taken deep root in his mind 
because of an essentially habitual mental subjection to his social 
environment. The diverse, isolated interests of life are becoming 
increasingly integrated, and this is tantamount to saying that there 
is a deepening conviction of the value of life as a whole. Never- 
theless, as was pointed out in our discussion of the fundamental 
significance of the religious value, he fails to find in experience 
itself any definite ground on which this growing conviction can 
consciously rest or support itself. On the contrary, he continues to 
find in experience much that would make to undermine this conviction 
of ultimate value. The conception of the ideal religious order 
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supplies him with the conscious rationale for which he is seeking 
and thus furnishes further and highly effective sanctions. Hence 
at this stage religion may function as a great organising, unifying 
agency; and in this way the forms, ritual, usages, phrases, around 
which had developed a vivid sense of authority, acquire a deeper 
significance and offer a definite concrete outlet and socialised 
form of expression for many hew-born impulses and needs. In so 
far as religion performs this function, we may say that the authority 
of the religious value is internalised, 
An interesting reflection of the intellectual expansion in 
adolescence is the appearance of a genuine interest in the larger 
problems and syntheses of philosophy. The intellect of the 
adolescent is impelled by the need for completeness and finality, 
and the vast unifications of philosophy evoke a ready, if somewhat 
uncritical response from his mind. He may even rush into system - 
making himself, undeterred by an intellectual humility which is 
proper to a later age. He is likely to be as unconscious or as 
impatient of intellectual obstacles here as he is of the practical 
obstacles which lie in the way of his moral ideals. As Slaughter 
says: "Many adolescents rush into it very early if their struggles 
with scepticism have been very severe - -a life -boat seems to be 
coming which will pick them out of the sea and the assurance with 
which the professor of philosophy navigates his craft gives them 
(1) 
boundless hope ". 
The social Values. The 'social' values are understood here 
in the narrower sense explained in chapter 2. The reference is to 
these values which underlie the development of a more perfect adjust- 
ment of individuals as such to one another. It was found convenient 
to draw a distinction between social values in this sense and 'group! 
(1) The Adolescent, p.56. 
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values, which more specifically concern the prosecution of corporate 
activities. Moreover, the values of veracity, justice and benevolence 
were found to be basic to the social values in the sense that all 
other values that regulate social relationships could be considered 
as special manifestations of these. The social values need not 
detain us here as we have already indicated the advance that is made 
at this stage in the direction of their fuller appreciation. 
Adolescent friendships represent at once the manifestation of a need 
for a fuller adaptation to one's fellows and at the same time the 
most effective school in which these basic values are learned and 
appreciated. The additional point may be mentioned here that the 
larger resources in literature which mental development has made 
accessible, serve further to enrich and expand the consciousness 
of their significance'and worth. 
The Group Values. The important development in this 
direction will be fully explained in the next section when we come 
to treat of the ethical influence exerted by special kinds of 
associations. The psychological facts underlying the expansion of 
the group life at this stage have been already discussed. 
Material or Economic Values. 7e return here to a value 
which was discussed in connection with our analysis of the ethical 
eñnscieusness but which has not since engaged our attention. 7e 
Would refer the reader here to our, the discussion of this value in 
chapter 3. It is important that the precise meaning which was there 
attached to the notion of the material value should be recalled. 
For the final outcome of ethical growth is intimately affected, in 
fact it is in large measure determined, in a society such as our own, 
by the kind of permanent attitude which the individual adopts to the 
satisfactions associated with the pursuit of this interest. The 
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material value was not considered in connection with the period of 
childhood for two reasons, one of which at least is obvious enough. 
For the average child the question of the pursuit of this value 
does not arise inasmuch as the measure of his material satisfaction 
is determined for him, not by him. Normally, this measure is 
adequate to his needs and he is left free to pursue his own childish 
ends. Hence follows our second reason for disregarding this value 
in our discussion of childhood. Certain influences which operate 
in the case of the youth and the adult to render the final outcome 
of ethical growth abortive are normally not brought to bear upon 
childhood. Such influences, as we shall presently see, are those 
that go to produce the 'materialist' or the 'hedonist', if we may use 
the terms loosely for the present. An unwise training, of course, 
or an unhappy combination of circumstances may give even the mind 
of the child an irremediable bent in the direction of distorting his 
sense of relative values. 
At the stage of youth this value may begin to assume a 
paramount importance. There are two aspects to the pursuit of it, 
and it will conduce to clearness if we separate them. In the first 
place, we have the necessity imposed upon the individual to "earn 
a livelihood" in the strict and narrow sense of the phrase. If he 
works not, neither shall he eat, is the inexorable fact he is called 
upon to face. In other words, there is the minimum demand that the 
individual pull his own economic weight. But in addition to the 
mere question of earning a livelihood, there is the further question 
of securing a share in what we may call the luxuries of life, meaning 
by that phrase in the present connection the numerous personal 
comforts, amenities and pleasures which material or economic develop - 
ment has made possible. Not only a livelihood but a 'good' livelihood 
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is the way in which the economic value may present itself to him; 
and the growth of a healthy ethical self -hood is closely affected by 
the way in which he responds to the demands and opportunities of the 
economic life. 
let us consider first the question of earning a livelihood. 
Under existing conditions, it may well happen that this demand can 
only be met at the cost of the sacrifice, at least to a large degree, 
of higher ethical possibilities. Equally true it is, too, that 
under the insidious influence of a materialistically -minded social 
environment, the mental outlook may be distorted and material satis- 
factions may come to acquire an importance altogether out of 
proportion to their intrinsic worth. The conditions under which 
this is likely to happen are discussed below. Here we would consider 
the more valuable consequences for ethical growth of this necessity 
which is now imposed upon the individual, the necessity of earning 
a livelihood. It is at this point that the individual encounters 
the fact of obligation itself in its most direct and inexorable form. 
At first sight one would be inclined to conclude that we are dealing 
here with the fact of mere necessity or compulsion, with a kind of 
obligation which is altogether external and which therefore can in 
no sense be regarded as a form of moral obligation. This, however, 
would be a mistake. In a society like our own, the obligation to 
take part in the economic life of society is not simply identical 
with the necessity imposed upon Robinson Orusoe to rear goats. 
In the last resort, it doubtless amounts to this kind of necessity. 
But the important thing is the manner in which this obligation is 
realised in the actual consciousness of the individual. In point of 
faot,,law far as the individual consciousness is concerned, this form 
of obligation is normally realised and accepted in precisely the way 
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in which other admittedly 'moral' obligations are realised and 
accepted. 7e have seen that the entire education of the individual 
has bade for his acceptance of social values. One aspect of this 
fact is that the prosecution of the economic activities of society 
is accepted by him as a valuable end. His acceptance of this value 
is intimately bound up with his acceptance of other values. This 
explains how the obligation here comes in actual fact to be felt 
as a moral obligation. Conformity to this demand is not really 
due to the realisation of the terrible alternative, starvation, 
although that is probably how the individual himself would explain 
or 'rationalise' his conformity. It proceeds from the fact that 
this conformity has come to be, often very vaguely it is true, 
associated in his consciousness with the continued existence of any 
or all of the values of social life. Hence there is a real sense 
in which the obligation to 'work' is self -imposed. '::Then the indi- 
vidual appears not to accept this obligation, his protest is really 
directed against the special conditions under which he is compelled 
to fulfill the obligation. 
'2ork, however. acquires its full and explicit ethical 
significance only when the vague consciousness of value and obli- 
gation is clarified into a definite sense of the larger social 
issues involved. The lustre of these larger, ultra- individual ends 
is reflected back to illumine the common -place activities of liveli- 
hood and to transform them into explicitly ethical activities. This 
might be expressed by saying that the economic activities of the 
individual are integrated with other ends which possess unconditional 
value for him. In simpler forms of society than ours, this integration 
is easier. The mutual dependence of individuals, the corporate or 
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group aspects of work, in short, the organic inter- relatedness of 
the community elements, are manifest at the simpler levels of 
community life in a way that they cannot well be in the case of our 
own intricate economic organisation. A grave problem, indeed, of 
our own day arises out of the high degree to which our economic 
activities are specialised. This is the problem of avoiding, or, 
failing this, of compensating somehow for the depression of the 
sense of personal worth, of personal dignity and responsibility, 
which the vaster economic organisation inevitably tends to produce. 
It is when the individual loses sight altogether of these larger 
ends that the obligations of the economic life tend to assume the 
form of mere external compulsion, and the activities of that life, 
sinking to the level of mere means, are stripped of direct ethical 
significance. 
Mother the ends be conceived in a broad or a narrow way, 
it remains true that economic activities involve some measure of 
direct training in the inhibition and control of impulse, in the 
postponement of present gratification in favour of the remoter 
satisfactions. As we have seen, this is the fundamental ethical 
fact, the basic virtue of which all the particular virtues are special 
manifestations, when we regard the ethical life from the inside, as 
the process of character -formation, rather than from the outside as 
the pursuit of objective ends. From this point of view, the economic 
life is itself a school of the sterling virtues. In this connection 
we would recall again the fact of the essential continuity of ethical 
training. 7e have found an example of this continuity above in the 
fact that the individual's consciousness is already prepared to 
accept the fact of economic obligation. Another aspect of this 
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continuity presents itself here. The need for the inhibition and 
regulation of present impulse in the light of remoter ends is most 
Erectly brought home to the individual in connection with the 
necessity of earning his livelihood. But if ethical training has 
on true i nes, 
proceeded this demand for self - control is not now encountered for 
the first time. If it were, to expect the individual adequately to 
meet the demand would be to ignore the fact that such control is 
itself the outcome of a long process of habituation. The individual's 
earlier training, and especially that part of his training for which 
the school is directly responsible, ought to have already habituated 
him to a control which is now demanded in a larger degree. Insistence 
on this fact is desirable even in the face of possible misunder- 
standing. There is a noticeable tendency in pedagogical literature, 
and to some extent in pedagogical practice, to misconstrue the real 
meaning of liberty and to interpret superficially the psychology 
of interest. Dewey and others have well shown that the true inter- 
pretation of these terms is incompatible with the practice of /soft 
Pedagogics ". 
In the foregoing paragraphs we have been occupied with the 
higher ethical possibilities of the fact that the individual must ---- 
take his part in the economic life of society. But the realisation 
of these higher possibilities presupposes a true attitude of the 
individual's will to what we called the material value. The general 
nature of these satisfactions which we summed up under the head of 
(1) 
economic or material value' has already been indicated. ,;fie 
considered, moreover, the sense in which this value might be 
regarded as 'instrumental' without contradicting the notion of 'value' 
itself. At the present stage in the individual's development, a 
(1) 7)11? 10 --41. 
Ñ72 
consideration of prime importance is the settled attitude of the 
individual's will to this value, his final estimate of its relative 
worth. That influences contribute to give rise to a faulty estimate 
of its worth and hence to a false integration of the values as a 
whole? As far as the ethical life is concerned, the term 'materia- 
lism' raises no special philosophic difficulties but, on the 
contrary, admits of a very definite interpretation. Materialism 
would mean the magnification of the intrinsic worth of the kind of 
satisfactions at present Zander consideration. In practice it means 
the undue preoccupation with the pursuit of what are essential 
appetitive pleasures, the appetites themselves being either inherited 
(1) 
or acquired. The life which is ordered on this plan is a practical 
illustration of hedonism,- In one very definite sense of that term. 
Mat are the influences which go to produce an integration of this 
character, in which the consciousness of the other values tends to 
disappear before the engrossing pursuit of material satisfactions? 
The unethical character of the integration is due essentially to the 
fact, pointed out in an earlier chapter, that this value, while not 
in the strictest sense instrumental, is nevertheless subsidiary in 
the sense that it is a precondition of those activities which 
humanity has pronounced to be good rather than an integral part of 
them. Even admitting, as we did in that chapter, that there is a 
sense in which such satisfactions may be pronounced good simpliciter, 
nevertheless the preponderating interest in this kind of good 
indicates an organisation of values which is essentially unethical. 
Now this result is probably to be traced partly to the influence 
of two specific factors, which begin to operate during adolescence 
and may permanently undermine the ethical sense, and partly to a 
more general kind of influence which has been exerted throughout the 
c.f .15rever, 
(1) Instinct in Man, pp.254 -256. 
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entire course of the individual's development. 
In the first place, this kind of materialism or hedonism, 
(whichever term be preferred) may be the result of a kind of 
emotional and intellectual exhaustion. The strain of mental adjust- 
ment incidental to the adolescent stage may involve a reaction which 
takes the form of a virtual surrender of interest,?n the higher 
values and the more or less deliberate acceptance of the attractively 
simple plan of life which this kind of materialism seems to offer. 
It is true that the moral and intellectual scepticism of youth is, 
as a rule, only provisional and temporary when it is not merely a pose. 
Not infrequently, however, this negative reaction is more serious and 
more permanent, involving the gradual loosening and weakening of the 
moral fibres. It is here that some special integrating influence, 
such as religion, finds its greatest justification and value. 
The second specific influence which we would mention is 
incidental to untoward economic conditions. The extent to which 
this influence is responsible for the undoubted prevalence of a 
materialistic attitude is perhaps not sufficiently appreciated. 7e 
refer to the fact that, owing to cruel economic donditions, there 
are too many who find even a moderate and legitimate share of material 
satisfactions difficult to procure. One of the sources of the spirit 
of materialism is beyond question to be sought in the bitter and 
long- continued fight on the part of the workers for a more equitable 
distribution of economic goods. The original motive of such a demand 
may have been of the worthiest kind, a desire to secure the means of 
a fuller, more adequately human life. But the means which has proved 
so hard to secure, this more generous share of economic goods the 
claim to which has in practice at least been stubbornly disputed, 
has doubtless acquired a disproportionate value in the eyes of the 
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combatants. In any case, the entire atmosphere of our industrial 
disputes, charged as it is with the snirit of materialism, makes to 
distort the ethical outlook of our age. 
And this brings us to the third factor which we described as 
operating in a larger, more general way to undermine the judgment of 
470.ue. An essential contention of the present essay has been that 
ethical development is incomplete then it has not resulted in the 
appreciation of essential human values such as knowledge and art. 
This means in effect that the consciousness of duty or obligation 
would grow up around these values in the same sense in which it 
developos in connection with the values of the social and group life. 
Translated into practical terms, this simply means that the individual 
ought to feel it a duty to interest himself it these values to the 
degree that his special circumstances permit. On the other hand, 
nothing is more patent in our own day than that the practical 
attitude of the individual or, we might say, of society as a whole, 
to the opportunities for self -development and self- culture which 
such interests offer, falls far short of meeting the demands of a 
true ethical ideal. Not the least serious of our social problems 
is to secure that, with the general extension of the leisure part 
of life (that is, technically, leisure from direct economic activities), 
there should be provided the means of worthily using that leisure. 
When Spencer dismissed the so- called cultural subjects of study with 
the remark that "as they occupy the leisure of life, so they should 
(X) 
occupy the leisureAof education," the specious logic of the 
statement concealed a far -reaching fallacy. Materialism, in the 
ethical sense, would mean either of two things with regard to the 
individual's conduct of his life. Either too much of his time is 
(Z) Education: p.63. 
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occupied with actual economic activities, in which case the leisure 
of life is sacrificed to the pursuit of ends ,, ?hich are merely 
subsidiary; or a leisure which is itself adequate, is frittered 
away in the pursuit of 'pleasure', in other words, in the preoccupation 
with the material value'in our sense of that phrase. 7e have this 
second alternative mainly in view when we characterise our age as 
an'age of materialism. 
Here, then, we would find the general explanation of the fact 
that an ethically false integration is too frequently the outcome 
of the process of development traced in this essay. If the point 
of view which we have consistently maintained be sound, it would 
follow that the subjection of the individual, from the very beginning 
of education, to a powerful indirect suggestion can only have one 
result. In truth he is largely subjected to such an indirect 
suggestion, namely, the suggestion as to the paramount importance 
of the material value. The suggestion is indirect, for the express 
teaching of society may well be otherwise. But the important thing 
is the kind of interests or ends with which society in actual 
practice is seen to be most strenuously concerned. There is thus 
nothing surprising in the fact that an age (might we say a civilisatioe 
which at least acts as if the material value were supreme should too 
often find that the product of its ethical training is an individual 
who can hardly even apprehend what is meant by a reprehensible use 
of leisure which need not involve any breach of definite moral 
Standards. Nor is it difficult to see that this attitude, were it to 
become sufficiently widespread and permanent, might fatally under- 
mine the vitality of our civilisation by converting that civilisation 
into an elaborate mechanism for the satisfaction of lower needs. 
There are influences, however, of a special nature which may 
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largely contribute to obviate this result and to lead to a truer 
integration. The existence within society of subsidiary social 
groupings which identify themselves with the prosecution of one or 
more of the larger ends of social life may have important consequences 
for ethical development. 7e may attempt to indicate here how, 
fundamentally, these associations exert their ethical influences 
These subsidiary social grou.pings,with which the individual may come 
to be more or less inteimately identified) are usually referred to as 
the voluntary associations. The principal voluntary associations 
Which are of special interest to the student of ethical development 
nay be classified as 1. Economic; 2. Cultural; 3. Religious; 4. 
philanthropic or Humanitarian. Wundt, in his discussion of 
'olun_tary associations, uses the term 'cultural' to indicate all 
(1) 
orms other than the economic. The viewpoint of the present 
assay would demand that 'cultural' association should more narrowly 
,pply to an association the raison d'ftre of wllich is the interest 
n knowledge as such. 7undt, moreover discusses these associations 
Inly from a broadly social or sociological point of view and. seeks 
(2) 
o indicate their true place and value in the life of the state. 
e does not consider the question in which we are mainly interested, 
iz., the specific ways in which participation in such associations 
ffect the development of the individual. 
All the voluntary associations, irrespective of the varying 
haracter of their ends, contribute alike to one general result. 
his may be described as, first, the further development and discipline 
f the group spirit and., second, the integration of the group values 
1) Ethics: The Principles of Morality, p.248. 
2) A thorough investigation of this aspect of the voluntary associations 
will be found in "The New Statesman "; Sept.25,1915; Oct. 2, 1915; 
April 21, 1917, April 28, 1917. 
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ilith one or more of the other values. Ends which have hitherto 
presented themselves merely as private concerns or at the most as 
things in Which society as a whole was vaguely felt to be interested, 
now definitely reveal themselves as the avowed objects of corporate 
striving. Thus, by a process of indirect suggestion such as has been 
mentioned above, the value of these ends for the individual is 
greatly enhanced. The voluntary associations, therefore, are an 
important means of securing the final internalisation of the authority 
attaching to these values. 
But they another important function. Not only do they 
furnish the individual with definite, concrete opportunities of 
self -expression, but they may function to assist him in the discovery 
of his own individuality. We have seen that the nature of the final 
ethical synthesis must vary according to the peculiar aptitudes and 
capacities of the individual himself. The process of education as 
awhole, of course, ought to be directed to the bringing out of 
individual peculiarities of endowment which are of fundamental s ignifi- 
cance; but this result is often most effectively achieved by active 
membership in the voluntary associations. Other results of a more 
specific character may be mentioned in connection with the discussion 
of the special types of association. 
Economic Associations. Under this category we would 
include all types of voluntary association which have for their 
primary object the furtherance of the economic interests of their 
members. All forms of trade associations, such as trades unions, 
guilds, etc., professional associations of doctors, lawyers, teachers, 
property -owners, employers, etc. would be included under this head. 
It might be misleading, indeed, to classify these simply as 
economic associations; for associations of this kind may have 
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objects over and above the merely economic object. Thus a professional 
association has for one of its objects the furtherance of professional 
]rnowledge and technique. The-term 'occupational' association used 
bylundt and others, would therefore be more satisfactory purely from 
the point of view of classification. But we are classifying here 
entirely on the basis of the primary object or purpose of each 
association, and we are thus interested in the above associations 
only in so far as the object is economic. It is characteristic, 
indeed, of all the voluntary associations, economic, cultural, 
religious, philanthropic, that they tend to concern themselves with 
objects or, what is the same thing, with aspects of the individual's 
life, other than that which is the raison d'4.tre of the association. 
This very characteristic, as will be presently shown, may be fraught' 
according to circumstances, with beneficial or detrimental 
consequences for ethical growth. 
In the light of our discussion of the economic value in the 
preceding pages, we need not devote any further attention to the 
economic associations here. Having recognised their value in the 
quickening of the group consciousness, in the training and 
habituation in group activities and in group modes of deliberation, 
it need only be pointed out that their further ethical value depends 
essentially on the degree to which the activities of such associations 
come to be widened so as to include objects of higher intrinsic value. 
In so far as the object remains purely and frankly economic howeve 
legitimate that object may be in the light of special conditions 
obtaining in society, the fact remains that the object represents 
what has been called a 'competitive' good. In so far as this 
competitive aspect of the economic good is present to consciousness, 
the ethical value which we have found to reside in the corporate 
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character of the associational activitiesps discounted by the implied 
antagonism, or, at least, the negative attitude to the rest of society. 
Under such circumstances, the dominant motive is furnished by the 
acquisitive tendency which we found to be in its essence anti-social. 
The full ethical value of corporate activities is realised only in 
those associations which have for their object the promotion of non- 
competitive or social ends such as knowledge, art and religion. 
Cultural Associations. Under this head would be classified 
all forms of association which aim primarily at the development in 
their members of a fuller acquaintance with and appreciation of the 
world of knowledge and art. In practice, the object may be of a 
general or of a more specific character. Reading clubs, literary 
societies, historical, philosophic, scientific associations, societies 
for the study of Einstein or of Shakespeare, would all be inc] ded 
in this category. 7e have remarked that'in the case of the professional 
associations, t4at the cultural aim may be combined with the economic. 
But even in these cases, it is not uncommon to find the two aims kept 
apart by the growth of independent associations. 
The cultural associations represent, pear excellence, the 
humanising associations. Whether the interest centres on a present - 
day scientific theory, or a present -day movement in art, or on some 
branch of knowledge that leads the individual to probe into some 
corner of the past of mankind, some glimpses are forthcoming of those 
permanent, universal ends or interests from which in the last resort 
life derives its dignity and its worth. The cultural interest is 
humanisinP/ because it is 'pure', ---it represents the disinterested 
interest in humanity and, moreover, this humanity is approached through 
the study of its finest products. There is possibly a certain truth 
in Huxley's pessimistic remark: "I know of no study which is so 
saddening as that of the evolution of humanity as it is set forth in 
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the annals of history. Man is a brute, only more intelligent than 
other brutes;" and perhaps some excuse for his readiness to 
(1) 
"welcome a kindly comet to sweep the whole affair away ". Probably, 
however, an 'uncertain half -truth' would better describe such an 
interpretation of the annals of his. tort'. It is from these same 
annals, which preserve the record of man's multifarious strivings and 
reflect his more or less dimly conceived ideals, that the individual 
may rise with an invigorated sense of the essential, inalienable 
dignity of human life. 
The question of these larger ends brings us to the consideration 
of the religious associations. 7e have already explained the sense in 
which it might truly be said that religion makes these immaterial ends 
its special province. The essential function of religious associations 
is twofold. They perform the distinctive function of fostering a vivid 
consciousness of an ideal order in which, as we saw, religion finds 
the ultimate justification of the pursuit of immaterial ends. In this 
way, as MacCunn puts it, they "bring their members to live for distant 
(2) 
and unseen ends ". Here too, as in the case of the other voluntary 
associations, belief is strengthened in so far as it is shared, and 
the value of the end is enhanced by the mere consciousness of a 
common or corporate interest in it. 3 further function, too, the 
religious association is peculiarly fitted to perform. The real 
ethical danger incidental to the wide cultural interest which we 
have described in the previous paragraph is not really the danger of 
a relapse into pessimism concerning humanity as a whole. The real 
danger lies in the tendency towards a depression of the consciousness 
of individuality, a depression of the sense of personal significance 
and pence of personal responsibility before the immensity of the 
world which knowledge reveals. The religious life, and especially the 
(1) Quoted by Bury; The Idea of Progress, pp.344 -345. 
(2) The Making of Character, p.130. 
281 
associational form of it, may furnish a valuable counteractive to 
this ennervating influence. The object of the religious consciousness, 
we found, is conceived somehow in personal terms, and the thing that 
religion essentially stresses is the reality of the individualvs 
personal relation to this object. The question is both pertinent and 
interesting, whether the continued need for the kind of synthesis 
presented in religion does not ultimately imply an ethical defect. 
That, however, is really the question as to whether the religious need 
is a permanent, essential need of human nature, - -a need which the 
human being cannot shed without laying aside an essential attribute 
of his humanity. In the broad sense in which we have interpreted 
it in the present essay, the religious value would represent a kind 
of synthesis to which, it would seem, human nature as such is committed. 
Philanthropic or Humanitarian Associations. The value of 
such associations in ethical growth has been already touched upon in 
the present chapter. Like the religious associations, they furnish a 
definite, concrete outlet or means of expression for the altruistic 
impulses which we have found to be associated with adolescent develop- 
ment. Everything that has been said abtut the cultural and religious 
associations in connection with (a) the fostering of the group 
spirit, (b) the direction of corporate activities to the pursuit of 
immaterial ends and (c) the enhancement by indirect suggestion of 
the value of these ends, is applicable to the present type of 
association. There is one aspect, however, of these philanthropic 
associations which calls for remark in the light of our general 
position. As has been pointed out the voluntary associations as a 
whole are an important means whereby the individual may be led to 
discover his true individuality. From our point of view this 
essentially means the discovery of the kind of integration of values 
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to which his capacities, t v4- -h his special training and circumstances 
point the individual. This will normally mean that some one of these 
values will tend to become central and the others will occupy a 
subordinate place. Now it may appear that we are perpetrating an 
outrage on common -sense ethics when we suggest that, according to 
circumstances, the individual may or may not make active benevolence 
a controlling interest of his life. Is not the active interest in 
Pk-promotion of the good of others founded upon the universal with 
which the ethical life is concerned? Are we not here in the presence 
(1) 
of that "homelier infinite" which concerns all alike, as distinct 
from the remoter, more 'exclusive' infinite of science and art? The 
(2) 
general answer to this question has already been given. A practical 
illustration of our general position is in point here. It depends 
altogether, of course, on how much we mean by the benevolent or 
philanthropic interest. A certain measure of that interest is 
inseparable from the ethical consciousness. But in practice the 
interest may adequately reveal and express itself in a willingness 
and preparedness to minister to others' needs incidentally as the 
clear occasion presents itself. After all, this has its exact 
parallel in the case of the art interest, in the willingness to 
devote a larger portion of one's leisure to Shakespeare than to 
Bridge. But when it is a question of the more complete identification 
of the self with one of those interests, a question, for example, 
of the active pursuit of art or of phil as the dominant interest 
in life, the matter is different. In our intricate society, with its 
delicate adjustment of psychological forces, active philanthropy (under 
which would be included the larger projects of the social reformer) 
(1) c.f. 1hyte and Macbeth: The Moral Self, p.177. 
(2) see chs. 1,2, and 3. 
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demands no less than does the active pursuit of art the native aptitude 
and the specialised training. Philanthropy has its failures no less 
complete than the failures of art; and there is the important 
difference that the former are always less obvious and as a rule more 
dangerous to society as a whole than the latter. Thus the philanthropi 
associations, in so far as their activities are conducted with prudence 
and wordly wisdom, may usefully discipline the impulses of the 
aspirant to social service and perhhance lead him to find his own 
true place and function among the highly diversified ranks of society's 
wórkers . 
Again, looking at these voluntary associations as a whole we 
must take account of the fact that the individual may, and normally 
does, belong to more than one association at a time. This may react 
upon his ethical growth in either of two ways. It may make for a 
still more comprehensive integration, for the development of a more 
adequate, more balanced ideal. On the other hand, it may function 
in the opposite way, and the kind of adjustment or harmony achieved 
may cover an underlying disunity of a more complete and permanent 
character. The nature and the significance of the ethical failure here 
will be considered in connection with the general question as to the 
typical ways in which ethical development may be arrested or mis- 
directed. Finally, the voluntary associations, in so far as they cut 
across class divisions in society, class divisions which purely occu- 
pational associations tend to accentuate, operate directly in the 
further break -down of what Hobhouse calls "group morality" (which 
civilised society tends to resuscitate in new forms) and thus they 
accelerate the movement in the direction of that Universalism which, 
(1) 
according to Hobhouse, has already "made great inroads ". 
(1) Morals in Evolution. p.316. 
281 
le may at this point return to the consideration of that aspect of 
the general integrative process which has not yet been considered 
in connection with the adolescent stage. This is the inner aspect 
d the process of synthesis. As explained elsewhere, by the inner 
aspect of this process we mean the enlargement, stabilisation and 
systematisation .of the ideational or representative train (with, of 
course, its accompanying affective quality) which furnishes the 
essential content of the 'self' notion. The general intellectual 
development has been already considered. Two aspects of this 
general intellectual gfowth are of interest here. The time -sense 
is now fully developed. Past experiences are preserved in represen- 
tative memory and integrated into a stable and orderly series. 
Moreover. the growth of the powers of generalisation and abstraction 
has led, as already explained, to a more adequate apprehension of 
causal relations and to the integration of experiences on the basis 
of such apprehension. On the ideational side, therefore, the 
content of the self idea is given in this ordered memory series; the 
members of this deries are the past experiences of the self and 
these are apprehended in their temporal and causal relations. Thus 
we have one sense in which behaviour may now be regarded as fully 
and explicitly ethical, a sense in which behaviour has been fully 
transformed into conduct. Past experience is available in full 
neasure for the determination of present choice. But there is 
mother aspect of this conduct. The fact that behaviour has become 
Ythical in the full sense does not mean exactly that choice is 
ietermined with conscious reference to past experience whenever an 
alternative presents itself. Past experience is the fundamental 
ieterminer of choice, but it is an essential characteristic of 
;he ethical life that the lessons of past experience have been 
3laborated and projected into the future, to form ideals of conduct. 
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Through these ideals past experience is consciously brought to 
bear upon present choice. In other words, the self has not only 
apast, it has a future. The development of the time -sense and 
the more adequate grasp of causal relations mean that this 
projection which we call the future reveals in a varying degree 
certain characteristics or marks which are, so to speak, an index 
ofthe completeness of ethical development. let us explain. 
That train of projected experiences of which the future is 
made up is in the nature of the case relatively unstable and 
changing as compared with the train which constitutes the past. 
Now the ethically significant aspect of the future is that portion 
of it which has been in a greater degree stabilised, and represents 
the kind of projection which we callr,ideal. But what is the 
nature of this projection? No term is more common both in ethical 
theory and in everyday speech than the term 'ideal'. Ordinarily 
the term presents no difficulty. But a more careful consideration 
of its exact psychological meaning proves instructive from our 
point of view for, in considering it, we are brought back to the 
notion which we have made fundamental in the present, - the notion 
of 'integration'. 
Ad far as Ethics is concerned, the meaning of an 'ideal' 
seems to be clear enough. An ideal means the conception of a kind 
of activity or a kind of life from which supreme satisfaction is 
anticipated. As will be presently shown, something more than this 
is needed to constitute the ideal a strictly ethical ideal. At present 
we would insist that an 'ideal' refers to the projected satisfaction 
Of conative dispositions. From this point of view, it would be 
distinguished from the notion of 'sentiment', which refers essentially 
to an organised emotional disposition. The term 'disposition' as 
used in these two connections is somewhat confusing. But conative 
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disposition means simply that the individual 'has' or actually 
experiences certain needs or impulses which impel him to seek 
satisfying ends or activities. By emotional disposition is meant 
that in presence of certain objects or situations, the individual 
is likely to have a peculiar emotional experience. Needless to say, 
the conative and the emotional dispositions are intimately connected 
with one another. But at the same time it is confusing not to 
distinguish clearly between the two psychological facts: an 
organisation of emotional dispositions, giving us the notion of a 
'sentiment'; and the organisation of conative dispositions, which 
underlies the development and projection of an 'ideal'. Dreyer 
states the distinction between a sentiment and an ideal as follows: 
"she Sentiment 'love of justice' is a disposition constituted by 
certain emotional tendencies; that is, those characteristic of 'love' 
sentiments, associated with the abstract idea of justice. The 
ideal of justice, on the other hand, involves reflection upon the 
meaning of 'justice' and the acceptance of justice as a determining 
end of action, that is, recognition by the 'self' of justice as 
(1) 
representing law for the self." The important point here is the 
fact that in the case of the ideal of justice, 'justice' is accepted 
as a determining end of action, as a law for the self. This state- 
ment, however, must not be taken to mean a minimising of the 
importance of the intellectual factor ( "reflection upon the meaning 
of justice ") in the determination of the ideal. The role of this 
factor has been described at some length in ch. 1V - a role which 
we there found to be wrongly described as merely instrumental. That 
is insisted upon in the present connection is the fact that, when 
the ideal has been constituted, when it has finally taken shape and 
form, it presents itself as the conception of a kind of activity or 
life which the individual sets himself, to some degree at least, to 
(1) Instinct in Man, pp.214 -215. 
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'realise', to bring nearer somehow to the actual conditions of his 
existence. 
Hence 'sentiment' and 'ideal' both imply organisation or 
synthesis but the two notions are on a different psychological plane. 
'Sentiment' refers to an emotional synthesis, while 'ideal' means 
a projected synthesis of conative tendencies. Although the sentiments 
intimately affect the development of the ideal, we must recognise 
the distinction between the two syntheses and recognise further 
that in Ethics we are primarily concerned with the latter. It would 
follow that McDougall's apparent interpretation of ethical develop - 
(1) 
ment in terms of the growth of a hierarchy of sentiments does not 
seem exactly in the right direction. It is permissible indeed, to 
doubt whether such a hierarchy as he indicates exists. At any rate, 
the notion of the 'hierarchy' is speculative, and while it is doubtless 
legitimate as a hypothesis, we submit that it does not appear to 
become more convincing the more closely it is examined. 
Our next step is to indicate how we would appraise the 
ethical worth of any particular ideal. Two things must be taken into 
consideration in judging the worth of an ideal: (a) the nature and 
the number of the conations which are represented in it, and (b) the 
degree to which the ideal has been integrated with the real or actual 
life of the individual; in other words, the degree to which it has 
become the object of actual, effective volition. The first point 
has been considered throughout the present essay as a whole. The 
second point was discussed in connection with the two earlier 
periods of growth, and we must add a few remarks relevant to the 
final stage now under consideration. In our discussion of the child- 
hood stage of development, it was pointed out that the child's ideal 
or ideals, even at the close of the period, possessed ethical value 
(1) Introd. to Soc. Psych. p.259. 
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only to a limited degree. The meaning of this limitation was found 
in the fact that these ideals are only to a small degree synthesised 
with actual activities, that is, they are only to a very limited 
extent the objects of effective volition. A larger appreciation of 
means and end, based on more adequate and more highly controlled 
representative processes, is necessary before the influence of the 
ideal projection is reflected in the control of present behaviour. 
One of the essential marks of ethical maturity is this appreciation 
of a vital connection between the actual and the ideal. With 
such an appreciation, the ideal comes to represent the object of 
actual volition or, in other words, it becomes ethical in the 
complete sense. The extent to which this occurs is one important 
measure or criterion of the completeness of ethical development. 
But while the thing of central importance is the ideal which 
has become the object of practical effort or pursuit, we must 
at the same time recognise the role in the individual's life of 
ideal projections which are not ethical in the full sense but which 
may nevertheless have indirect ethical value or significance. For 
example, I may construct in imagination the picture of a life such 
as that of Livingstone or Abraham Lincoln and find satisfaction and 
inspiration in the contemplation of that life. But I need not by 
any means accept that kind of life as my personal ideal. I may 
recognise the total impracticability of that life so far as I am 
concerned. In a real sense, however, this life may be truly said to 
represent an ideal. Our discussion of art has indicated the true 
place of such imaginative constructions in the ethical life. Their 
ethical value is indirect and depends on the degree to which they are 
somehow assimilated to or brought to bear upon the construction and 
the pursuit of my practical or directly ethical ideal. In so far as 
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they provide mere satisfaction, they have some ethical value, however 
indirect; but in so far as they afford inspiration (by which is 
really meant the extent to which they are integrated with my practical 
ideal) they acquire a more direct and explicit ethical significance. 
Towards the close of the adolescent period, the process 
of ethical growth, considered in its inner aspect, means the 
development of an ideal which becomes the synthesising principle 
of the volitional life. The ideal at this stage is to be contrasted 
with the earlier ideals of childhood in respect of the feature 
discussed in the preceding paragraph. The mind of the youth, as 
contrasted with that of the child, is capable of forming and 
projecting ideals which are ethical in the full sense. This later 
ideal sums up, as it were, the entire ethical content of the 'self' 
notion, This is commonly expressed by saying that the self comes 
to identify itself with certain activities and ends. It may be 
remarked that, in the present essay, we have consistently avoided 
a form of statement which is very common in discussions of this 
kind. 7e refer to the common method of statement according to which 
the individual comes in the course of his development to be motivated 
by 'the idea of the self'. .7e have avoided this way of expressing 
the matter because it is liable to mislead. The mere idea of self 
is apt to be regarded in a vague way as one of the factors to be 
separately considered in the psychology of motivation. The truth 
is, of course, that the mere idea óf self has no such motivating 
value. A less dangerous and, indeed, an accurate way of describing 
ethical behaviour is to say that such behaviour is motivated by an 
'ideal' of self. But what are we really saying here? There may 
be nothing seriously misleading about this method of statement, but 
at the same time, if we scrutinise it, it does not seem really exact 
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as a psychological statement. Conduct is motivated by the idea of 
certain activities or ends, which have been integrated in certain 
ways, which appear valuable and which are therefore willed. To say 
that the self identifies itself with them is simply to repeat that 
they are willed. The self is identified with them because they have 
already been willed; it is not that they are willed because the self 
finds it possible to identify itself with them. To say that the 
self finds it possible to identify itself with the idea of certain 
acts is of course only another way of saying that the acts can be 
accomdedated to or harmonised with that relatively stable organisation 
of tendencies which has been so far achieved. Now all this may 
appear only a question of the method of statement, but, on the other 
hand, there may be a real confusion lurking in the background. In 
point of fact, this method of statement may easily lead our minds 
to a husteron -proteron like that of psychological hedonism, where 
the thing willed (which in reality is certain objective activities 
or ends) is said to be 'a state of the self'. Ethical growth is 
usually associated with and, indeed, is rightly said to be a function 
of, the development of what is called 'self- consciousness'. In the 
present essay, we have described the development of that kind of 
organisation or synthesis to which the phrase 'self- consciousness', 
as far as the psychologist is concerned, ought to refer. Less than 
the usual prominence has been given to the term 'self -consciousness' 
itself. Although convenient and valuable when used in the strict 
Psychological sense, even the psychologist finds it difficult to 
resist certain suggestions which lurk in this phrase, suggestions 
which tend to obscure that all- important fact of the ethical life, 
namely, the fact that the individual's attention is directed outward, 
that his will expresses itself in the pursuit of objective ends or 
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values, that he loses himself or, for that matter of it, loses his 
'consciousness' of self in the single minded pursuit of these ends. 
Nothing is farther from the mind of the moralist than the intention 
to approve the'self- consciousness' of the prig. At the same time, 
it is easy to fall into forms of statement or expression which 
unwittingly point to a kind of super -prig as the ethical ideal. 
This chapter may be concluded with a brief statement on the 
question of ethical failure. By ethical failure we mean here, not 
the casual, occasional lapse from accepted standards but the 
permanent arrest or misdirection of ethical growth. Taking 
'integration' as the keynote of the ethical life, we may consider 
some fundamental ways in which ethical education may fail to achieve 
its desired results. 
The first and very common type of failure is that which we 
would describe by saying that no real and final integration has been 
achieved. This means the type of life characterised by no real 
unity or singleness of purpose. A certain measure of synthesis, of 
course, there must have been in the nature of the case, but not 
enough to impart to the life any stability or consistency. Many 
factors may contribute to produce this result. The fault may lie, 
for instance, with the process of training as a whole in that it 
has failed to habituate the individual to the control or inhibition 
of impulse which is implied in the sustained pursuit of an end. Or 
the fault may be found in a failure to emerge successfully from the 
intellectual and emotional unrest of the adolescent period. It is 
not impossible, again, that the general weakening of the moral 
fibre is to be traced to a still more specific failure, such as the 
failure to face some specific crisis, the shirking of a clear duty, 
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the evasion of some momentous decision. Jung considers that an 
experience of this kind may occasion one of those repressions which 
undermine subsequent mental well -being. Without necessarily 
committing ourselves to the psych -analyst's concept of repression, 
we may admit, on general psychological principles, that the memory 
of such a specific and serious abnegation of clear duty might persist 
as a disturbing influence and react adversely on the mental life 
as a whole. Not infrequently the final outcome of such a life with- 
out purpose is, as we suggested above, the relapse to a level of 
purely material interests or satisfactions, or, in other words, the 
relapse to a level of practical hedonism. But this need not happen. 
The individual may, on the contrary, display intense enthusiasms 
but these enthusiasms are fitful and fleeting. He flits restlessly 
from one interest to another and, in general, presents the distressing 
spectacle of a lib without plan or aim. 
A second form of ethical failure may be said to represent 
the opposite type of failure. In this case integration has taken 
place, but it has taken place on too narrow a basis. One value 
has become dominant to the extent of involving the sacrifice of all 
practical, effective interest in the other values. The synthesis 
in this case may be effective and permanent but it is the outcome of 
a mere curtailing of interests, a mere ignoring of certain sides of 
human life which cannot be disregarded without loss to the personality 
as a whole. The degree to which such restriction or curtailment of 
the self's activities would be considered in practice to involve 
real ethical failure depends, of course, on the nature of the 
interest which has come to play the governing role. There are those, 
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for example, for whom the mere externals of our social life, the 
round of social entertainments, functions, parties, etc. etc. offer 
an all- absorbing occupation: Such a worship of mere 'outward shows' 
stands condemned before the ethical judgment, fir only a starved 
personality could find its food in the mere husks of the fundamental 
(1) 
value which we described as 'social intercourse'. In the same 
ethical category is the individual for whom a narrow sphere of 
politics contains all that is of interest in life. At the other 
extreme, the artist, the scientist, the philosopher may fall into 
a kind of preoccupation with their special pursuits which involves 
an impoverishing of the personality. Theoretically, of course, 
the specialised pursuit of one of the basic values need not entail 
a blunted sensitiveness to the varied interests of life. For these 
values, as we have shown, permeate or affect each other in subtle 
ways, and there is a sense in which it is true that, as Mitchell 
puts it, "it is only depth that commands variety in the long run ". 
It is equally true, however, that devotion to one pursuit may lead 
to a much narrower kind of depth, involving a real shrinkage of 
personality. 
The third type of ethical failure which we have to consider 
is beyond question the most interesting type. While ethical theory 
may recognise the prevalence of this type, the real nature or meaning 
of it is not, as a rule, adequately appreciated. It is usually 
described as a disharmony of the character as a whole, but this 
description fails to distinguish it from the first type we considered. 
In the latter case, the disharmony was found to be due to an absence, 
(1) see p.33. 
(2) Structure and Growth of the Mind, p.406. 
(2) 
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relatively speaking, of any real principle of synthesis. But in 
the. case we are now considering, the life is apparently well 
synthesised; but it is synthesised along different lines or on 
âifferent principles which, in turn, are not synthesised with one 
another. At the same time, there is no consciousness of disharmony 
on the part of the individual himself. Serious disharmony may be 
implicit in the life but this disharmony is not apparent except 
to the onlooker. To the latter, the life may present the spectacle 
of partial integrations which are seemingly independent of one 
another and possibly (except for the individual himself) more or 
less plainly incompatible with one another. In short, we have here 
the case not of the life without aim, but of the life with more 
than one dominant purpose, these purposes not being themselves 
coordinated because fundamentally not admitting of such coordination. 
This kind of ethical failure -- a life implicitly at war with itself- - 
is referred to commonly enough in the literature of Ethics. But 
the psychology of it is not clearly explained nor is the frequency 
of its occurrence appreciated. To the more glaring examples of it, 
common -sense applies the opprobrious term 'hypocrisy'. But a very 
lifferent kind of adjustment is really implied in hypocrisy, which 
i dompatible, as a matter of fact, with a complete singleness of 
purpose. Examples of the kind of adjustment we are considering are 
not far to seek. The man who is an ardent and active supporter of 
the Christian Church and its teachings and is not scrupulous on the 
score of hard bargaining or even sharp practice in business; the 
Philanthropist who can combine cruelty or callousness at home with 
genuine charity abroad; the politician who can combine a stern moral 
rectitude in private life with a frank indifference to moral . 
principles in the sphere of politics; the otherwise strictly honest 
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and upright citizen who is prepared to prevaricate shamelessly to 
customs officials and Railway Companies these represent only more 
obvious examples of an inconsistency which may be latent in the 
volitional as well as in the intellectual life. 
What is the psychological interpretation of an adjustment 
of this kind? The answer would seem to be found in a concept which 
is now familiar in psychology but more familiar in abnormal than 
in normal or general psychology. ?e refer to the concept of 
tdissociation'. This extraordinarily fruitful concept has been 
sufficiently discussed in psychological literature to render unnecessary 
any elaborate discussion of it in the present connection. Dissociation 
implies a more or less permanent 'split' in consciousness, so that 
a system of ideas (or, as we must add in the light of more recent 
investigations, a system of impulses) becomes under certain conditions 
inoperative. In virtue of this dissociation of an entire system of 
organised tendencies, seeming inconsistencies of behaviour such as 
we have illustrated above, become possible. At present we need ier 
only remark that we must accept from abnormal psychology the concept 
of dissociation, and recognise the explanatory value of it in regard 
to so- called normal behaviour. In the next chapter, we define our 
position with respect to certain further psychological considerations 
of a more or less speculative character which have been advanced by 
the students of abnormal mental phenomena. Here we may conclude 
with a final illustration which indicates the meaning and range of 
this principle of dissociation. Take, for example, the 'economic 
man' of Iu'iill and the older economists. Psychologists, and especially 
the Instinct psychologists, have made this notion the special butt 
of their criticisms. Their attack is of course justified when 
directed against the notion as ordinarily understood. In so far 
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as these economists assumed that "man is a reasonable being who 
always intelligently seeks his own good or is guided in all his 
(1) 
activities by enlightened self -interest ", then it is in point 
to retort that "mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a 
(1) 
great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways ". 
We need not consider here whether the economist has not after all 
the right to 'abstract', so to speak, the 'reasonable' side of 
Nan and to base his science upon this abstraction, precisely in the 
sense in which the mathematician is allowed to concern himself with 
the abstraction of space. To a large extent, indeed, this seems 
to be what the political economist actually does, judging from the 
very casual and hesitant way in which, for example, advertising, as 
a factor in economics, is treated in the literature of that science. 
But in so far as Mill or his readers hypostasised this abstraction, 
that is, asserted that this abstraction represents the real man 
and the whole man, the fallacy is clear. On the other hand, the 
interesting fact is usually overlooked that the 'economic man') 
precisely as the older economists pictured him, is a reality with 
which we must reckon in practice. For example, a man may be fully 
and sincerely convinced of the importance of education andthe 
wisdom of spending money in the cause of education; and, if approached 
at the right time, may give generous practical proof of his sympathy. 
The same man, acting on a business commission, may be found behaving 
in a spirit of narrowly calculating self -interest, plainly impervious 
to all wider considerations of public or social utility. To advance 
any consideration that does not obviously appeal to his self- interest 
is useless. It is not that the wider and higher interests have lost 
their hold over his mind; it is rather that under certain circum- 
stances their appeal is in vain. The 'atmosphere' is fatal to them. 
(1)LIc Dougall; untrod. to 5oc. psych. p.11. 
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It would seem then that in this sense the economic man is a fact. 
But he is a fact to be accounted for by the notion of dissociation; 
the economic man may thus be a thoroughly 'real' man, despite the 
fact that he is not the 'whole' man. 
The principle of dissociation, to which we have resorted 
for the explanation of the last -mentioned type of ethical defect, 
clearly brings us to the very ill -defined boundaries of what is 
called abnormal psychology. We must now raise in a more explicit 
ray certain questions in this field which have a direct bearing 
on our general problem. In the remaining chapters 7e shall therefore 
consider (a) certain important concepts which have been largely 
used in modern psychology, especially in the discussion of abnormal 
pienomena; and (b) the nature of what has been called moral 
deficiency, moral blindness, or moral idiocy, all of which terms 
indicate a permanent incapacity, partial or complete, to benefit 
by the ordinary processuof moral education. This discussion will 
serve both to sum up and to indicate some further applications oft 




Some Fu_rthDr As -oects of 'Integration'. 
The object of the present chapter is to take account of certain 
recent developments in psychological science which bear on our 
own problem in a way that cannot be ignored, and to define, as 
precisely as possible, our attitude to them. The movement to which 
we refer may be conveniently designated the Freudian psychology. 
Let it be understood at the outset that we use the phrase 
'Freudian psychology' as a matter of convenient description to 
indicate the entire movement known as psycho -analysis. The term 
'psycho,- analysis' itself is ambiguous, inasmuch as it means both 
a body of doctrine and a definite technique. We use the descriptive 
phrase 'Freudian psychology' merely to indicate the general 
movement initiated by Freud. 
Moreover, we would be explicit on the point that the present 
chapter is in no sense intended as a discussion, much less as 
an attempt at an evaluation, of the Freudian psychology as a 
whole. Such an attempt would be entirely beyond the scope of 
the present essay. The aim of the chapter is to explain, as 
precisely as possible, where our account of ethical development 
stands with respect to certain important concepts or principles 
which, in one sense or another, are central to Freudianism. To 
anyone who has given attention to the theories and hypotheses 
on which psycho -analysis is based, it is clear that some of the 
concepts employed are already more or less familiar in general 
psychology, but in the light of the Freudian psychology 
they may be found to possess a much more basic significance 
for general psychology than has hitherto been suspected. We 
may state here the conceptions of the Freudian school which 
we shall isolate for consideration. They are (a) the notion of 
the paramount importance of the infancy period for all later 
development; (b) the concepts of 'repression and 'dissociation;' 
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(c) the concept of compensation. Other notions familiar from 
the Freudian psychology, such as the notion of 'mental 
conflict': 'complex' and 30 on, will arise incidentally 
in the course of our discussion. Our main purpose will be to 
explain the exact sense in which we have accorded recognition 
to certain of these principles in the foregoing pages. Incidentally 
we shall indicate some distinctive features of Freudianism concerning 
which our attitude must best not exactly hostile or sceptical, but 
rarely interrogative. Some of the advocates of psycho -analysis appear 
to be rather unscientifically sensitive to criticism; their case 
would be better served by a frank recognition of the fact that, 
while the general psychologist must take the whole movement very 
seriously, the situation by no means justifies the acceptance in 
toto of their fundamental tenets. 
Let us consider first what is perhaps the most interesting 
and suggestive aspect of Freudianism, namely, the supreme importance 
attached to the period of infancy.(1) We have already stressed the 
importance of this early period in connection with the acquisition 
of habits and habitual attitudes. An important lesson to be 
derived from recent controversies on the topic of instinct is 
to the effect that a much fuller and more exact investigation than 
has yet been found possible of these earlier years must be 
carried out before such an important question as that of the 
nature and number of the human instincts can be finally settled.(2) 
It may be asserted that the general tendency in present -day 
psychology as a whole is to lay the emphasis on experience 
rather than on inheritance, and to discountenance the practice of 
freely attributing to native endowment certain specific reactions 
simply because we find them in operation at an early age. 
Consistently with this general tendency, we have laid the 
(1) cf. Pfister The Psycho -Analytic Method: ch .VI; also 
(g) e l 1T.he Psychology of Medicine, p. 164 & 165 
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emphasis on habit rather than on instinct. In particular, we have 
looked to the period of infancy to find the main source of 
certain habitual attitudes, such as the responsiveness of the 
individual to the attitudes, feelings, opinions and beliefs of 
the social environment. What is the relation of this general 
psychological standpoint to the Freudian hypothesis with respect 
to the infancy period? 
According to Freud, the supreme importance of infancy is 
to be traced to certain developments of the emotional life which 
occur during the period. Emotional organisations of a very special 
kind occur, - organisations that are at least analogous to the later 
organisations described by the term 'Sentiments,'(1) The former, 
however, are peculiar in that they represent unconscious emotional 
organisations. These unconscious organisations are designated 
'complexes'. The significance of these complexes is that they may 
operate in such a way as to prevent integration of the elements 
of the personality. This might be expressed by saying that, 
according to Freud, special emotional attitudes are unconsciously 
developed and become firmly established during the period of 
infancy. Again, not only have these attitudes been unconsciously 
formed but, unless eradicated by special means, they persist 
throughout life as a disintegrating influence. But their continued 
existence in later life is not at all patent either to the 
individual himself or to the observer. They manifest themselves 
only in various indirect ways and especially in the appearance 
of peculiar character traits which, in their turn, do not reveal 
their true origin to ordinary observation. Some further remarks 
on the meaning or origin of these attitudes will be offered presently 
In_ the meantime, we would point out the\sense in which the 
(1) For relation of these two concepts, see p. 312. 
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Freudian hypothesis goes beyond the position we have taken up 
in the foregoing pages. 
It may be recalled that we found a main characteristic 
91 the infancy period to be emotional instability and inco- 
ordination. This trait of the period would, of course. be 
fully admitted by the Freudians. But their explanation of the 
trait is distinctive. The manifest instability of the emotional 
life of infancy would be held to be due to the existence of 
these u.zconscious attitudes to which we have referred. The 
lack of stability and coordination would be explained as the 
effect of special emotional organisations which, for reasons to 
be presently mentioned, have been carried out below the level 
of consciousness. 
Now we have here a definite and, it must be admitted, an 
extremely interesting and suggestive hypothesis as to the 
origin or explanation of a definite infancy trait on the 
existence of which psychologists are agreed. Nor need we deny 
that the evidence adduced in support of the hypothesis is 
impressive. At the same time it must be considered to be still 
sub judice. While mechanisms of the kind that Freud has described 
may indeed be at work, it would seem that a reasonable explanation 
of the trait in question is possible without a hypothesis of 
the kind. It can hardly be doubted that the general failure 
to synthesise in early childhood is due, in large measure at 
least, to certain further characteristics which we found to 
belong to the period. Certain fundamental facts of the 
psychology of childhood, which have been fully treated in the 
goregoing pages, would seem, when taken as a whole, adequately 
to account for this trait. We have pointed out, for example, 
the feeble and often inaccurate representative processes ( "that 
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strange' perspectiveless conception of life ") l) his very limited 
power to appreciate the meaning of his experiences and 
especially of certain experiences incidental to his social 
relationships, the seeming variability in the behaviour 
of his human associates, coupled with their immense power to 
create emotional experiences for him; factors such as these 
would go far to account for the lack of synthesis in 
the life of the young child. This means, in effect, that the 
instability and incoordination would be regarded, not as an 
abnormal or pathological fact (which is essentially what the 
Freudian view would amount to ) but as the normal outcome of the 
low level of general mental development. 
The next concept of the Freudian school which bears on 
our problem is the concept of repression. It is important to 
note the special sense in which this term is used by the Freudians. 
In their sense of the term, it is by no means identical with 
that inhibition or checking of impulse with which we have been 
hitherto concerned. It is true that certain authorities -- Bernard 
Hart, for example, - -- use the term broadly not only to cover 
the kind of process which Freud has in view but all cases of 
inhibition or thwarting of impulse. The distinctive feature of 
the Freudian repression is that the act of repression is 
unconscious. ''Repression' in Freud always implies 'unconscious' 
repression, -- a fact which his critics not infrequently forget. 
Such unconscious repression causes dissociation)--a condition 
in which a tendency or system of tendencies becomes severed 
from the main stream of the conscious processes, refuses to 
be integrated with them and continues to exert a disturbing, 
disintegrating influence on them. We have already made use 
of this concept in a special explanatory way in connection 




to Freud, is par excellence the period for repressions of this 
kind. The reason is to be found in the fact of the child's 
subjection to the Pleasure- Principle, - a fact which is continually 
bringing him into conflict with certain standards or prohibitions. 
Before we further examine repression in this sense, it will 
be well to explain the sense in which the notion of 'repression' 
is fundamental in ethics and to point out the sense in which it 
has been fully recognised in the foregoing discussion. In this 
latter sense 'repression' would refer to a conscious process., 
the process of conscious inhibition or checking of impulse. Inasmuch 
as 'repression' has come to bear the almost technical Freudian 
meaning of unconscious repression, it seems desirable to use a 
different term to indicate the conscious process, and hence the 
term 'suppression' is used by some writers to refer to the latter 
process. We may, however, continue to use the term 'inhibition' to 
indicate the kind of conscious or deliberate act by the repeated 
performance of which suppression is eventually achieved. 
Now inhibition of impulse is inseparable from the process of 
ethical growth. Such inhibition means, to begin with at least, 
nothing more than that an impulse to perform a certain act is 
checked and hence that particular act is not performed. 
Such inhibition of impulse is the condition of all education and 
training. But what of the impulse which is thus denied satisfaction ? 
' Thether it is going to persist as a disturbing factor in personality 
would depend on two things: (a) the nature of the impulse and (b) the 
manner in which the inhibition of it was brought about; (a) will be 
considered presently; concerning (b) the situation seems clear as far 
as ethical growth is concerned. For the kind of inhibition which is 
5V 
integral to the ethical life is that in which an impulse is checked 
because it is brought into relation with a larger organisation 
of impulses in the light of which it loses its attractiveness for 
the will. Now inhibition in this sense is no mere incident of ethical 
growth. It is ethical growth itself, looked at, so to speak, on 
its negative side. Character- formation on its positive side means 
the harmonising of the life of impulse; on its negative side it 
means the repression or inhibition of particular impulses. So 
far this represents what would be the ordinarily accepted view. 
But the point is not always sufficiently appreciated that the 
entire tendency, if we may so express it, of the Freudian 
psychology(at least as the present writer understands it) is to 
justify inhibition in the above sense and fully to vindicate 
the claim of the ethical consciousness that such inhibition is 
inseparable from healthy, harmonious development. This statement 
may look like an exaggeration, but it is not difficult to 
justify it when we consider from this point of vieN two notions 
to which the -Freudians attach fundamental importance; (a) the notion 
of bringing back into consciousness an impulse which has been 
"repressed into the unconscious" and of so making the individual 
aware of it as the disturbing factor in his life; and (b) the 
notion of 'sublimation'. (a) ?ere we have the Freudian method 
of effecting a 'cure', of finally resolving the mental conflict. 
This consists essentially, as has been said, in making the 
individual fully conscious of the real character of the tendencies 
in question and of their connection with his particular disorder. 
Jung, it is true, goes farther and holds that, after the individual 
has been brought to face the fact of the existence of these 
impulses, he must forthwith take the final step of consciously 
and finally repressing orlsimplyl of suppressing them. The 
important thing, however, is that deliberate inhibition of impulse 
in the sense in which, as we saw, it is integral to the ethical life, 
is recognised here as the way of return to health and balance of 
personality. There would seem, then, to be no real basis or justi- 
fication in the Freudian psychology for the corollary that is often 
drawn from it, namely, that all checking or inhibition of impulse is 
dangerous, and that all impulses, of Whatsoever kind, should be satis- 
fied. 7hat this psychology does assert is that some means of expression 
should be found for them. But the kind of 'expression' which is meant 
is essentially that implied when we say that the individual is brought 
(1) 
to face them and recognise them for what they are. Sublimation, 
of course would mean a still further expression of them. 
We may now return to the question of 'unconscious' repression. 
The phrase is a dangerous one and may open the door to all manner of 
speculation. Keeping the discussion strictly to the concrete, we would 
lay down that one fundamental principle, at least, stands out clearly; 
this is the principle according to which the mind tends to turn away 
from the unpleasant as such. This general tendency to withdraw the 
attention from the unpleasant and as far as possible to hold the 
pleasant in the focus of consciousness would be the psychical parallel 
to the physical shrinking and withdrawal from a physically painful 
stimulus. It represents the 'general appetite tendencies recognised in 
the statement of native endowment on. The biological value of the 
tendency is obvious. Moreover, unpleasant experiences which tend 
to be forgotten in virtue of a withdrawal of attention from 
them might with propriety be said to be 'unconsciously' repressed; 
for beyond this turning away from the contemplation 
of them (a mental movement which may well become habitual), 
(1) See Hadfield: Psychology and Morals. This interesting contribution 
came into my hands only after the present chapter had been completed. 
The point in question is fully and clearly explained. (pp.100 -101). I 
leave the statement in the text as originally written. 
(2) cf. Valentine, Dreams and the Unconscious, pp.32 -33. 
(2) 
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there is no express, deliberate effort to repress them. 
In the notion of repression,the Freudians would include 
an unconscious repression of this kind; and they also imply 
more. But as regards this 'more', we prefer for the present to 
adopt a non -committal and interrogative attitude. One.remark, 
however, is in point here. If repression does occur in the further, 
more comprehensive sense intended by Freud, then it would follow, 
on our general view as to the nature of ethical growth, that 
we would be forced to admit the truth of Freud's contention 
that such repression would tend to undermine the possibility of 
healthy ethical growth. It might indeed be objected that, in the 
nature of the case, it is not clear that such repression 
ought to be considered injurious. Admitting, as the fundamental 
cause of repression, the tendency on the part of the mind to 
turn away from the unpleasant, why should such repression, which 
would appear to have a distinct biological value, be held to work 
havoc in the mental life as a whole or be even considered 
dangerous? There is, however, no real difficulty here. The 
'unpleasant' from which the mind turns away in the present case 
is not really the biologically unpleasant, it is an 'unpleasant' 
which is occasioned by the existence of certain artificial 
standards and restraints. In point of fact, the mind in reality 
is turning away from the biologically pleasant( the satisfaction 
of instinct) and endeavouring to act in the line of tho biologically 
unpleasant. Or, to put the matter in another way, the unpleasantness 
which repression removes is the unpleasantness incidental to 
mental conflict. And this solution of the conflict could be 
considered biologically valuable even although it involves 
consequences such as the development of a neuroses, of peculiar 
character traits, etc., which we would recognise as injurious in 
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the light of existing social conditions to which the individual 
is called upon to adjust himself. 
Closely connected with the above discussion is the definite 
sense in which we accepted the notion of an 'unconscious impulse' 
and of an 'unconscious desire'; and also the sense in which the 
existence of such an impulse or desire might be held to involve a 
(1) 
disturbing, disintegrating influence on the personality. We 
found that the individual might fail to realise the true signifi- 
cance of a sense of dissatisfaction which is felt acutely enough; 
that this sense of maladjustment or need may prompt to the pursuit 
of certain objects; that these objects may not be the true or 
appropriate objects of the impulses in question; and hence that, 
after the attainment of these objects, the dissatisfaction or 
restlessness will continue and a condition of general mental 
instability may ensue. The significance of this kind of 
situation for general mental development has been already 
considered. Here we would point out an important difference 
between our position in this respect and the Freudian position. 
Take the case -- apparently common enough -- where the individual's 
continued ignorance of the real significance of his impulse is 
traceable to the fact that the impulse itself is of a character which 
would be repugnant to him, inasmuch as it runs counter to certain 
standards which he has come to regard as authoritative. In this 
case, the real nature of his impulse simply does not occur to 
him, or if it does, he promptly dismisses the suggestion of 
it and, in doing so, may be acting in perfectly good faith 
with himself. Now we would naturally expect that such a 
situation would occur only in the later stages of mental develop - 
ment; and during these later stages it seems clear that this 
kind of situation does commonly arise and does actually lead -- 
() see p. 212. 
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at the very least -- to mental instability. But Freud's conception 
of infancy as the period par excellence of repressions and distur- 
bances of this character is, to say the least, hard to accept on 
general grounds and, as we have stated, it must await evidence of a 
more compelling kind than has yet been adduced. For example, granting 
that the child experiences an impulse which we would recognise as 
incestuous, why should it be repugnant and thus repressed at all? 
The Freudian answer would seem to be that there is an inherited 
(1 
aversion to incest. But social anthropology, while it presents 
nineroas examples of customs which in point of fact make for the 
(2) 
avoidance of incest, would furnish no real support for the notion 
of such an inheritance. In the present state of the evidence con- 
cerning human inheritance the notion seems hardly legitimate as a 
hypothesis and certainly not as an assumption. It is in fact as 
unscientific as the notion of an inherited 'moral sense' to which, 
as we shall point out in the next chapter, certain authorities resort. 
The Freudian psychology performs a distinct service in 
vividly reminding us of the number and difficulty of the adjustments 
which the child is called upon to make under the complex conditions 
of modern society. In particular, this school of psychology draws 
out attention to the special danger points, so to speak, of the 
child's development, -- the stages at which maladjustment of a more 
or less serious kind is apt to arise. As we have already indicated, 
two stages are specially significant from this point of view. One 
is the transition from infancy to childhood proper and the other 
is the stage of adolescence when the individual is struggling to 
achieve his final adjustment to social conditions. With regard to 
the transition from infancy to childhood, failure of adjustment 
would be peculiarly apt to occur in connection with the transition 
from the small and intimate family circle, with its larger measure 
of personal freedom, to the wider social circle of the playground 
and the school. Needless to say, it is not necessary to adopt the 
Freudian viewpoint as a whole to appreciate the danger here. On 
any view of mental development, this stage would be considered 
critical. The Behaviourist, for example, 
(1) cf. Mitchell: Psychology of Medicine, p.170 




would describe the situation by saying that many old habit -systems 
must now be discarded and new habit -systems acquired.(1) Further, 
the importance of this tratsitional stage has been long 
recognised by educationists, although perhaps not adequately 
recognised. The Freudian psychology, too, gives a special point 
to the insistence, on the part of some educational thinkers, on 
the necessity of a closer approximation of school work and 
school conditions to the work and conditions of real life. 
The transition, for example, from an artificially sheltered school 
life to the more rigorous and exacting conditions of real life 
is probably the occasion of numerous failures of adaptation. 
This brings us to the next concept of this school of 
psychology which we would connect with our own account of 
development. We refer to the notion of 'compensation', of the 
development of compensating mechanisms. It is not necessary to our 
purpose here to consider the many forms in which compensatory mechanisms 
are said to assert themselves. But there is one important group 
of phenomena, belonging apparently to this category, which 
of special interest. Failure of adjustment means that the individual 
is thrown back, so to speak, on his own inner resources for the 
solution of his difficulties and the attainment of satisfactions. 
Hence there may develope a tendency to become altogether preoccupied 
with these inner resou.ces, and to seek and find adequate satisfaction 
in an imaginative world constructed entirely in harmony with the 
dictates of the Pleasure Principle, as Freud would call it. Without 
committing ourselves to special hypotheses such as will be 
presently mentioned, we accorded full recognition to this fact 
in our account of ethical development. Identifying in a general 
(1) cf. VVatson,Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist 
pp.415-420 
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way the motive underlying the construction of a world of ideal 
satisfactions with a motive which is fundamental to what we 
called the art value, we found that true ethical development 
demands that this value be integrated with the other values of 
life. In our outline of the history of this integration, we 
pointed out that the young child's reactions to the ideal world 
tend to be wholly uncritical, and are explicable by the fact 
that the distinction between the ideal and the real has not yet 
been achieved. As mental development proceeds, this distinction 
is normally achieved, and we found that in later childhood the 
attractions of the inaginative world have considerably waned in 
face of the immensely increased interest in or preoccupation 
with the real. Towards the close of the adolescent period, the 
final integration, as was explained9is attempted and happily 
achieved. The attitude is now discriminating and critical. The ideal 
world not merely offers a temporary escape from the stress of 
the real, although it continues to do this; but it proves 
itself an inexhaustible source of fresh inspiration and 
deepens the consciousness of the value of life as a whole. 
To retain our own terminology, the individual has achieved 
a true and lasting synthesis of art and the other values, 
and thus his enjoyment of art possesses fundamental ethical 
significance. This was expressed in an earlier passage by 
saying that for those ideal projections which are essentially 
of the nature of mere phantasies, -- that is, they are divorced 
from the actualities of life -- he has come to substitute a 
practical or ethical ideal; and art is an important fountainhead 
from which inspiration is drawn in the projection and pursuit 
of this ideal. 
The meaning of a failure or an arrest of development 
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in this r:apect is now clear. Let us suppose that the conditions 
of real life make demands to which the individual cannot respond. 
serious misdirection of the course of development may occur. In 
passing, for instance, from the family circle to the school, too 
many new adjustments may be called for and called for too suddenly. 
Upon the failure of the child to adjust himself, there may super- 
vene a general mental withdrawal from the activities of real life. 
He may thus become engrossed in his world of phantasy and find 
a dangerously adequate satisfaction in it. Such is often, in 
all probability, the psychology of the child -- seemingly quite 
normal -- who holds aloof from the games and sports of his 
fellows and who -- his teacher will tell you -- is "really quite 
happy ". There is no need to suppose that he necessarily developes 
into a hopelessly incompetent adult. That probably happens in 
most cases is the development of an attitude which finds 
in the demands of real life only a troublesome distraction 
which should receive at the most but a necessary minimum 
of attention and interest. Clearly the growth of an attitude 
of this kind undermines in a fatal way the development that 
we found to constitute the ethical attitude. 
So far we have considered only a kind of process of which any 
psychologist must take account. The Freudians, however, go much farther 
than this in their treatment of phantasy. They not only stress the 
importance of phantasy satisfactions in the life of the child, but 
assert that these phantasies represent the expression and satisfaction 
lof special unconscious 'complexes'. We have, for example, phantasies 
expressive of the 'Oedipus' complex, the'Electra' complex, the 
Narcissistic complex. These complexes represent an emotional 
and conative organisation which has occurred below the level 
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of consciousnesJ, They right be described as tunconsious 
sentiments' except that this phrase only emphasises the emotional 
organisation and hardly brings out the notion of the unconscious 
conative organisation which seems to be implied in the complex.(1) 
It ,ould not be possible within the limifs of the present discussion 
to examine the evidence for the existence of such complexes. This 
would involve an examination of the entire Freudian position. On 
the whole, however, while it musi be admitted that the evidence 
adduced is impressive, the position must still be regarded as 
speculative. If we accept the Freudian account of unconscious 
complexes, we stand committed, it would seem to his view as to 
the predominating role which phantasy satisfactions play in the 
life of the young child. And this is a further point which, 
in the present state of the evidence, we find it difficult to 
accept. The point of view of the present essay, which has 
avoided as far as possible explanations of a speculative 
character, would attach much greater importance to the adolescent 
period with regard to the role of phantasy satisfactions. Our 
main reason for this would be not merely that the existence 
of such unconscious complexes is speculative, but also that the 
Freudians probably exaggerate the extent and seriousness of the 
maladjustments of infancy; while in the case of the adolescent, 
there is not only a greater a priori likelihood of serious mal- 
adjustment -- a point to which we would not attach much importance- - 
but, as a matter of fact, emotional disturbances and general 
maladjustments are distinctly in evidence at that stage. Moreover, 
inasmuch as the young child has not really achieved the distinction 
between the ideal and the real, his self- surrender to the it -usory 
satisfactions of the ideal can hardly be considered as other than a 
perfectly 
(1) For discussion of whole question of the relations of 
'complex' and 'sentiment', see Brit. Journal of Psych. Oct. 192 
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normal or natural mental phenomenon; while in the corresponding case 
of the adolescent, the line of demarcation, which had presumably been 
drawn, has been largely obliterated or at least rendered ineffective 
under the pressure of needs which have failed to find normal 
expression and satisfaction in the situations of real life. 
Hence that mental withdrawal) which we found to be fraught with 
baneful consequences for ethical development, would be more 
naturally associated with the later than with the earlier period. 
The psychologist may thus find certain fundamental concepts 
of the Freudian psychology extremely useful and suggestive in his 
account of many important phenomena associated with what would be 
described as normal mental life. Without committing himself to 
the distinctive theories of that school, he may adapt to his 
purpose certain terms Ouch as 'mental conflict', repression' 
dissociation' compensation' phantasy', and use them definitely 
to refer to certain processes plainly recognisable in everyday 
life, processes which may or may not be the superficial 
symptoms of more deep -seated activities in the unconscious. 
His acceptance of the latter hypothesis will depend upon his 
ideas as to what constitutes adequate evidence. 
Reference may again be made to a concept which is fundamental 
to our whole position and which is in full harmony 
with the general conception of the Freudians as to the 
meaning of sound ethical development. This is the concept of 
integration. In point of fact, it is our study of the operation 
of this principle in normal life that led us naturally to raise 
the questions considered in the present chpter. The notion of 
integration, as the essential fact of ethical growth d v o metrt, 
is of course nothing new in ethical theory. It is implied in 
the conception of the 'good' life as the life which is 'whole 'y 
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or chara.°terised by singleness of purpose in the broad sense 
that the isolated impulses have been organised and harmonised 
in the consistent pursuit of a personal ideal. It would be 
difficult to conceive of a more vivid justification of this 
conception than that which is afforded by the Freudian psychology(1) 
(1) c.f. Holt, The Freudian Wish,pp.198- -200. 
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C RAE T?R 12. 
MORAL DEFICIENCY. 
The object of the present chapter is to bring into line 
with our general position the problem of what may be called permanent 
moral deficiency. There is some difficulty in finding a suitable 
term to designate the individual who, owing to apparently 
irremediable defects of endowment,is not amenable or responsive 
to those educative influences which foster the growth of the 
ethical consciousness in the normal individual. The term 'moral 
defective' has been used although there are objections to the 
use of such a term. "'Mental defective' is a term already in 
recognised use to designate an individual who is subnormal in 
respect of mental endowment. The subnormality may be of a general 
or of a specific character, but, whatever be the nature of the 
defect, it involves the permanent inability to profit by the 
ordinary processes of training and education in order to adjust 
himself to ordinary environmental conditions. The use of the 
term 'moral defective' might convey the false impression that 
the problem with which we are concerned in the one case is 
independent of the problem raised in the other. The two problecls 
are best considered as standing to one another in the relation 
of genus and species. A main part of our contention has been 
that the problem of ethical growth involves somehow the question 
of mental development as a whole and, consistently with this 
general stand, we shall affiliate very closely to one another 
the problem of the mental and that of the moral defective. 
Lioreover, the problem now before us will offer a convenient 
occasion for summarising the general position taken up in the 
present essay. Wile ethical development has been treated as a 
function of general intellectual and emotionaln growth, peculiar 
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importance has been attached to certain special tendencies 
and capacities, inasmuch as they seem to condition in a 
fundamental way the final outcome of ethical training. Our 
discussion of the problem of moral deficiency will serve to 
illustrate our hypothesis with regard to the role of these 
factors. In these tendencies and capacities we would find 
the real meaning of that moral nature which the normal human 
being may be said inherently to possess. The enquiry of the 
present chapter has therefore a twofold interest, a theoretical 
and a directly practical interest. The theoretical interest 
consists in the fact that the enquiry will bring into closer 
range the question which Intuitionist ethics raises for the 
genetic psychologist. Recognising that there are different forms 
. 
inti-f7-444 
or interpretations of the Intuitionist theory al forms of the 
', theory would be at one in holding that there i some sense 
in which the categories of 'right' and 'good' are simple, ultimate, 
irreducible. In that case, the question is raised: when and how 
do they make their appearance in the child? At one point in our 
discussion direct reference was made to this problem and a 
il) 
line of solution suggested. But what appears to be the complete 
answer to the question (in so far as the psychologist as such 
can return an answer to it) is implied in our discussion as a 
whole. Here we are concerned rather to summarise what appear 
to be the essential preconditions of the apprehension and 
appreciation of those categories. 
Our discussion, then, really aims at offering some explanation 
of what is meant by this 'moral nature' which the normal human 
being is held to possess. But the explanation which we seek to 
offer is an explanation in psychological terms or from the 
psychological viewpoint. The fact of moral educability presents 
(1) See p.173. 
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the psychologist with a real problem, but the possibility of 
any fruitful discussion of it and the possibility of understanding 
the limitations of the psychological viewpoint itself, depend 
upon our putting the question in the right way. Consider, for 
example, the following statement of the issue: "passing now to 
a brief notice of the moral nature of childhood, I must first 
of all express my strong conviction, based upon observation as 
well as upon abstract reasoning, that moral ideas do not require 
to be created or implanted in the minds of children by their 
elders. Nothing is more certain than that the child is born 
potentially a moral being, possessing a moral nature which requires 
Only to be evoked and developed by environmental conditions. If 
this be not true then neither is it true that he is born potentially 
an active being, possessing a volitional nature which requires 
only to be evoked and developed by suitable conditions. If no 
amount of training can ever make a moral being of a dog, it is 
because he possesses no moral nature to begin with. If a child 
is capable of attaining to advanced moral ideas and distinctions, 
it is because he possesses at the outset a moral nature upon 
(1) 
which instruction and discipline can take hold." 
Now it is possible that this statement is meant to suggest 
that there are metaphysical implications involved in the mere 
fact of moral educability. If this be the writer's intention, 
then we do not deny that the statement possesses a real significance 
but a significance which the psychologist as such is not called 
upon to consider. Or, again, the statement may be the reflection 
of some theological prepossession about child nature in general. 
In that case it is equally outside the purview of the psychologist, 
Considered from the purely psychological standpoint, 
statements of his kind seem to be devoid of any real meaning. 
(1) Tracy: The Psychology of Childhood,p. 179. 
318 
For example, what meaning is to be attached to the phrase:: 
"potentially a moral being" What does this phrase tell us 
except that, under certain conditions of training and education, 
what we call moral behaviour normally appears? And this we 
C 
already know. Potentially a moral bein tells us nothing new; 
it simply reminds us that there is a problem. For some reason or 
other the child is capable of developing into a moral being or, 
in other words, he possesses "a moral nature to begin with." 
What, as a matter of psychological fact, represents this "moral 
nature to begin with "? Or, what test or criterion will enable us 
to say whether or not, in a particular case, the capacity exists? 
In so far as statements such as the above are intended to 
suggest that this latter question cannot be answered by the 
psychologist, then he must perforce reject them as misleading 
and unscientific. For he finds, as a matter of fact, that 
this same capacity appears to be wholly lacking in some cases. 
Examples occur of a thing variously referred to as 'moral 
blindness',' moral imbecility','moral deficiency', 'moral abnormality', 
and so on. His attitude to such cases, and, especially, the 
possibility of his usefulness to society in its attempts to 
deal with them, will depend upon his adoption of a truly 
psychological viewpoint at the outset. In the following pages an 
attempt will be made to point out precisely the lines along 
which the scientific investigation of such cases would proceed. 
The problem of an original moral nature clearly raises 
the question as to the facts of native endowment which affect 
fundamentally the moral development of the individual. Native 
endowment itself, as we found, is a complex affair and we found, too, 
that the problem of the congenital factors directly and 
fundamentally involved in moral development is far from simple. 
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We would expect, however, in the light of our entire discussion, that 
moral deficiency would somehow be a function of a number of factors. 
The various possibilities, with regard to the nature of such 
deficiency, may be stated as follows: - 
1. Deficiency in the equipment of instincts 
2. .abnormal strength of some special instinct or instincts 
3. Special deficiencies of representative powers; which 
deficiencies may take the form of 
(a) Incapacity to build up an ordered representative 
memory train 
(b) Incapacity to represent consequences of behaviour 
(Fundamental to (a) and (b) would be the incapacity to 
carry out processes of generalisation and abstraction.) 
(c) Incapacity to represent emotional experiences of others; 
i.e., incapacity for Reflective Sympathy. 
(d) Incapacity for'active sympathy ',:i.e., unresponsiveness 
to the feelings of others, the absence of any felt need to adapt 
or accommodate oneself to the emotional states of others. This 
does not necessarily imply any incapacity to apprehend others' 
emotional states. The failure to distinguish between (c) and (d) 
leads to a failure to discriminate between two very different 
sources of chronic delinquency. 
Needless to say, moral deficiency, as ordinarily considered, 
obviously means something narrower and more specialised than is 
implied in our notion of ethical failure as discussed in the foregoing 
pages. Such delinquency essentially concerns the individual's 
social reactions and, from the broader standpoint of this essay, 
would be described as the incapacity to achieve the necessary 
minimum of adjustment to a special class of values, namely, the 
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values of the social and group life. The present chapter is 
explicitly concerned with moral delinquency in the ordinary sense. 
If we consider fundamental those deficiencies of endowment 
which have been classified above, the general position might be summed 
tip by saying that, owing to the fact of the individual's deficiency 
in one or more of the capacities mentioned, society finds it 
peculiarly difficult or even impossible to foster in him those 
fundamental habitual attitudes, those habits of acting and judging, 
which moral education aims to create. 
What evidence can be adduced to shew that the psychological 
basis of moral deficiency is to be found in the defects of 
endowment which have been stated above? A consideration of the 
problem of delinquency as it presents itself to the authorities 
who have made a special study of mental deficiency in general, 
and an examination of their descriptive accounts of the typical 
or, at any rate, the frequently recurring cases, suggest clearly 
that the psychology of the problem is far from simple and that 
our analysis is at least on the right lines. We would refer, 
Lin particular, to the investigations of three authorities, 
Tredgold(1) Goddard( 
2) 
and Healy.3)Taking the accounts of these 
lauthorities as a whole, we find substantial corroboration of our 
broader notion of the psychological basis of moral deficiency. 
sense' 
Tredgold draws a distinction between the lack of 'the moral 
and the lack of what he calls 'wisdom'. (4) The latter 
means for him essentially the capacity to foresee consequences of 
behaviour hence the capacity for what is commonly called'prudential 
morality'. Defect in this direction is described in our statement 
(1) Mental Deficiency, ch. XVII 
(2) Juvenile Delinquency 
(3) The Individual Delinquent 
(4) Mental Deficiency,pp.358 -360. 
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as a fundamental defeat of the representative powers. Tredgold 
truly points out that the possession of 'wisdom' in this sense 
does not constitute the individual a moral individual in the 
strict sense although it may serve "to curb primitive instincts in 
such a way as to keep the individual within the codes prescribed by 
society.''(1) On the other hand, the absence of this quality 
will effectively preclude the possibility of any real moral 
development. In an abnormality of this kind, then,we would find 
one fundamental reason for the incapacity for moral education. 
Tredgold sums up the underlying causes of moral deficiency in thee 
words: "Misconduct my result from three abnormal psychological 
conditions. from the presence of morbid or abnormal impulses which 
directly lead to anti -social acts; from a defect of moral sense, in 
consequence of which the primitive moral instincts remain unneutralized 
by any consciousness of social obligations; from a defect of wisdom 
in consequence of which the individual is unable to utilize his 
experience so as to control and coordinate his behaviour to his 
ultimate advantage and well- being. "(2) 
With regard to the first condition, our own statement 
1 
represents this as (a) a deficiency in the instinctive equipment 
and (b) abnormal strength of some special instinct or instincts. 
It is well to recognise both aspects of the abnormality in 
instinctive equipment. The absense or marked weakness of a special 
instinct, such as curiosity, repulsion, or self- abasement, seems 
in many cases to be the determining factor. On the other hand, there are 
1 numerous examples of a failure of moral training which is traceable 
to an abnormal strength of a particular instinct, such as, the 
sex instinct3) The point here is that the individual is not 
(I) Opp. cit. p. 358 
(2) Ibid pp.359 -360. 
(3) c.f. Healy, The Individual Delinquent,p.534; also chs. XXIII et 
32 
necessarily lacking in the moral sense,which we discuss below and may 
be acutely aware of the seriousness of his seemingly unavoidable lapses. 
We have already commented on the significance of Tredgold's third 
condition, defect of 'moral sense'. 
Tredgold well describes what we may call the symptoms of this 
lack of moral sense, "As children they have been wayward, intractable, 
intolerant of all restraint and regardless of all discipline 
Some of them may have stolen, or have tortured dumb animals, or 
have been guilty of acts of violence, or cruelty to their younger 
companions. They have persisted in these things in spite of the tears 
and entreaties of their parents, and in spite of being punished, 
and they have done so simply because they have been unable to realise 
that these acts were wrong, simply because they had no moral sense. "(1) 
And again, "It is, however, usually after leaving school that this 
moral defect begins to attract serious attention and it then shows 
itself in the complete absence of any consideration for the rights 
or feelings of others, the total disregard of all authority, the 
absence of any real affection for relatives and friends, the utter 
incapacity to grasp any ideals of duty, honour obligation or 
patriotism, and the repeated commission of vicious and illegal acts. "(2) 
What kind of problem is raised for theoretical psychology by 
the abnormal behaviour thus excellently described by Tredgold? 
Clearly the question is: What is the precise nature of the deficiency 
here when it is reduced to its lowest psychological terms? To say 
that it is due to a "lack of the moral sense" does not in itself 
carry us far: it only indeed restates the fact that the individual 
is prone to perform a large variety of anti- social acts. In point 
of fact, we must here take exception, from a psychological stand- 
point, to one part of Tredgold's discussion of the whole problem. 
(1) Opp.cit.pp.366 -367 
(2) Ibid. p.367. 
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This is the part in which he suggests that the normal individual 
inherits -- in the strict biological sense -- an aversion to certain 
kinds of behaviour, that such an aversion has been'evolved' in the 
technical sense. The following statements show that such is really 
his view: "It is probable that primitive man had little, if any, 
moral sense. He was an egoist pure and simple." (1) "Since then 
it Ithe moral sense] has undergone a very great development, and there 
can be little doubt that it is to the gradual evolution of this sense 
that civilization as we see it to -day is in great measure, if not 
entirely, due. "(2) "It seems likely that, phylogenetically, moral sense 
was developed at a later stage than many other human instgpts, and 
there is no doubt that the degree of its present evolution varies 
very greatly in different races. Among many barbarous races, polygamy 
is a virtue, lying and thieving commendable acts, killing no murder, and 
torture, even cannibalism perfectly right and proper. The consider- 
ation and forbearance, the sense of right and justice of the 
English stock as a whole is to -day proverbial, and yet even in England 
it is only a few generations since it was considered perfectly 
right to torture and put to death those who held heterodox theological 
views, to burn so- called witches, and to hang the child who stole 
an article to the value of a few pence. The recent war has revealed 
the extent to which a whole nation, which has reached a high degree 
of intellectual development may still be behind in this respect. "(3) 
It is apparent from this last statement especially that 
Tredgold has lapsed here into a loose and vague use of the term 
'moral sense'. Surely the truth is that polygamy, lying, thieving, 
cannibalism, religious persecution, bui ng of witches, etc. could 
become recognised practices only because of the existence of 'moral 
sense'. the paradox is merely apparent. The quotation from Tredgold 
(1) Opp cit. pp. 354 -355 
(2) Ibid p. 355 
(3 ) Ibid pp. 355 -356. 
reminds us forcibly of the extent to which the individual's 
conceptions of what is "right and proper" are determined by the 
feelings and beliefs of his social milieu; the normal individual 
feels impelled to conform to these social values. Now, in the 
case of the particular individual who is lacking in moral sense, 
the conspicuous thing is somehow an original lack of this very 
sensitiveness which renders him capable, according to the'circum- 
stances of his training, of burning witches or of going himself to 
the stake for an ideal. Tredgold confuses here two very different 
questions. The first is a purely psychological question: in the 
case of the so- called "moral imbecile," what is the nature of the 
psychological defect which underlies the incapacity for moral 
education? The second question properly belongs to ethical theory: 
given human beings with a moral sense, what kind of conduct is 
approved by this moral sense when it has attained to the fullness 
of its development? The answer to the latter question would be 
doubtless determined by racial experience in some sense; but 
racial experience in this connection essentially means those ideas, 
beliefs or values which are transmitted by 'social' and not by 
biological heredity. Hence the customs described by Tredgold point to 
a faulty 'social' inheritance, a faulty moral 'education,' and not 
to weakness of moral sense in the fundamental meaning of that phrase 
which we are considering here. We do; not mean to deny that some 
biological variation occurs and is transmitted; but such knowledge 
as we possess concerning the nature of biological changes and the 
conditions of their transmission clearly discountenances as loose and 
vague the. idea of an inherited moral sense. 
On the other hand, in the case of the moral imbecile, a 
psychological defect exists and the defect is somehow a defect of 
inheritance. What is the precise nature of it? Tredgold himself 
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puts the matter accurately when he says: "In such cases we are 
compelled to assume a psychological defect, that they are lacking in 
the very germ of capacity, to develope moral sense. "(1) What, then, 
is this germ of cap:: city which is lacking? We have already admitted 
the possibility of fundamental defects of representative powers, such 
as are implied in the incapacity for what Tredgold calls 'wisdom' or merely 
prudential morality. The incapacity for moral education in the 
ordinary sense may indeed be due to a purely intellectual defect of 
a fundamental kind. Throughout our discussion of ethical growth, we 
have pointed out the basic part which is played the capacity for 
abstraction and generalisation, and we have shown how ethical 
development proceeds pari passu with the growth of the individual's 
powers in this respect. It has further been shown that the 
apprehension of ordinary moral standards implies a fairly high 
development of this basic capacity. Hence we find that'feeblemindedness' 
or general mental deficiency is associated with a distinct incapacity 
for moral'education' in the strict sense. Moral 'training' of a 
kind appears to be possible. That is, the feebleminded are capable 
of what might be described as a merely perceptual type of morality. 
By this is meant that the environment is made easy, the situations 
are simplified and limited in number. Habituation to this relatively 
small number of simple situations is possible. 
A fatal defect of another kind may be present, again a defect 
of the representative powers. We refer in this case to the incapacity 
for reflective sympathy, in our sense of that phrase. The individual 
may be incapable or, at best only very inadequately capable, of 
representing or 'understanding' the feelings of others. "But yourself 
in his place" would imply a mental act of which he is more or less 
completely incapable. The fundamental importance of the capacity 
(1) Opp cit. p. 356 (italics ours) 
which is lacking here has been fully explained in the foregoing pages; 
and doubtless many of the cases of moral deficiency illustrate a 
defect of this kind. 
At the same tire, it must be recognised that such cases do 
not exactly represent what the authorities have especially in view 
when they talk of moral deficiency. The typical case of the lack 
of moral sense appears to be that of the individual who is seemingly 
capable of apprehending the feelings of others but for whom those 
feelings possess no significance as conduct controls. There is no 
impulse to conform to or take account of the feelings of others. 
This might be expressed by saying that the capacity for 'active' 
sympathy is absent but, in point of fact, this way of expressing the 
matter fails to indicate the fundamental character of the defect; and 
a few further remarks are desirable. 
In Chapter VI, we discussed at some length the significance of 
a tendency in the human being to direct attention to the members 
of his own species and to find their behaviour in some way specially 
interesting and significant. We admitted, moreover, that the 
tendency may be, as Thorndyke asserts, original or innate, while 
we recognised also the possibility that it may be of the nature of 
a habit which has been very early established. In any case the 
tendency itself is a fact which we found to possess an altogether 
basic significance; for it is basic to the development of that 
sensitiveness to social judgments of value -- to feelings, beliefs, 
attitudes, etc., of the social milieu -- which we have found to 
underlie the entire ethical development of the child. Now the 
general nature at least of the abnormality implied in the lack of 
moral sense in the special meaning Dhich we are at cresent considering 
is clear. Owing to a defect of endowment the exact nature of which 
the neurologist or psychologist of the future may reveal ,the 
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the individual is lacking in this original responsiveness or 
sensitiveness to the social environment; and hence there is nothing 
T has Instruction and 
discipline 
on which, as Tracy put it, can lay hold in 
order to foster those habitual attitudes the development of which 
we have found to constitute the meaning of ethical growth. This 
is fundamentally what we mean when we say that the moral sense 
is lacking -- lacking, that is, to a degree that constitutes the 
individual a moral defective. It might be objected that our 
discussion adds nothing to the ordinary view which accounts for 
the moral defective simply by saying that there is a lack of the 
moral sense. The objection is not well- founded for two results 
of at least theoretical importance have been achieved, 
(a) We have indicated the original, fundamental character of the 
psychological defect implied; and this defect has been accounted 
for in a way that is consonant with the fundamental explanatory 
principles on which we have relied throughout our entire discussion 
of ethical development.. Our discussion, then, constitutes a warning 
against the wholly deceptive simplicity of the notion of " a lack 
of moral sense . "(1) , and 
(b) while admitting our ignorance of the ultimate basis of the defect, 
we have at least indicated the lines along which, it is permissible 
to hope, the neurologist and the psychologist of the future may 
cooperate to remove that ignorance. 
c.f. Interesting remarks of Healy. opp.cit. pp.782 -788. 
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